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ABSTRACT
The School of Graduate Studies
The University of Alabama in Huntsville

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Name of Candidate
Title
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Joshua Robbins

Discovery of Counter IADS Swarming Autonomy Behaviors with Machine Learning

Counter air-defense operations in highly contested airspaces pose significant risk
to human life and scarce material resources, making it desirable to reduce the exposure of
personnel to risk of loss of life and limb. Replacing human-piloted air platforms with a
swarm of low-cost, unmanned systems in the contest for air superiority is therefore an
area of intense interest. However, no doctrinal or tactical best practices for swarming
combat yet exist. This dissertation documents research conducted to develop a
systematical framework for discovery of counter-air defense tactics for unmanned aerial
vehicles under control of a cognitive agent, using a reinforcement learning approach.
Traditionally, counter-air-defense mission effectiveness is achieved through use of
weapons having a combination of high quantities, low radar cross section, high speed,
low altitude, and/or electronic attack. In the absence of any of these force multipliers,
cooperative swarming tactics can be leveraged to achieve mission effectiveness. This
domain presents a highly complex state-action space compared to other more constrained
rule-based games where artificial intelligence agents have been successful in learning
gameplay strategies. The approach taken in this research is to develop highly semantic
observation and action functions, interfacing the cognitive agent behavior function to the
gameplay environment, which is trained through repeated gameplay. Various designs of
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observation and action function for a cognitive agent are developed and analyzed and the
framework developed is used to facilitate the agent reinforcement learning as well as
evaluate mission effectiveness. The proposed framework is shown to be capable of
producing highly effective cognitive agents, learning swarm-enabled tactical behaviors
maximizing mission effectiveness and leveraging traditional optimizations where noncognitive agents are unable to do so.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the concepts of air superiority, air defense, and discusses
traditional and contemporary approaches that modern air forces use to defeat modern air
defense networks. The main hypothesis of the research is then laid out, followed by a
discussion of the organization of the rest of this dissertation.

1.1. Problem Statement
1.1.1. Air Superiority
The primary mission goal of the United States Air Force (USAF) is to achieve air
superiority as a precursor to all other joint combat operations [1]. The US Joint Forces
define air superiority as [2]
“... that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its
operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile
threats.”
The conflict to achieve air superiority in defended airspace presents significant
risk to life and limb of human personnel, as well as risk of loss of costly material
resources.
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1.1.2. Offensive Counter Air
Suppression (SEAD) or destruction (DEAD) of enemy air defense are offensive
counter air operations, which attempt to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade
surface-based enemy air defenses (ADs) by destructive (DEAD) or disruptive (SEAD)
means, in order to provide joint forces with uncontested access to the controlled airspace.
In addition to targeting AD sensors and weapons, DEAD missions also typically target
high value fixed-site ground assets such as [2]

1) Airfields and Operating Bases
a) Aircraft
b) Runways
c) Air traffic control
d) Hangars
e) Fuel storage
f) Shelters and personnel facilities
g) Maintenance facilities
2) Command and Control (C2) systems
a) Early warning (EW) systems
b) Intelligence gathering systems
c) Communication infrastructure
3) Weapons
a) Launch facilities
b) Storage facilities
4) Support Infrastructure
a) Power generation and distribution
b) Railways and rail terminals
c) Ports and maritime terminals

1.1.3. Defensive Counter Air
An adversarial AD system presents a substantial challenge to an airborne force
attempting to achieve the desired degree of air dominance in contested airspace. The
defensive counter air mission of the enemy integrated air defense system (IADS) is to
destroy, disrupt, or neutralize air and missile attacks, intelligence, surveillance, and
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reconnaissance collection, or other unauthorized penetrations of defended airspace.
Modern IADS have become increasingly complex and can vary widely in terms of
organization, sophistication, and operational procedures. Modern surface to air missile
(SAM) systems have been dramatically improved in both range and capability and pose
serious threats to US forces. Long-range SAMs are usually emplaced near high-value
assets to provide point defense coverage, while also effectively denying access to broad
volumes of airspace.
The distributed, layered, and interconnected nature of AD elements allows for a
defense in depth strategy, allowing for multiple engagements to increase the probability
of success. Many adversaries employ centralized C2 of AD activities, while others may
employ a decentralized system in which multiple nodes have the redundancy necessary to
direct part of or the entire IADS. Data infrastructure includes radio, landline (cable/fiber
optic), microwave, cellular, satellite, and Internet systems [2].
Figure 1.1 shows a conceptual IADS laydown, in which several long range SAM
(LRS) sites are deployed forward of two high value protected assets (PA) to form a
protected front. The LRS sites are supported by two early warning radar and command,
control, and communications (C3) sites, which provide an integrated situational
awareness of the defended airspace. Additionally, an LRS site is situated at each PA to
provide point defense. The orange wedges in the figure represent the weapon engagement
zone (WEZ) of each LRS.
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual IADS Laydown

Clearly, the IADS in this example is postured to defend the PAs against an attack
expected to originate somewhere to the south-east of the protected front.
Successful suppression of an enemy IADS can be achieved in a number of ways.
Jamming communication systems and sensors can provide short term local suppression if
sufficient, or as a temporary measure to achieve desired higher-order indirect effects.
Destruction of a C3 or EW resource, or forcing the enemy AD elements into autonomous
operations can sometimes result in a sufficient reduction in the level of threat presented to
friendly forces to obtain a required level of air dominance. Often, however, an AD site
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itself must be targeted for destruction if its autonomous operation capability continues to
represent a significant threat to friendly forces [3].

1.2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Swarm
Given the interconnected and layered nature of the IADS, the DEAD mission
requires a concept of operations (CONOPS) that addresses defensive weapons with
varied capabilities at various points throughout the contested airspace. There is rarely a
single point of failure available for exploitation. In fact, the IADS is designed to degrade
gracefully as AD elements are taken offline due to destruction, degraded performance, or
depletion of munitions. The fact that the AD elements contain advanced technology
weapons and sensors optimized for the defensive counter air mission and are backed by
human decision-making at all levels of C2, means that the DEAD mission can unfold in
ways that can be quite difficult to predict. Those factors, coupled with the high risk to
human life and scarce material resources, make it desirable to reduce the exposure of
friendly personnel and high cost air platforms to the risk of attrition in the conflict to
achieve air superiority. It is desirable therefore, to replace humans operating expensive,
manned air platforms with low-cost, unmanned systems in the contest for air superiority
[4].
A swarm of UAVs presents a unique set of characteristics that allows for a
different approach to the DEAD mission, compared to the traditional airborne strike
package. First, if the swarm is composed of a large number of units, it can achieve much
greater geometric diversity. The size of the swarm also allows for diversity in tactics. The
swarm is also robust to attrition: whereas the loss of a single manned platform in a strike
package could result in loss of human life, it also often results in a severely compromised
5

mission outcome. A UAV swarm can adapt to the loss of individual units by rolereplacement, adjustment of tactics, and adjustment of goals. Additionally, a swarm of a
large number of units is more adaptable to changing conditions due to the nature of the
swarm: the larger the number of units available to perform actions, the larger the number
of free variables available to achieve a favorable solution.
A swarm consisting of a large number of UAVs would be very difficult to
coordinate and control by a human operator, however, unless each was piloted
individually and remotely by a human operator. Even so, the latency and quality of the
data available to the operator may not be sufficient to fully realize optimal cooperative
behavior to support a dynamic DEAD mission. Linking a human pilot to a remotely
controlled UAV unit greatly increases the cost of the unit and therefore of the overall
mission. A large advantage of a (semi-) autonomous swarm is that the production and
operation cost is potentially far below that of a remotely piloted UAV swarm. Therefore,
at least at some level, the UAV swarm would greatly benefit from some type of
autonomous behavior.
Each UAV in the swarm is potentially capable of performing autonomous actions
based on its own observed information from the environment as well as information
shared with it by other members of the swarm. The problem of developing behavioral
algorithms for UAV swarm autonomy lends itself quite naturally to the domain of multiagent learning, especially cooperative multi-agent learning. Several techniques have been
considered in the literature to implement cooperative multi-agent learning: team learning,
hybrid team learning, and concurrent learning [5]. Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a
general approach to understanding systems through simulation of interacting agents.
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The complex, dynamic nature of the UAV swarm application to the problem of
the DEAD mission is sure to lead to the “emergent complexity” phenomenon that is well
known in multi-agent systems. This refers to the notion that with a large number of
agents interacting with one another, especially with agents on either side of a conflict, the
joint behavior of each team can be surprising [5]. Rather than view this as a negative side
effect, this research has shown this phenomenon to result in swarm agent behaviors that
are novel and informative, especially since no doctrinal or tactical best practices for UAV
swarm combat CONOPS yet exist in the DEAD mission domain.

1.3. Hypothesis
Excluding costly features like stealth, electronic attack, standoff weapons, and
severely asymmetric numbers, the primary weapon a UAV swarm can bring to bear
against an IADS is its ability to posture its various constituents throughout the contested
airspace dynamically, employing tactics that primarily modulate attack timing, tempo,
and geometric presentation.
The hypothesis of this research is that through use of ABM, novel cooperative
behaviors for UAV swarm agent behaviors can be discovered via machine learning (ML)
producing a cognitive agent that
1) demonstrate mission effectiveness (ME) in the DEAD domain
2) are equal-to or more-than effective than a “dumb” group of a much larger number
of units, such as a large of volley of conventional cruise missiles
3) are effective against a human-controlled adversarial IADS
Once UAV swarm agent behaviors are discovered that show success in
performing the DEAD mission against an IADS comprised of algorithmically-controlled
agents, the same swarm agent will be tested against IADS under human control, via the
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real-time strategy game (RTSG). This will allow for characterization of potentially subtle
swarm agent strategies and for evaluation of the ability of the swarm agents to adapt to
different and varying IADS defensive strategies.
A significant criticism of ABM for behavioral learning is that the behaviors are
learned using a simulation that may not be representative of real world effects, i.e., if the
simulated environment takes too many shortcuts or makes simplified or incorrect
assumptions, the behaviors that are learned will not have real world relevance [6]. A goal
of this research is to develop real-world applicable CONOPS in the UAV DEAD domain,
so this criticism is taken quite seriously. In order to overcome this potential shortfall, the
simulation environment that the ABM learning will occur in will take the form of a
RTSG. This provides a crucial check on the results of the UAV swarm learned behaviors
for several reasons:
1) The physics-based simulation of the DEAD mission is modeled to a high degree
of fidelity
a) UAV flight dynamics, flight endurance, probability of kill on various targets
b) AD sensor detection, tracking, measurement resolution, information sharing
c) AD missile interceptor flight dynamics, probability of kill on UAV
2) Various programmed agents may control either side of the conflict: UAV swarm
or IADS
a) This presents different tactics, doctrines, difficulty levels
3) A human player may control either side of the conflict: UAV swarm or IADS
a) This presents innovative, unpredictable behaviors for adversary
4) The gameplay (DEAD scenario) is highly configurable
a) This presents different levels of scenario complexity
5) The real-time strategy format enforces the timeliness of human decision making,
which is a crucial feature of the problem domain.
6) A very rich data set of state data is captured for each game session
The nature of the RTSG also presents various challenges, such as the elimination
of traditional turn-based gameplay. This means that the agent decision-making must
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occur in real-time, working from a continuously changing set of environmental input
data.

1.4. Organization of this Dissertation
This dissertation is organized in 13 chapters and 5 appendices. Chapter 2
discusses the concept of mission effectiveness and analytical approaches to predicting the
outcome of a mass-raid attack of air vehicles against a group of ground targets defended
by an advanced air defense network. Chapter 3 describes the agent-based simulation
approach taken to conduct this research. Chapter 4 documents the methodology used for
training the cognitive swarm agents, describes the simulation of the environment, agents,
and entities, and discusses existing literature concerning agent-based machine learning
and gameplay methodologies. Chapter 5 describes the background and development of
the design of the objective fitness function used to provide the reward in the
reinforcement learning process. Chapter 6 describes the kinematic model used for the
swarm unit. Chapter 7 describes the physics model used for the air-defense sensor and
weapons. Chapter 8 describes the design of the basic non-cognitive swarm agents which
are used to understand baseline mission effectiveness against the various air defense
agents. Chapter 9 describes the design of the basic air-defense agent logic which are the
adversarial agents against which the cognitive swarm agents compete in gameplay
training sessions. Chapter 10 documents the statistical mission effectiveness of the basic
non-cognitive swarm agents compiled through Monte Carlo analysis. Chapter 11
documents the design of various experimental cognitive swarm agents that were explored
in this research. Chapter 12 documents the analysis and evaluation of the highly effective
tactics that selected cognitive swarm agents learned. Chapter 13 concludes the
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dissertation, summarizing major and minor findings and proposes areas where
continuation of this work might focus.
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CHAPTER 2 ANALYTIC PREDICTION OF MISSION
EFFECTIVENESS

Mission effectiveness can be quantified as the total losses to the PA caused by the
swarm under defense of the IADS. The loss to the IADS, 𝐿, is a random variable. Even if
the actions taken by the IADS and the swarm units are deterministic, each SAM
engagement has a random outcome with probability 𝑃𝐾,𝑚 that the targeted swarm unit
was successfully killed, and each swarm unit engagement of a PA or IADS element has a
random outcome with probability 𝑃𝐾,𝑠 that it successfully destroyed its target (with itself
also being destroyed by the action regardless of outcome). The loss then, is the sum of
destroyed PA and the replacement costs of the IADS elements in the attack and the total
replacement value of the SAM rounds spent by the IADS in defense of the PA.
The loss 𝐿 is a discrete random variable, because each IADS element and PA has
an objective value, and at the end of the conflict, each will have been either destroyed or
preserved. Similarly, each available SAM round, having an objective value, will have
been either expended or not.
Mission effectiveness is defined here as the expected value of the loss 𝐿, with an
attack on a particular IADS configuration, under assumptions of IADS and swarming
strategies and total swarm size:
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𝑁

𝔼(𝐿) = ∑ 𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝐿 𝑛

(1)

𝑛

where 𝑝𝐿 is the probability mass function of 𝐿. Naturally, for any given IADS
configuration, 𝑝𝐿 must depend on many variables, the most important of which include
the IADS behavior function, the swarm behavior function, and the size of the swarm. The
distribution of 𝐿 can be computed analytically in a few narrow cases.

2.1. Analytical Prediction of ME
2.1.1. Engagement Efficiency
As a swarm unit closes the distance to its target over time, an ADS can engage the
unit multiple times. Since in reality each single-shot engagement outcome is uncertain
(𝑃𝐾,𝑚 < 1), the ADS might require multiple successive engagements to successfully
prosecute the target and protect the PA. The most difficult case for the swarm unit is the
one in which the ADS itself is the intended target for the swarm unit. This is because the
swarm unit is forced to continually close distance to the ADS, which both improves the
𝑃𝐾,𝑚 , and also increases the number of engagements it can perform.
The efficiency at which an ADS can engage targets with SAMs can be expressed
as a number of engagements per second. Normally, a threat ADS fires a multiple-SAM
salvo at a single target in order to increase the probability of kill, 𝑃𝑘𝑒 , over that of a single
SAM. Therefore, the rate-of-fire efficiency should be thought of as the number of
chances per second that the ADS has the opportunity to destroy a single unit in the
swarm.
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The efficiency at which it can prosecute targets is largely dependent on a few
parameters [7]:
𝑁𝑐 , the number of track channels
𝜓, the angular width of the ADS sensor field of view
𝑇𝐹 , the time of flight of the SAM interceptor
𝑀𝑠 , the number of missiles fired in each engagement (salvo size)

The number of track channels, 𝑁𝑐 , is the number of targets that the ADS is
capable of tracking and engaging simultaneously. For radar-based ADS, this number can
be greater than one when certain technologies are deployed such as phased-array
antennas (which allow the radar antenna beam to be steered electronically rather than
mechanically) and flexible radar resource scheduling.
The angular width of the ADS sensor field of view (FOV), 𝜓, is the maximum
angular displacement that a target may fall from the physical boresight of the sensor
aperture while the sensor is able to maintain its track of the target. For some optical
systems and radar systems using mechanically-steered antennas, this value is typically
small. On the other hand, the FOV of a radar system using phased-array antenna
technology can be quite large.
The SAM interceptor time of flight, 𝑇𝐹 , is the time required for the SAM to travel
its course to the target, starting at launch and terminating at “endgame” with a successful
kill or a miss. Alternatively, the ADS system may terminate the flight prior to endgame
for various reasons, resulting in a “drop”.
The salvo size, 𝑀𝑠 , is the maximum number of SAM rounds that may be
simultaneously guided at a given target track channel.
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The maximum rate-of-fire efficiency achievable for a SAM ADS system is
𝑁𝑐 𝑀𝑠
𝑇𝐹

𝜌=

(2)

and the single-engagement probability of kill, 𝑃𝑘𝑒
𝑀𝑠

𝑃𝑘𝑒 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝑃𝐾,𝑚 )

(3)

1

2.1.2. SAM Time of Flight
For a target at a distance 𝑅𝑜 from an ADS, moving with speed 𝑉𝑡 , the time of
flight for a single SAM flying out with constant average speed 𝑉𝑚 (Figure 2.1) can be
calculated:
𝑇𝐹 (𝑡) =

𝑅𝑜 + 𝑉𝑡 𝑡
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(4)

Figure 2.1: Basic Illustration of SAM Time of Flight Parameters

It is fairly obvious that the condition 𝑉𝑚 > 𝑉𝑡 must hold for a successful flyout to occur.
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Since the engagement capacity is limited by 𝑀𝑠 , the number of missile channels,
for a given track channel, and the previous SAM flyout must complete before the next
can begin, then the time-of-flight for any engagement depends on the time-of-flight of the
previous because the target range changes over the course of each flyout. This leads to a
discrete recurrence relation, where the 𝑛th flyout time in a series can be calculated. The
derivation of the time-of-flight recursion function follows.

2.1.3. Derivation of Time of Flight Recursion Function
As shown in Figure 2.1, a target, beginning at distance 𝑅0 , and having a speed 𝑉𝑡 ,
is intercepted by a missile, beginning at distance 0, and having a speed 𝑉𝑚 . The intercept
occurs when the distances of the missile and the target
𝑑𝑚 = 𝑉𝑚 𝑡
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑅0 + 𝑉𝑡 𝑡

(5)
(6)

become equal. Beginning at 𝑡 = 0, the time at which the intercept occurs is the time of
flight,

𝑇𝑓 =

𝑅0
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(7)

Beginning at any point after 𝑡 = 0, the target distance, 𝑅𝑡 , can be written as
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑜 + 𝑉𝑡 𝑡

so the time of flight, 𝑇𝐹 (𝑡), becomes a function of time:
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(8)

𝑇𝐹 (𝑡) =

𝑅𝑜 + 𝑉𝑡 𝑡
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(9)

The target is moving, so the time of flight of any given flyout will depend on the
time at which it starts (launch time). This means that the time of flight of a particular
flyout will depend on the time of flight of all previous flyouts going all the way back to
𝑡 = 0. This implies a recurrence relation for the 𝑛th flyout time.
To discretize the flyout events, let 𝑛 be the interval between the times 𝑡𝑛 and
𝑡𝑛+1 .
𝑅𝑜 + 𝑉𝑡 𝑡𝑛
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑅𝑜 + 𝑉𝑡 𝑡𝑛+1
=
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

𝑇𝐹𝑛 =
𝑇𝐹𝑛+1

(10)
(11)

Figure 2.2: Illustration of the Recursion Timeline

If there is a delay, 𝜏𝑠 , between the end of the first flyout and the beginning of the
next flyout, as shown in the above figure, then the time delay relates to the launch times
thusly:
𝑡𝑛+1 − 𝑡𝑛 = 𝑇𝐹𝑛 + 𝜏𝑠
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(12)

Solving for 𝑡𝑛 in terms of 𝑇𝐹𝑛 yields
𝑡𝑛 =

(𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡 )𝑇𝐹𝑛 − 𝑅𝑜
𝑉𝑡

(13)

Plugging 𝑡𝑛 and 𝑡𝑛+1 into the delay equation yields
(𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡 )𝑇𝐹𝑛+1 − 𝑅𝑜 (𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡 )𝑇𝐹𝑛 − 𝑅𝑜
−
= 𝑇𝐹𝑛 + 𝜏𝑠
𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑡

(14)

Solving in terms of 𝑇𝐹𝑛+1 yields
𝑇𝐹𝑛+1 = (

𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑡
+ 1) 𝑇𝐹𝑛 +
𝜏
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡 𝑠

(15)

This is the time of flight recurrence relation. The 𝑛th time of flight can be solved in a
closed form by solving the recurrence relation in terms of 𝑛.
First, for simplicity of notation, the following substitutions are made:
𝑦𝑛 = 𝑇𝐹𝑛
𝑉𝑡
𝑎=(
+ 1)
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑡
𝑏=
𝜏
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡 𝑠

(16)

𝑦𝑛+1 = 𝑎𝑦𝑛 + 𝑏

(19)

(17)
(18)

yielding

This is a non-homogenous recurrence equation, as long as 𝑏 is non-zero. Were 𝑏 equal to
zero, the equation would be homogenous. For 𝑏 to equal zero, either 𝜏𝑠 or 𝑉𝑡 would have
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to equal zero. Since 𝑉𝑡 equaling zero is not an interesting case (in fact, it would not be a
recurrence relation at all), the 𝜏𝑠 = 0 case will be examined for the homogenous solution.

2.1.4. Solving the Homogeneous Case
For the homogenous case 𝜏𝑠 = 0,
𝑦𝑛+1 = 𝑎𝑦𝑛

(20)

𝑦𝑛 = 𝑎𝑦𝑛−1

(21)

or equivalently,

The solution in terms of 𝑛 can be written
𝑦𝑛 = 𝑐1 𝜆1𝑛 + ⋯ + 𝑐𝑚 𝜆𝑛𝑚

(22)

where 𝜆1..𝑚 are the 𝑚 roots of the characteristic equation that represents the system:
𝜆𝑛 = 𝑎1 𝜆𝑛−1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛−1 𝜆 + 𝑎𝑛

(23)

and 𝑐1..𝑚 are coefficients which specify the general solution into a particular solution.
For this case the characteristic equation is (𝑛 = 1),
𝜆 = 𝑎1

(24)

𝜆1 = 𝑎1

(25)

which has a single root

So the general solution can be written
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𝑦𝑛 = 𝑐1 𝑎1𝑛

(26)

or, by substitution

𝑇𝐹𝑛

𝑛
𝑉𝑡
= 𝑐1 (
+ 1)
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(27)

To solve for the coefficient 𝑐1, boundary conditions must be used. The flyout time
of the first shot can be solved for since it does not depend on a previous flyout (𝑛 =
0, 𝑡𝑛 = 0):
𝑇𝐹0 =

𝑅𝑜
= 𝑐1
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(28)

Finally, the 𝑛th flyout time can then be written

𝑇𝐹𝑛

𝑛
𝑅𝑜
𝑉𝑡
=(
)(
+ 1)
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡 𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(29)

2.1.1. Solving the Non-homogeneous Case
The non-homogenous case is the more realistic case, when 𝜏𝑠 > 0. The recurrence
relation is written as
𝑦𝑛+1 = 𝑎𝑦𝑛 + 𝑏

(30)

𝑦𝑛 = 𝑎𝑦𝑛−1 + 𝑏

(31)

or equivalently,

This non-homogenous relation can be transformed to a homogenous relation of the form
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𝑥𝑛 = 𝑎𝑥𝑛−1

(32)

𝑥𝑛 = (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦 ∗ )

(33)

where

and 𝑦 ∗ is known as the steady-state value of the recurrence relation. The steady state
value can be found using the formula
𝑦∗ =

𝑏
1 − 𝑎1 − ⋯ − 𝑎𝑛

(34)

for this case,
𝑉𝑡
𝜏𝑠
𝑉
𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑦∗ =
= −𝜏𝑠
𝑉𝑡
1 − (1 + 𝑉 − 𝑉 )
𝑚
𝑡

(35)

Now, like in the previous example, the homogenous solution is found to the
relation
𝑥𝑛 = 𝑎𝑥𝑛−1

(36)

𝑥𝑛 = 𝑐1 𝑎1𝑛

(37)

as

and substituting back into the original variables:

𝑇𝐹𝑛

𝑛
𝑉𝑡
= 𝑐1 (
+ 1) − 𝜏𝑠
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
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(38)

Again, the coefficient 𝑐1 must be found using boundary conditions. The flyout time of the
first shot can be solved for since it does not depend on a previous flyout (𝑛 = 0, 𝑡𝑛 = 0):

𝑇𝐹0 =

0
𝑅𝑜
𝑉𝑡
= 𝑐1 (
+ 1) − 𝜏𝑠 = 𝑐1 − 𝜏𝑠
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑅𝑜
𝑐1 =
+ 𝜏𝑠
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(39)
(40)

Finally, the 𝑛th flyout time can then be written

𝑇𝐹𝑛 = (

𝑛
𝑅𝑜
𝑉𝑡
+ 𝜏𝑠 ) (
+ 1) − 𝜏𝑠
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡

(41)

It is evident that this result is consistent with the homogeneous case by simply setting the
salvo delay to 𝜏𝑠 = 0, which causes the expressions of 𝑇𝐹𝑛 in both cases to then be equal.

2.1.2. Solving the Time-Constrained Maximum Number of
Engagements
Now that a general expression for the 𝑛th successive time-of-flight value in a
series is known, it can be used to determine the maximum number of engagements that
are possible in a given time interval.
In order to find the number of engagements, 𝑁, that are possible before the target
reaches the ADS, one must use boundary conditions. Once the target has reached the
ADS, the distance to fly out, 𝑅𝑜 + 𝑉𝑡 𝑡 has naturally gone to zero. Using this knowledge
and using the 𝑇𝐹𝑛 expression:

𝑇𝐹𝑁

𝑁
𝑅𝑜
𝑉𝑡
=(
+ 𝜏𝑠 ) (
+ 1) − 𝜏𝑠 = 0
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
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(42)

This expression can then be solved in terms of 𝑁

𝜏𝑠
)
𝑅𝑜
+
𝜏
𝑠
𝑉𝑚 − 𝑉𝑡
𝑁=
𝑉
ln (1 + 𝑉 −𝑡 𝑉 )
𝑚
𝑡
ln (

(43)

A few observations of this expression can be made. Setting the salvo time delay
𝜏𝑠 to zero causes 𝑁 to go to infinity. This makes sense intuitively because if there is no
delay between shots, no matter how closely the target approaches the threat, a new shot
can be taken and will complete before the distance to go reaches zero. It is a slightly
modified restatement of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox [8].
Setting the target speed to zero also causes 𝑁 to go to infinity. This is also
intuitive because if the target is stationary, whatever the flyout time happens to be, there
is nothing to bound the number of engagements to be made with that time, allowing the
total time accumulated to go to infinity.
If the target is receding from the ADS location more slowly than the interceptor
flies out, (0 < 𝑉𝑡 < 𝑉𝑚 ), 𝑁 will go to infinity. Again, by allowing the total time
accumulated to go to infinity, there is no bound on the number of engagements to be
made as the range to go increases toward infinity.
If the target velocity equals the interceptor velocity, (𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑚 ), then 𝑁 is
undefined. This is the stale-mate scenario in which the target maintains the separation
distance from the interceptor and the interceptor can never catch up. Naturally, it is
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nonsensical to think of the maximum number of possible engagements in this situation
since the first engagement can never end.
If the target velocity exceeds the interceptor velocity, (𝑉𝑡 > 𝑉𝑚 ), then 𝑁 becomes
complex. This is the classic “tail chase” scenario in which the target is able to outpace the
interceptor. Naturally, it is nonsensical to think of the maximum number of possible
engagements in this situation since the first engagement can never end.
From this, it can be seen that 𝑁 will be real and finite if and only if 𝜏𝑠 > 0 and
𝑉𝑡 < 0.

2.1.3. Swarm Partitioning
It is important to note here that nearly all ADS engagement sensors use radar in
some fashion. Systems which use optical sensors for target tracking and missile guidance
exist and are common, but are limited to very short ranges and favorable weather
conditions compared to radar-based ADS tracking and engagement sensors. For longrange AD surveillance, there is no substitute for radar [9]. In either case, a tracking sensor
has finite resolution in the dimensions it measures the target states: range and angles for
3-D track, sometimes adding Doppler as a fourth dimension. A collection of small,
independent UAVs flying in a tight formation with a common destination would be
unresolvable in one or more measured dimensions to an ADS system unless it had some
high-resolution capability such as SAR or ISAR. These features are typically the domain
of target identification and discrimination rather than tracking and missile guidance [10]
[11].

23

If there are multiple units in the group, then even with a certain probability of kill,
(𝑃𝐾,𝑚 = 1), multiple engagements will be required to fully prosecute the target group,
assuming the individual units are spaced sufficiently to prevent a single SAM interceptor
from destroying more than one each shot. As long as the individual units in a group are
arranged compactly enough in space so as to fall within a single resolution cell of an
IADS sensor, then that sensor must consider the group of units as a single target. This is a
powerful feature the autonomous swarm can bring to bear against the IADS. In addition
to allowing a group to ingress further into defended territory, the true size and
composition of the swarm is obscured. For example, if a swarm of 20 units is grouped
into four groups of five units, to the IADS, it will appear as though there are four targets,
which require four or more SAM engagements to fully destroy.
A key tactical question that arises regards the optimal partitioning of the swarm.
A swarm totaling a given number of units, 𝑆, can be divided into a number of smaller
groups of varying sizes. Modern AD radars use multi-function phased array antennas
which enable them to track multiple targets simultaneously across a wide angular FOV.
The swarm controller could divide the swarm into enough groups to exceed the number
of available track channels than the ADS possesses. However, this tends to decrease the
size (number of units) of each group, which makes them more vulnerable to attrition
through SAM engagements. The problem for the swarm controller then becomes how to
best organize the swarm so that the maximum number of units reaches their mission
targets, while the ADS attempt to shoot them down.
The most difficult case for the swarm is the one in which the ADS itself is the
intended target for the group. This is because the swarm group is forced to continually
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close distance to the ADS, which both improves the single-shot 𝑃𝑘,𝑚 , and also increases
the number of engagements it can perform. Using (41) and (43), the number of total
engagements in a given period of time, e.g., from when the target is first detectable until
it reaches the ADS, is a function of several variables, listed in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Primary Variables
Controlled Variables

Uncontrolled Variables

Target speed, 𝑉𝑡

SAM interceptor speed, 𝑉𝑚
Initial range, 𝑅𝑜
Salvo delay, 𝜏𝑠
Number of track channels, 𝑁𝑐
Number of missiles in salvo, 𝑀𝑠

The only variable under control of the swarm is the target (group or unit) speed.
Clearly, in order to minimize 𝑁, the swarm controller could maximize 𝑉𝑡 and minimize
𝑅𝑜 . Classically, this has been the approach wherein attempts to minimize the initial range
have focused on decreasing detectability by decreasing target radar cross-section, radar
jamming, flying at low altitudes, and using local terrain to obscure detection, as in
designs such as TLAM, JASSM, and ACM [12] [13] [14], and attempts to maximize the
unit speed has been the classical solution as in designs such as TBMs and HARM [15].
This research offers a different approach and rather seeks to develop swarm tactical
behaviors to enhance swarm survivability and maximize ME.
In order to examine the sensitivity to ME on dividing the swarm into groups, the
assumption is made that for subdividing the 𝑆 units into groups, all the groups remain in
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the ADS FOV. Of course, moving the groups outside the FOV is a very viable swarm
tactic, but this analysis focuses on the capability of the ADS to engage multiple clusters
of targets in its FOV.
There are many ways to divide a swarm of 𝑆 units into 𝐺 smaller groups of
varying sizes. This problem is well known in mathematics as the Integer Partition
problem [16]. The partition function, 𝑝(𝑠), represents the number of unique ways an
integer 𝑠 can be divided into 𝑝(𝑠) parts. For example, the number 4 can be partitioned in
5 different ways, so 𝑝(4) = 5:






4=4
4=3+1
4=2+2
4=2+1+1
4 = 1 + 1 +1 +1

The value of 𝑝(𝑠) grows very large for relatively small values of 𝑠, and has no known
closed-form solution:




𝑝(20) = 627
𝑝(30) = 5,604
𝑝(60) = 966,467

2.1.4. Swarm Partitioning Within the Field of View
An example scenario is depicted in Figure 2.3 in which a single ADS defends
against an attacking swarm comprised of 8 units. The ADS has three track channels
available, each of which can support a two-missile salvo, with salvo delay of 10.5
seconds. The threat has a maximum intercept range of 208 km and a field of view of 61
degrees, shown by the orange wedge. The left half of the figure shows the swarm
partitioned into two four-unit groups. The right shows the swarm partitioned into four
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two-unit groups. Including those two configurations, there are a total of 22 different ways
to partition the 8-unit swarm into between 1 and 8 groups. For these examples, assume a
swarm speed, 𝑉𝑡 , of 300 m/s and an interceptor speed, 𝑉𝑚 , of 1000 m/s, and certain kill
probability (𝑃𝐾,𝑚 = 1), unless otherwise noted.

Figure 2.3: Swarm Partitioning Example Scenario

Partitioning the swarm into these configurations makes a difference in the
outcome of the scenario. As long as the ADS has enough interceptors in its magazine, all
the swarm units will be destroyed before they can reach the ADS, but the distance they
are able to ingress does depend on the swarm partition.
Assuming the first intercept occurs at maximum range, 208 km, 𝑁 = 11 salvos
are possible per channel before the target reaches the threat, which equates to a possible
total of 22 interceptors fired.
For a swarm of a single 8-unit group, the fourth salvo intercepts at around 89 km
from the ADS. A swarm partitioned into 2 4-unit groups, however, can only ingress to
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about 158 km from the ADS, and 4 2-unit groups can only ingress to about 160 km (these
ranges are the closest ingress range of the final remaining swarm unit). This is because
the ADS has three engagement channels available and partitioning the swarm into
individual targets allows the ADS to engage them simultaneously. Therefore the 8 unit
swarm is not expected to be able to ingress any closer than 89 km, no matter how it is
partitioned. This result, however, depends on the number of track channels the ADS has.
Figure 2.4 shows the ingress range vs swarm partitioning for an ADS with 1-4
track channels available.

Figure 2.4: Nearest Ingress Range vs Swarm Partitioning Example, Channel Multiplicity Effect

The most successful swarm is composed of 8 1-unit groups against the singlechannel ADS. This is because the 8 units must all be engaged serially, with the flyout and
salvo times accumulating. For the 2-, 3-, and 4- channel ADS, the best swarm
performance is a single 8-unit cluster (the 2 cluster case that has nearly the same ingress
range as a swarm composed of one 1-unit cluster and one 7-unit cluster). This is due to
the relationship of the swarm size to the number of ADS channels and its salvo size.
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When all 8 swarm units are grouped into a target for the ADS to engage, its channel
multiplicity is useless. Like the single-channel case, each engagement occurs against the
single target in a serial fashion, with each salvo of two SAMs eliminating two swarm
units.
Adding just a single unit to the swarm allows the nearest ingress range to jump to
66 km, from 89 km possible with the 8-unit swarm. Since a total of 𝑁 = 11 salvos are
possible per channel given the scenario, the total number of units in the swarm must be
increased to exceed that number before a breakthrough condition can occur. Figure 2.5
shows the marginal ingress range improvement with the addition of each swarm unit.

Figure 2.5: Nearest Ingress Range vs Swarm Size

The figure shows that a 22-unit swarm can ingress nearly all the way to the threat.
Adding any additional units to the swarm enables that many units to “leak” and complete
their mission. Also of note, is that marginal gains in ingress range must be accomplished
through addition of units in pairs, due to the threat salvo size 𝑀𝑠 = 2.
For the given parameters used to calculate 𝑁, a swarm of 𝑆 = 𝑁𝑀𝑠 + 𝐿 units are
needed to leak 𝐿 units to their mission goal.
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For the example outlined above, 𝐿 = 1 when 𝑆 = 23.
Reducing the threat salvo delay, 𝜏𝑠 to 5 seconds, yields 𝐿 = 1 when 𝑆 = 28.
Reducing the threat track channels, 𝑁𝑐 , to 1, yields 𝐿 = 1 when 𝑆 = 17.
The results of this example can be generalized into the following statements:
1) The optimal swarm strategy is achieved
a) Against an ADS with a single track channel
i) Partition into S 1-unit clusters.
ii) Ingress range gains are accomplished by adding units.
b) Against an ADS with multiple track channels
i) Remain in a single 𝑆 -unit cluster.
ii) Ingress range gains are accomplished by adding units in groups equal to the
ADS salvo size.
c) More units are needed to accomplish gains as the threat salvo time delay
decreases.

2.1.5. Swarm Partitioning Outside the Field of View
The preceding analysis assumed all the swarm groups were at all times within the
ADS FOV, and approaching with the same speed, starting at the same range. The
probability of success of a swarm can be improved if it is partitioned in such a fashion
that some groups are inside the FOV and some are outside, all else held constant.
Moving swarm groups outside the FOV effectively reduces the number of track
channels available to the ADS. Since the ADS can only track and engage targets within
its FOV, groups outside can continue to ingress unmolested while the ADS engages other
groups inside its FOV. The following analysis assumes the ADS can move its field of
view very quickly (by means of mechanically moving its phased array antenna to
reposition the electrical FOV), to cover one or more groups, but cannot widen its
electrical FOV.
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Figure 2.6: Nearest Ingress Range vs Swarm Partitioning Example, Angular Spread Effect

Figure 2.6 above shows the best ingress range of the 8-unit swarm against the
same ADS outlined in the first example. It shows the best ingress range achieved as a
function swarm partition, as in the previous example, but it also compares the progress of
the swarm when all the swarm groups remain in the ADS FOV (blue), vs when the
swarm groups are separated angularly around the ADS (red). The angular spread in this
example is 360 degrees. So for each partition configuration, each group is separated by
360
𝑔

degrees when ingressing toward the threat.
The figure reveals some interesting results. First, composing the 8-unit swarm as a

single 8-unit cluster is no longer the optimum partitioning strategy. On the contrary, it is
among the least successful configurations. The least successful partitioning strategy is the
6-group swarm partition, in which each cluster separated by 60 degrees around the ADS.
Since the ADS FOV is 61 degrees in this example, it has two groups trackable
simultaneously at all times, and can engage them concurrently, since it has 3 available
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track channels. Widening the group angular separation beyond the ADS FOV defeats the
ability of the ADS to engage multiple clusters simultaneously.
The most successful strategy is to begin with 𝐺𝑀 groups, each of which have a
number of units equal to 𝑀𝑠 + 1 (𝑀𝑠 being the ADS salvo size). The remaining units
should be divided into groups of one unit apiece. This strategy based on analytical results
is borne out in simulation.
𝐺𝑀 = ⌊

𝑆
⌋
𝑀𝑆 + 1

(44)

The groups should be spread in angles such that the angular separation of each
group, relative to the ADS, is greater than or equal to the threat FOV.
For this example, the most successful swarm partition strategy consists of two 3unit clusters and two 1-unit groups (since the example ADS has a salvo size of 𝑀𝑠 = 2).
The 4 groups are separated by 90 degrees and ingress all the way to 54 km, a significant
improvement from the best ingress range of 89 km in the prior example.
The total angular spread of the swarm will likely be constrained to less than 360
degrees for various reasons. If this is the case, the swarm is best partitioned into a number
of angular groups to ensure that the ADS can only engage a single group at a time:
𝜃 > 𝜓𝐶

(45)

where 𝜃 is the total angular spread of the swarm groups and 𝜓 is the angular width of the
ADS FOV, as shown in the following figure:
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Figure 2.7: Swarm Group Angle Separation Diagram

For our example, the 54 km ingress result can be achieved by the 4 cluster swarm
spreading over only 244 degrees. Here, the swarm is best partitioned into 𝐶𝐴 angular
groups
𝜃
𝐶𝐴 = ⌊ ⌋
𝜓

(46)

where the size (number of units) of each group is as large as possible.
To improve on the swarm performance from this point, additional units must be
added to the swarm. Figure 2.8 below shows the best ingress range achieved as the size
of the swarm grows. For each point, the best ingress range achieved across all possible
swarm partitions is plotted. The plot also includes the result from the previous section
with no angular separation, as a reference to compare against.
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Figure 2.8: Nearest Ingress Range vs. Swarm Size, Angular Separation Effect

With no angular separation, 22 units were required in the swarm before a single
unit was able to leak. Using a total angular separation of 244 degrees improves the small
swarm performance significantly, but only marginally for the large swarm sizes. Using a
total angular separation of 360 degrees marginally improves the swarm performance over
the performance using 244 degrees. 21 units are needed to leak a single unit using 244
degrees of separation, and 20 units are needed to leak a single unit using 360 degrees of
separation.

2.2. The Need to Go Further
The previous sections showed that for a single ADS, the ME of a non-reactive
swarm can be predicted analytically. The analysis can extend to the case in which there
are multiple AD systems co-located. Extending the scenarios beyond these simple cases
is beyond the capability of algebraic analysis for several reasons. Chief among them are
the target selection criteria, and launch criteria of the ADS, since those decisions of each
ADS unit will produce effects on the other ADS units. Similarly, if the swarm units
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behaviors are allowed to become more exotic than simply flying at a constant speed and
heading, the decisions that the IADS must perform as a whole becomes dynamic.
For these and other reasons, this research approaches analysis of this problem
through the entity-based simulation framework.
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CHAPTER 3 APPROACH

This section describes the ontological approach to the development of the ABM
RTSG that is the basis for the research. The ontology is developed from first principles,
as the basis for the research hypothesis.

3.1. Entity-Based Simulation

Entities

Entity
States
Properties

This is an Agent

Active

Inactive
This is an Object

Figure 3.1: Entity Definition

The entity is the basic atomic element of the ontology. An entity is simply an
inseparable and connected set of states and properties. In the RTSG model, an entity
represents self-contained instantiation of something physical. Properties are the various
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quantitative characteristics or attributes of an entity, e.g., the position, velocity, and
acceleration of a missile. States are the various conditions of an entity, described by a list
of properties, e.g., the kinematic state of a missile.
Agents and Objects are both sub-types of entities. Objects are physical entities
that cannot act upon their environment, but can be acted upon or affected by their
environment. Agents are physical entities that can act upon their environment, and can be
acted upon or affected by their environment.
Environment
Agent
States/Properties

Agent
States/Properties

Object
States/Properties

Object
States/Properties

Figure 3.2: The ABM Environment

The RTSG ABM environment is simply the collection of all extant agents and
objects, and the various rules which dictate their interactions and the ways in which states
and properties can change.
The rest of the RTSG ABM ontology is derived from these fundamental
definitions.
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3.2. Observation/Action Cycle
Fundamental to any implementation of ABM is the concept of an agent acting in
an environment. For this ontological development, the interaction of the agent with the
environment occurs in the Observation/Action Cycle. The agent observes various aspects
of its environment and performs actions on the environment, potentially changing certain
aspects of the environment or itself. This is the hallmark of a cognitive dynamic system
[17].

Figure 3.3: The Flow of Information into an Agent by Observations

As shown in Figure 3.3, an agent observes the environment, itself made up of the
other agents and objects, via its observation function. The actual quantifiable states and
properties of the environment are collected into a measurement. However, the agent does
not necessarily ingest those directly. Rather, the agent’s observation function maps the
measurements into perceptions, which are ingested by the agent.
This is analogous to various biological processes, such as the human eyesight.
The human brain does not directly observe light from the environment. Rather, cells in
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the retina respond to the presence of certain wavelengths of light by producing electrical
signals which are input to the brain. Other wavelengths in the environment are not
perceived at all due to the nature of observation function (the photo-sensitive cells). The
perception that the brain receives via the output of the observation function is a wide
spectrum of various colors and intensities of light, which are in fact combinations of
photo-cell outputs sensitive to three different wavebands in the visible spectrum.

Actions

Environment

Agent

Effect

States/Properties

Effect

Agent
States/Properties

Intent
Action
Function

Effect

Object

Agent
States/Properties

States/Properties
Action

Object
States/Properties

Effect

Figure 3.4: The Production of Effects on the Agent’s Environment by Actions

Just as the agent cannot directly ingest the values of the states and properties that
make up its environment, it likewise cannot directly change those states and properties.
As in Figure 3.4, however, an agent can produce intentions, which are mapped into
effects on the environment, by the Action function. An example to understand the
distinction between intentions, actions, effects, and environmental properties follows: A
person (agent) sits at her desk, on which rests (kinematic state) her coffee cup (an object).
She desires (intention) that the coffee cup accelerate toward the floor. Her hand pushes
the cup off the edge of the desk (action function) and gravitational attraction
(environment rule) accelerates the cup toward the floor (change in kinematic state).
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The environmental rules together with the agent’s action function, dictate what
effects can be produced on the various environmental states and properties (including
those of the agent herself). If, for example, the agent’s intention is that her coffee cup
change into a calculator, her action function and the rules that make up the environment,
do not provide a means for that intention to be manifested into the desired effect.

3.3. Behavior Function
Environment

Agent

Agent
States/Properties

Agent

Observation
Function

Behavior
Object
Action
Function
Object

Figure 3.5: The Agent’s Behavior Function

The Agent interacts with its Environment through its Observation and Action
functions. The Behavior function is what maps the various perceptions that the Agent
receives into intentions that can have potential effects on the environment states and
properties.
The goal of this research is to develop behavior functions for UAV swarm agents
that are novel, adaptive, and cooperative, and leverage the unique characteristics of a
UAV swarm to demonstrate success in the DEAD mission, without having to resort to the
use of stealth, EA, standoff weapons, or overwhelming numbers.
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3.3.1. Development of Behavior Function

Figure 3.6: Function Definition

A function is simply a mapping of elements from a set 𝑉 into a set 𝑊, as shown
in Figure 3.6. The sets 𝑉 and 𝑊 need not be similar in dimension or composition. For
example, the 2-norm maps N-dimensional complex vectors on to the real number line:

𝑛2 : ℂ𝑁 → ℝ
𝑛2 (𝑐) = √𝑐̅1 𝑐1 + 𝑐̅2 𝑐2 + ⋯ + 𝑐̅̅̅𝑐
𝑁 𝑁

(47)
(48)

The observation function maps a subset of elements from the set 𝐸 (environment)
to the set 𝑃 (perceptions).
The behavior function maps elements from the set 𝑃 (perceptions) to the set 𝐼
(intentions).
The action function maps elements from the set 𝐼 (intentions) to a subset of 𝐸
(environment).

41

Figure 3.7: An Agent’s Influence on its Environment, Functional Mappings

As shown above, each agent is itself a subset of the environment, so the collection
of all agents, 𝐴, is also a subset of the environment:
∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑎 ⊆ 𝐸 → 𝐴 ⊆ 𝐸

(49)

The agent’s behavior function determines how the agent interacts with the
environment. The perceptions and intentions, the inputs and outputs of the behavior
function, can be highly abstracted from the actual state and property elements in the
environment, i.e., they can be non-linear functions of those elements. As was discussed in
the earlier example, it is likely that the observation function can only create perceptions
acting on a subset of the elements in 𝐸, and the action function can only have effects on a
subset of the elements in 𝐸. It is also highly likely that these two subsets, 𝐸𝑜 and 𝐸𝑎 , are
not equal and perhaps contain few if any common elements.1
𝐸𝑜 ⊆ 𝐸
𝐸𝑎 ⊆ 𝐸
◇(𝐸𝑜𝑚 ≠ 𝐸𝑎𝑚 )

1

Here the ◇ operator means “it is possible that”

42

(50)
(51)
(52)

It is also highly likely that the domain of the 𝑚th agent’s observation function is
not equal to that of the 𝑛th agent, and likewise, that the range of the action function is not
equal to that of another:

◇(𝐸𝑜𝑚 ≠ 𝐸𝑜𝑛 )
◇(𝐸𝑎𝑚 ≠ 𝐸𝑎𝑛 )

(53)
(54)

In order for an agent, therefore, to have influence on elements in the environment
that are not in the range of its own action function, it must rely on other agents actions to
make those influences.
The hypothesis is refined, therefore, to be stated as follows: Given an
environment which accurately defines the physical rules and properties of UAV swarm
DEAD mission, and for an observation function and action function that enable swarming
behaviors, a swarming behavior function can be discovered that maximizes ME.
The behavior function that maximizes ME in this manner would necessarily
perform actions that inspire reactions of the other agents that are advantageous to itself.
When the other agents are adversarial, these behaviors are exploitative. When the other
agents are teammates, these behaviors are cooperative. The behavior function must be
capable of producing both cooperative and exploitative behaviors, therefore, since the
DEAD mission contains multiple agents on both sides of the conflict.
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Figure 3.8: Indirect Agent Influence

This is only possible when two conditions are satisfied. First, the environmental
parameters, 𝑒𝑘 , that agent 𝑚 intends to influence that are not within the range 𝐸𝑎𝑚 of its
action function are contained within the range 𝐸𝑎𝑛 of the action function of agent 𝑛.
Second, there are some number of environmental parameters in the range 𝐸𝑎𝑚 of agent
𝑚’s action function that are observable by agent 𝑛, i.e., in the domain 𝐸𝑜𝑛 of its
observation function.
An element of the environment can be observable by an agent:2
∀𝑎𝑚 ∈ 𝐴, ∃𝑒𝑘 ∈ 𝐸𝑜𝑚 → 𝑜𝑏𝑠(𝑎𝑚 , 𝑒𝑘 )

(55)

An element of the environment can be directly actionable by an agent:

2 Here the ∃ operator means “there exists”. The statement reads, “For all elements a m which belong to set
A, there exist some elements ek which belong to set Eom, defining the function obs(...)”
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∀𝑎𝑚 ∈ 𝐴, ∃𝑒𝑘 ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑚 → 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 (𝑎𝑚 , 𝑒𝑘 )

(56)

Further, an element of the environment can be indirectly actionable if it is
observable, it is directly actionable by another agent, and the other agent can observe an
element of the environment that is directly actionable by the first agent:

∀𝑎𝑚 , 𝑎𝑛 ∈ 𝐴, ∀𝑒𝑘 , ∃𝑒𝑙 : 𝑜𝑏𝑠(𝑎𝑚 , 𝑒𝑘 ) ∧ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 (𝑎𝑛 , 𝑒𝑘 ) ∧ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 (𝑎𝑚 , 𝑒𝑙 )
∧ 𝑜𝑏𝑠(𝑎𝑛 , 𝑒𝑙 ) → 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐼 (𝑎𝑚 , 𝑒𝑘 )

(57)

So, an element of the environment is actionable by an agent if it is directly or
indirectly actionable.
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 (𝑎𝑛 , 𝑒𝑘 ) ∨ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐼 (𝑎𝑛 , 𝑒𝑘 ) → 𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑎𝑛 , 𝑒𝑘 )

(58)

The domain of actionable elements in the environment, either directly or
indirectly, by agent 𝑚, then, is

{𝐸𝑎𝑚 ∪ {(𝐸𝑎𝑛 ∩ 𝐸𝑜𝑚 )|∀𝑎𝑚 , 𝑎𝑛 ∈ 𝐴, 𝐸𝑎𝑚 ∩ 𝐸𝑜𝑛 ≠ ∅}}

(59)

3.3.2. Machine Learning Approach to Behavior Function Discovery
This research uses a deep feedforward neural network to function as the UAV
swarm agent behavior function. By theorem [18], for any continuous function 𝐹, there
exists a finite, two-layer multi-layer perceptron (MLP) that approximates 𝐹 arbitrarily
well over the domain 𝑥, given that the neuron activation functions in the hidden layer(s)
are arbitrarily non-linear.
|𝐹(𝑥) − 𝐹̂ (𝑥)| < 𝜀
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(60)

The number of neurons in the hidden layer must increase as the approximation
error, 𝜀, decreases. Since an arbitrarily large, but finite MLP can be constructed to
approximate any continuous function over the specified domain, the feed-forward neural
network is considered to be a universal approximator [19]. Adding additional hidden
layers between the input and output layers increases the level of abstraction from the
input variables at each layer, and allows the width of the hidden layers to be reduced
[20].
For this research, it is taken as unknown what particular actions a swarm unit
should perform when given a certain set of perceptions from its environment. This is
primarily because swarm tactics, techniques, and procedures are not as yet standardized
in the UAV swarm DEAD mission problem area. This goal of this research is to discover
swarming strategies and tactics for use in the DEAD mission, rather than teach swarm
agents how to perform behaviors which implement known tactics.
For these reasons, some type of unsupervised online learning is required to train
the swarm agent behavior networks [19]. Here, the neural network is used as a means to
implement a highly non-linear function mapping various elements from the swarm units’
environment into particular actions to be taken by the agent. Since it is used as a means to
an end, and the function that it is approximating is truly unknown, it can be treated as a
black box, and the swarm behaviors, interactions, and overall ME can be used as the
metric for success, and as the objective function to drive the learning process.
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the technical methods by which the overall research is
conducted. First, the model of the environment is described, as implemented in the
RTSG. Next, the RTSG gameplay objectives are described, as well as the information
that each player has available and the controls. The scoring methodology is described and
finally, the methodologies used for training artificial intelligence (AI) swarm agents is
documented. The chapters that follow expand on details of individual components.

4.1. Environment Description
As described in Chapter 3, the swarm-DEAD environment model implements the
physical rules that dictate the how the states and properties of the various constituent
objects and agents can change. The environment model is a time-based simulation
wherein a single instantiation of a swarm-DEAD conflict scenario is played out. The
various types of objects and agents that make up the environment are listed below along
with their various states and properties.

4.1.1. AD Systems
The AD systems are the agents on the IADS side of the swarm-DEAD conflict.
Their states and properties include:
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States and Properties:
o Continuity:
 Active/Destroyed: All objects and agents have a single state of
being, either currently active or destroyed. All are initialized as
active, and once destroyed cannot be re-activated in a given
simulation.
o Kinematic:
 Position: The plan (East/North) position is fixed throughout the
simulation.
o Sensory:
 Instantaneous field of view (FOV): This state is composed of two
properties – the angular FOV and its azimuth offset.
 Sensitivity: The maximum range that a swarm unit can be tracked.
o Capacity:
 Number of track channels
 Salvo size
 Salvo time: The minimum delay that must expire between
consecutive SAM launches.
 Ready rounds in magazine
 Maximum intercept range
o Communicative:
 Own states: Each ADS can share its own internal state data with
the other ADS.
 Other ADS track files: Each ADS can receive position, velocity,
and engagement states of other ADS track files.
 Early Warning Sensor (EWS) tracks: Each ADS can receive
position and velocity states of swarm unit groups tracked by the
EWS.
Perceptions:
o Position, velocity, and continuity of tracked swarm groups.
o Position, velocity, and continuity of own SAM interceptors.
o Kill assessment: After each intercept, the ADS can determine if the swarm
group that was engaged has been destroyed.
Actions:
o Rotate FOV: The FOV can be rotated, clockwise or counterclockwise.
o Add a track: Swarm groups that are trackable can be tracked if an empty
track channel is available.
o Drop a track: Any active track file can be terminated.
o Fire a SAM: The target in any active track file can be fired upon, provided
 at least one ready round remains
 at least one missile channel is unoccupied by a current flyout
 the salvo time has expired.
o Share track file:
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The visibility function determines if a particular swarm group is trackable by a
particular ADS:
𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑡, 𝑠)
(𝑅 < 𝑅𝑡𝑟𝑘,𝑠 )⋀ (cos−1 (𝑢
⃑ 𝑡,𝑠 ⋅ 𝑣𝑠 ) <
= { 𝑡,𝑠
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

𝜓𝐹𝑂𝑉,𝑠
)
2

, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒

}

(61)

, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒

where 𝑅𝑡,𝑠 is the range from the target to the ADS, 𝑅𝑡𝑟𝑘,𝑠 is the ADS maximum track
range, 𝑢
⃑ 𝑡,𝑠 is the target unit position vector relative to the ADS, 𝑣𝑠 is the ADS antenna
position unit vector, and 𝜓𝐹𝑂𝑉,𝑠 is the angular width of the ADS FOV.

4.1.2. EW Systems
The EW system tracks all targets in the scenario and passes that information to all
ADS in the IADS. The EWS take no actions.



States and Properties:
o Continuity:
 Active/Destroyed:
o Kinematic:
 Position: The plan (East/North) position is fixed throughout the
simulation.
o Communicative:
 Continuity: Each ADS receives information regarding the
active/destroyed status of the EWS.
 EWS tracks: Each ADS receives position and velocity states of
swarm unit groups tracked by the EWS.

4.1.3. Protected Assets (PA)
The PA are passive objects and can take no actions.


States and Properties:
o Continuity:
 Active/Destroyed:
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o Kinematic:
 Position: The plan (East/North) position is fixed throughout the
simulation.
o Communicative:
 Continuity: Each ADS receives information regarding
active/destroyed status of each PA.

4.1.4. Swarm Groups
The swarm group is the level of agency on the swarm-side of the swarm-DEAD
conflict. When multiple swarm units are collected into a single group, they act as a single
agent with a single observation/action cycle. Groups are allowed to change their
constitution through means of the split and join actions. The swarm is the collection of all
groups. A group can consist of any number of units, from one up to the size of the entire
swarm.




States and Properties:
o Continuity:
 Active/Destroyed:
o Kinematic:
 Position: The plan (East/North) position is fixed throughout the
simulation.
 Altitude: The height above the ground.
 Velocity: The rate of change of the plan position and altitude
states.
o Sensory:

o Capacity:
 Number of units: The number of individual swarm units
constituting this group.
o Communicative:
 Other group states: Each group communicates its own states to the
other groups in the swarm.
o Lethality: 𝑃𝑘 = 0.85 against IADS components.
Perceptions:
o Disposition: The position of the IADS components are known to the
swarm.
o Tracking: By sensing the RF emissions of the ADS, the swarm group can
determine if it is being tracked by a particular ADS.
o Engagement: By sensing the RF emissions of the ADS, the swarm group
can determine if it is being engaged by a particular ADS.
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o Kill assessment: By sensing the RF emissions of the ADS, the swarm
group can determine if it has destroyed a particular ADS after each
attempt.
Actions:
o Select waypoint: set the plan position of the point to fly toward.
o Select speed setpoint:
o Select altitude setpoint:
o Attempt to destroy IADS component: Each swarm unit in each group can
attempt to destroy an IADS component when its group has closed the
distance to zero. Each unit has a 0.85 probability of killing its target. Each
attempt is taken in sequence, and the sequence stops when the target is
killed. If the group has at least one remaining unit, it continues.
o Split: a group with more than one unit can split into two groups, of equal
size. The new group acts as an independent agent.
o Merge: Two groups of any size can merge into a single group, provided
they are collocated. If they are not collocated, the merging groups will
select waypoints to arrive at a merge point automatically.

4.1.5. Unknown information
There are states and properties that are unknown on either side of the conflict. If a
state or property is unknown, it is because there is no means of directly measuring them
or receiving the information from another source. Some states and properties can be
inferred or at least bounded by various means (e.g., number of track channels, track
range, width of FOV). Some of these are discussed in Chapter 11. In any case, intentions
– by definition – cannot be known unless communicated.



States and Properties Unknown to the Swarm:
o Number of ready rounds: The number of rounds available to each ADS.
States and Properties Unknown to the IADS:
o The number of units in each group: A group of units is indistinguishable in
state space from a single unit.
o The total number of units in the swarm: Since the total swarm size is the
sum of the sizes of all constituent groups, the total number of units is
unknown.
o The swarm group’s target: While EWS and ADS have perception of the
current position and velocity of the visible swarm groups, their intended
targets or waypoints are unknown.
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4.2. SwarmCommand RTSG
SwarmCommand (Figure 4.1) is the RTSG developed to serve as wrapper to
encapsulate the swarm DEAD environment simulation and provide a graphical user
interface to provide real-time control and visual feedback allowing one or more human
players to interact with the simulation.

Figure 4.1: SwarmCommand Human Playing as ADS Gameplay Screenshot

SwarmCommand is a multiplayer game. Between one and ten human players may
choose to control agents on either side of the conflict. Any agents that are not assigned
control by human players are controlled by software agents selected by the game host
during setup. The software agents include the basic swarm and threat agents described in
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 as well as AI swarm agents described in Chapter 11.
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4.2.1. Game Lobby
Human players begin by either creating their own game scenario – thereby
becoming the host of their game – or by joining a game being configured by another
player on the same network. Figure 4.2 shows the Game Lobby window, in which a
player can select their screen name, see all other online players (if they have chosen to
show their availability), see some properties of their game configuration, and elect to join
one or create their own. Any number of games can be played simultaneously on a
network, and players may choose to come and go between games as often as they like.

Figure 4.2: SwarmCommand New Game Lobby Window Screenshot
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4.2.2. Game Setup
Game setup consists of defining the various IADS and swarm component
properties, their initial conditions, and assigning human or software control over the
individual agents. Figure 4.3 shows a screen capture of the New Game Setup window.

Figure 4.3: SwarmCommand New Game Setup Window Screenshot

The host player may individually parameterize all the individual game elements
or load them from a file (see section 5.3 Procedurally generated scenarios). The window
also shows a list of players who have joined the game, and which agent they have chosen
to play as – if any. Any agents, threat or swarm, which have not been assigned a human
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player are controlled by the default software agent, selected by the host. The game begins
once all necessary configuration is complete and the host pushes the Start Game button.

4.2.3. Display
For players controlling either ADS or swarm assets, the common information
displayed is











the current simulation time (black numerals in Game Control area)
the current swarm score in points (blue text)
the current IADS score in points (red text)
the reference East/North axes (gray lines with light blue labels)
the position and continuity states of
o the PA (green filled octagons)
o the EWS (red filled bowtie)
o the ADS (red hollow diamonds)
the position and continuity states of the swarm groups (blue squares)
the velocity vector of the swarm groups (green line)
current target tracks (bright pulsing red line connecting ADS to swarm group)
SAM interceptors in flight (orange x markers)

For players controlling ADS assets the gameplay screen appears as in Figure 4.1.
The information available to the IADS is







tracking FOV and range of selected ADS (yellow wedge)
WEZ of selected ADS (orange wedge)
Tracking FOV and WEZ of other ADS (gray wedges)
SAM magazine of each ADS (white numerals near each)
the currently selected target (rotating orange square)
the track elevation angle of the selected target (blue numeral)
For players controlling swarm assets the gameplay screen appears as in Figure

4.4. The information available to the swarm is





WEZ of each ADS (orange wedge)
the number of units in each swarm group (white numerals)
the currently selected group (rotating orange square)
the speed and altitude setpoints of the selected group (white numerals)
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the current fuel remaining of the selected group (white numerals)
the current waypoint of the selected group (pulsating + marker)
the waypoints of non-selected groups (gray + marker)

Figure 4.4: SwarmCommand Human Playing as Swarm Gameplay Screenshot

4.2.4. Controls
The players use the mouse and keyboard to control the agents actions and other
game features. Players controlling either swarm or ADS assets can:






move the screen viewpoint perspective (left-click and drag with mouse)
re-center the screen viewpoint (keyboard c-key)
zoom in/out screen viewpoint (mouse scroll-wheel)
pause/restart the game (Game Control on-screen button, only available in a singleplayer game)
stop the game (Game Control on-screen button)
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Players controlling the swarm can:











select a swarm group (left single-click with mouse)
de-select all groups (keyboard escape key)
select a second group for merging (right single-click with mouse)
assign a new waypoint for selected group (long right-click, drag, release with
mouse)
increase speed setpoint (keyboard d-key)
decrease speed setpoint (keyboard a-key)
increase altitude setpoint (keyboard w-key)
decrease altitude setpoint (keyboard s-key)
split selected group (keyboard j-key)
merge primary and secondary selected groups (keyboard m-key)

Players controlling the ADS can:









select a swarm group (left single-click with mouse)
de-select all groups (keyboard escape key)
cycle selected ADS for control (keyboard tab key)
de-select all ADS for control (keyboard escape key)
assign a new azimuth setpoint for selected ADS (long right-click, drag, release
with mouse)
add track of selected target (keyboard enter key)
drop track of selected target (keyboard delete key)
fire on selected track (keyboard space bar)

4.2.5. Objectives
Since SwarmCommand simulates the swarm-DEAD conflict, it is an
asymmetrical game in which the players on either side have different objectives. The
swarm objective is to simply maximize damage to the IADS components – the PA, the
EWS, and the AD systems. The IADS objective is to minimize the damage done by the
swarm.
The balance of the game – how easily one side can prevail over the other – is a
function of several factors. Primarily, as discussed in Chapter 2, asymmetry in unit
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quantities can easily tip the conflict in either direction. It is the nature of the conflict that
when the number of swarm units greatly outstrips the number of available SAM ready
rounds or vice-versa, the conflict is heavily asymmetric regardless of tactics employed.
The complexity of the IADS is a key driver in outcomes for a given swarm size. As the
complexity of the IADS increases, its total capacity for engaging targets increases
nonlinearly. When numbers of available swarm units and SAM ready rounds are more
balanced, the tactics employed by either side are much more influential in the final
outcome.
Provided no human player quits, the game is finished when either all swarm units
have been destroyed (having been shot down or crashed after expiry of remaining fuel) or
when all IADS components have been destroyed by swarm units.

4.2.6. Scoring
The game outcome is determined by the point balance at the end of the game. At
start, the game score for each side the sum total value of all entities. The IADS typically
has a much higher initial score as the various assets are very high value and the value of
the swarm units is comparatively low. The point value of the individual entities is
described in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The exchange of score is zero sum –
points lost by one side are gained by the other. This means that the maximum score
attainable by either side is fixed per scenario, depending on the quantities and properties
of the entities.
The point value for the IADS SAM ready rounds is accounted for at the start of
the game. The value of any IADS assets, once killed by the swarm, is transferred from
the IADS side to the swarm side. As SAMs are launched, their point value is transferred
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to the swarm score, since those are IADS assets that have been made unavailable. If the
SAM flyout ends in a successful intercept killing a swarm unit, the value of the swarm
unit is transferred from the swarm side to the IADS side. Likewise, the value any swarm
units that crash due to having expended their fuel reserve is transferred from the swarm
side to the IADS side.
The IADS maximizes its score by minimizing its losses; using as few SAM
launches as necessary to repel the swarm attack. The swarm maximizes its score by
trading the fewest swarm units possible for the most IADS components kills possible.

4.2.7. Data Recording
The entire state space of the simulation at each timestamp is recorded to a binary
file each game session. Additional metadata is recorded including a 64-bit UUID
identifying players (since their screen names are arbitrary, transient, and not necessarily
unique) associated with the particular game session and which software agents and their
versions participated.

4.3. Existing Research
In game-theoretic terms, SwarmCommand RTSG, and the underlying swarmDEAD conflict simulator, is a dynamic, continuous, simultaneous, non-cooperative,
asymmetric, zero-sum game in which players have incomplete information [21]. The
game-theoretic approach of analysis was discarded because strategies in the swarmDEAD domain are undiscovered.
Like most RTSG, the swarm-DEAD game presents the requirement for decisionmaking on multiple scales: players on both sides must make decisions taking into account
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possible future states (long-term planning or deliberative actions) and must make
decisions based on current states and actions of their opponent (short-term or reactive
actions) in order to reach their objectives.
Existing research in the domain of developing AI agents for gameplay can be
broadly grouped into two categories. The first is those in which a set of strategies is
defined a priori, like the game-theoretic approach, and the AI agent employs various
techniques to select the strategies to employ at any given turn or point in time. Examples
of this research are AI agents learning to play traditional human games such as chess, go
(AlphaGo [22]), and StarCraft (EISBot [23]) .
The second category is that in which the strategies is undefined a priori, and the
agent learns its strategies through reinforcement learning and self-play (AlphaGo Zero
[24]) and (AlphaStar [25]). Additionally, progress in multi-agent reinforcement learning
has been made in which multiple agents learn to cooperate to achieve common tasks in
small, well-defined gridworld environments [26].
There are several key differences in this research and those noted. Primary among
them are that the individual actions, not strategies, are being learned by the multiple AI
agents. Additionally, the number of agents extant in the game at any time can change:
decreasing by the merge action of the swarm, by insufficient economizing of time by the
swarm – running out of fuel –, and through attrition by actions of the IADS and
increasing by the split action of the swarm. Finally, the swarm agents operate in a
continuous state space and act over a continuous action space.
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4.4. AI Agent Design and Training Methodology
Stipulating that the swarm group agent behavior function is implemented as a
fully connected feedforward MLP, and that the actions available to the swarm groups are
rigidly defined, the agent development process consists of
1.
2.
3.
4.

Designing the observation function
Selecting the MLP hyperparameters
Training the behavior function MLP through gameplay against software agents
Analyzing and validating swarm agent learned behaviors
a. through gameplay against software agents
b. through gameplay against human agents

The methodology for training the behavior function was approached as an
optimization problem as in [5] [27] [28], operating on the MLP weights and biases and
other observation function-specific hyperparameters to maximize the SwarmCommand
game score. Two search-space optimization algorithms were investigated in this research:
genetic algorithm (GA) and particle swarm optimization (PSO). The following sections
specify the implementation for the two optimization algorithms used in this research.

4.4.1. General Training Parameters
Several parameters were used to tune the performance of any particular swarm
agent training trial. These parameters and their descriptions are summarized in Table 4.1.
In general, the parameters are used to control various aspects of the procedurally
generated scenarios that describe the constitution, configuration, and layout, of the IADS
that the swarm agents play against. The specifics of the scenario generation procedure are
described in Chapter 5.
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Table 4.1: Scenario Tuning Parameters
Parameter

Variable Name

Description

Complexity
Level Range

clRange

a 2-element vector of integers containing the minimum and
maximum Complexity Level values that can be used to generate
the random scenario for each training epoch, each ranging
between 1 and 11

Swarm Ratio

swarmRatio

a strictly positive value dictating the ratio of the number of
swarm units to the number of SAM rounds in each scenario

Group Size
Limits

clustLims

a 2-element vector of integers containing the minimum and
maximum number of swarm groups to initially partition the
swarm units into

4.4.2. Genetic Algorithm
The high-level flowchart for the GA used to train the swarm agent’s behavior
functions is shown in Figure 4.5. The parameters that are used to configure and specify a
particular GA training trial are listed in Table 4.2. One training epoch, or generation, is
the cycle beginning with the Evaluate Fitness block and ending in the Mutation block,
and then repeating in the next cycle. The “genome” that the GA operates upon to
optimize ME is comprised of the entire set of weights and biases that comprise the
artificial neural network (ANN), along with various extra parameters that may be used in
the particular agent’s observation function. The training session ends when the Ending
Criteria have been met and no further training generations are run.
Table 4.2: Genetic Algorithm Tuning Parameters
Parameter

Variable Name

Description

Population Size

popSize

the number of unique behavior functions trained in the trial

Mutation
Probability

mutProb

the probability of mutation for a single gene

62

Weight
Mutation
Variance

mutWtVar

the variance of the mutation effect for ANN weights

Bias Mutation
Variance

mutBsVar

the variance of the mutation effect for ANN biases

Extra Parameter
Mutation
Variance

mutEPVar

a vector containing the variance of the mutation effect for
each Extra Parameter

Initial Weight
Distribution

initWtDist

a 2-element vector containing the lower and upper bounds of
the uniform distribution used to initialize ANN weight values

Initial Bias
Distribution

initBsDist

a 2-element vector containing the lower and upper bounds of
the uniform distribution used to initialize ANN bias values

Initial Extra
Parameter
Distribution
Upper Bound

initEPDistUpp

a vector containing the upper bound for the uniform
distribution used to initialize each Extra Parameter value

Initial Extra
Parameter
Distribution
Lower Bound

initEPDistLow

a vector containing the lower bound for the uniform
distribution used to initialize each Extra Parameter value

Population
Selection
Fraction

selectFraction

the fraction of the population that is selected for genetic
crossover each training epoch (generation), having range [0.0,
1.0]

Use Uniform
Draw on
Fitness

uniformFitnessDraw

Boolean:

Parents Persist

parentsPersist



true: the individuals selected for crossover are
randomly selected with a uniform probability density
function



false: the individuals selected for crossover are
randomly selected with a probability density function
described by their proportional fitness

Boolean:


true: the individuals selected for crossover are
propagated unchanged to the next generation



false: the individuals selected for crossover are
replaced by crossover results in the next generation
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Selection

Crossover

Mutation
no

Evaluate
Fitness

Initial

Ending
Criteria
yes

End

Figure 4.5: Genetic Algorithm Flowchart

GA – Initialize The initialization process occurs at the outset of a training trial,
prior to evaluation of the first epoch. Here the population of agent behavior functions,
each comprised of the collection of ANN weights and biases and potentially some
number of extra parameters, is initialized using a random draw from a uniform
distribution. The bounds of the distribution for each parameter is controlled by one of the
variables described in Table 4.2.
GA – Evaluate Fitness This block is the heart of the GA. First, a random
complexity level is drawn from a uniform distribution, bounded by the values in the
clRange parameter. This complexity level is used to generate a random IADS scenario
(described in Chapter 5). The fitness of each individual swarm behavior function in the
population is evaluated by playing as the swarm agent controller in a round of
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SwarmCommand RTSG, the parameters of which are described by the IADS scenario.
The specified ADS agent logic controls the ADS assets in each match. The swarm score
gameplay outcomes are taken as the objective fitness function to drive the GA.
GA – Selection After the fitness of each individual in the population is evaluated,
some fraction of the total population is selected for genetic propagation. The list of
fitness values is sorted in descending order, and the individuals with the highest fitness
(ME scores) are selected for crossover. The number of individuals selected is determined
by the selectFraction parameter. Once the most-fit individuals (MFI) are selected,
crossover pairs are selected. In each pair, one individual is selected as “parent 1” and
another is “parent 2”. A single individual cannot be selected as both parents for a single
pairing. However, since a fraction of the total population is selected for crossover, a
single individual is likely to be selected as either parent 1 or parent 2 in multiple pairings.
The parents are randomly drawn from the pool of MFI with uniform probability if the
parameter uniformFitnessDraw is true. Otherwise, the pool of MFI is drawn from with
probability proportional to the individual fitness score. As the total population will be
replaced with offspring each generation, the number of pairings is equal to the total
population size. The exception is in the case when the variable parentsPersist is true. In
this case, the list of selected most-fit individuals will not be replaced by crossed-over
offspring, but will persist unchanged to the next generation.
GA – Crossover Crossover, illustrated in Figure 4.6, is the process of creating
the unique genetic sequence of a new individual given the sequences of its two parents.
First, the genotype of each individual in the set of parent pairs is generated, consisting of
three chromosomes. The first is the list of ANN weights. The second is the list of ANN
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biases. The third is the list of observation function extra parameters. Each is concatenated
into a single vector, the particular order of which is unimportant, but preserved. The
crossover process uses odd-indexing for each chromosome of parent 1 and even-indexing
for parent 2. The crossed-over chromosome generated for the new individual is the
resulting ordered mixture of genetic content, with half contributed by each parent in the
pairing. It is important to note that the odd-even ordering defines the parent 1, 2
relationship, but there is no other distinction made in the genetic sequence. A single
individual from the MFI list can, and likely will be, selected as parent 1 in a given pairing
and also as parent 2 in another pairing in a single generation as shown in Figure 4.6.
Somewhat less likely, but possible, is the event that two given individuals (i1 and i2 in
the figure) may be drawn for two pairings, with their parent 1 and parent 2 roles reversed,
as shown in Figure 4.6. In this case, the genetic material of the resulting offspring of the
two pairings (o1 and o2) would be unequal.

Figure 4.6: GA Genome Crossover Illustration

GA – Mutation The final stage of the GA generation cycle is mutation. There is a
small probability, given by the parameter mutProb, that each element in each
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chromosome of each offspring will undergo a small random change. In that case, the
mutated value of the chromosome element, 𝑐𝑖+1, is updated according to (62). The value
𝑚 is a normally-distributed random variable having variance defined as mutWtVar,
mutBsVar, or mutEPVar for the weight, bias, or the extra parameter chromosomes,
respectively.
𝑐𝑖+1 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑚

(62)

4.4.3. Particle Swarm Optimization
The high-level flowchart for the PSO used to train the swarm agents’ behavior
functions is shown in Figure 4.7. The parameters that are used to configure and specify a
particular PSO training trial are listed in Table 4.3. One training epoch is the cycle
beginning with the Evaluate Fitness block and ending in the Update Particle Dynamics
block, and then repeating in the next cycle. The “particle position” that the PSO operates
upon to optimize ME is comprised of the entire set of ANN weights and biases, along
with various extra parameters that may be used in the particular agent’s observation
function. The training session ends when the Ending Criteria have been met and no
further training generations are run.
This implementation of PSO involves the use of multiple local optima as
attractors. Each iteration, each particle’s velocity is computed as attracting in the
direction of the nearest (in the Cartesian distance sense) point having the highest ME
found so far. Each particle keeps a record of its personal optimum which also contributes
as an attractor. As in most PSO implementations, the attracting vectors are scaled by a
random coefficient each iteration to aid in the optimizing search.
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Table 4.3: Particle Swarm Optimizer Tuning Parameters
Parameter

Variable Name

Description

Population Size

popSize

the number of unique behavior functions trained in the trial

Number of
Local Optima

NO

the number of local optima to keep track of

Maximum Age
of Optima

maxAge

the number of iterations that any local optimum will persist
before being removed from list

Learning Rate

LR

a coefficient that controls the degree to which a particle’s
position may be changed by attractors, having range of
[0.0 1.0]

Velocity Decay

w

a coefficient that defines the first-order decay of the particle
velocity, having range of [0.0 1.0]

Global
Attractor
Coefficient

phiG

a coefficient that defines the degree to which a particle is
attracted to the list of global maxima, having range of
[0.0 1.0]

Local Attractor
Coefficient

phiP

a coefficient that defines the degree to which a particle is
attracted to its own local maximum, having range of
[0.0 1.0]

Low Velocity
Threshold

minVel

the lower bound on the particle velocity where a randomizing
stimulus will be added
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Figure 4.7: Particle Swarm Optimizer Flowchart

PSO – Initialize The initialization process occurs at the outset of a training trial,
prior to evaluation of the first epoch. Here the population of agent behavior functions,
each comprised of the collection of ANN weights and biases and potentially some
number of extra parameters, is initialized using a random draw from a uniform
distribution. The ANN weights and biases, along with the extra parameters, concatenated
into a vector, is the particle position vector for each particle in the overall population.
Additionally, each particle velocity vector is initialized to a random draw from a uniform
distribution.
PSO – Evaluate Fitness This block is identical in function as that in the GA
algorithm.
PSO – Update Optima The first stage of this block is to increment the age of
each entry in the local optima (LO) list, and to remove age-limited optima. After any
entry has been on the LO list for more than maxAge iterations, it is removed the list as a
valid attractor. Next, the list of fitness values for all particles is sorted in descending
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order. Each particles fitness is tested against its own personal optimum. If the new fitness
value is higher than the personal optimum, the current particle position is recorded as the
updated personal optimum. Additionally, if the fitness value is higher than the lowest
entry in the LO list, that entry is replaced by the particle position.
PSO – Update Particle Dynamics Updating the particle dynamics takes place in
three stages. First, the Cartesian distance for a particle’s position, 𝑝𝑖 , to each entry in the
LO list is computed. The LO list entry that is nearest the particle is selected as the global
attractor, having position 𝑝𝐺,𝑖 . The particle’s own personal optimum position, 𝑝𝐿,𝑖 , is also
an attractor. The particle’s velocity 𝑣𝑖 is updated as in (63), as a first-order decayed
response (with decay factor 𝑤), and attracting components scaled by uniformlydistributed random factors 𝑟𝑝,𝑖 and 𝑟𝐺,𝑖 . After the velocity update, if the magnitude of any
velocity vector component is below the threshold value of minVel, then a uniformlydistributed random offset is added to the vector. Finally, the particle position 𝑝𝑖 is
updated with the particle velocity and the learning rate parameter 𝑅𝐿 , as in (64).
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑤𝑣𝑖 + 𝜙𝑝 𝑟𝑝,𝑖 (𝑝𝐿,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖 ) + 𝜙𝐺 𝑟𝐺,𝑖 (𝑝𝐺,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖 )
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑅𝐿 𝑣𝑖

(63)
(64)

4.4.4. Check for Validity by Human Gameplay
After the particular behavior function has been sufficiently trained, its
performance is analyzed by examining the swarm actions through gameplay against
software- and human-controlled IADS. In games with simple and well-defined actions
such as chess or go, and when the game is symmetrical and training is performed through
self-play, this step is unnecessary. However, in this research, the training must be
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performed against software-controlled IADS agents rather than human agents due to the
large quantity of game session data required.
Gameplay against human-controlled IADS is an important check in the process
because it often reveals flaws in the logic of the IADS software agent the swarm AI agent
was trained against, because human players rarely make the same mistakes. In these
cases, some of which are documented in Chapter 9, the logical flaws were corrected and
re-training of the swarm agent was completed.

4.4.5. Analyze Robustness of AI Behaviors
The final step, after validating that the swarm AI agent has developed some
relevant strategy (and is not simply exploiting some yet-unknown flaw in the IADS logic
or environment model) the robustness of the strategy is tested by running the agent with
varying parameters, collecting ME statistics, and comparing them against the baseline
software agent performance. Some particularly useful metrics are the sensitivity to total
swarm size and the IADS complexity.
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CHAPTER 5 DESIGN OF OBJECTIVE FITNESS FUNCTION

This chapter details the design of the objective fitness function used to evaluate
ME. Maximization of ME is the objective used to train the swarm AI agents behavior
functions. It is crucial to developing relevant swarm behaviors that the appropriate
measure of ME in the DEAD context be captured. Of particular relevance is assigning
particular values to each of the various entities on either side of the DEAD conflict in
strategic and economic terms.

5.1. Modern IADS Deployments and Use in Conflicts
In order to assign values to the particular assets on either side of the DEAD
conflict and thereby quantify objective ME for evaluation and training AI agents, two
real-world scenarios are analyzed in which modern and state-of-the-art AD systems and
weapons were employed. The first situation analyzed is the build-up of a Russian IADS
at Khmeimim Air Base, Syria. The second is the 2019 UAS attack on Saudi Aramco oil
processing facilities.

5.1.1. Russian Build-up of Khmeimim Air Base Syria
As part of its intervention in the ongoing Syrian Civil War, Russia established
Khmeimim Air Base (KAB) at the Basel al-Assad International Airfield south of the
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Syrian port city of Latakia. Becoming active in September 2015, the strategic base is used
to stage air strikes on Islamic State targets in support of the Assad government [29].
As of November 18, 2015 the IADS at KAB consisted of four SRS sites
distributed around the airfield (Figure 5.1) (see analysis in Appendix B). Four SRS AD
systems, three Pantsir-S2 and 1 TOR-M1, were deployed to protect at least 36 aircraft.

Figure 5.1: KAB as of 18 NOV 2015, with Identified AD Sites

Shortly after activation of the base, a Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24
near the Syrian border in late November 2015. In response, Russia deployed a unit of the
S-400 LRS AD system to KAB, establishing a de facto no-fly-zone over virtually the
entire country of Syria and much of the eastern Medeterranian [30]. In addition to the S400, several short-range AD systems (Pantsir-S1/S2 and TOR-M1) were also deployed to
KAB, building up a layered AD network (see analysis in Appendix B).
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Figure 5.2: KAB as of 7 NOV 2018, with Identified AD Sites

Analysis of the satellite imagery shows that the Russian build-up of the base
continued through late 2018, to include construction of large aircraft parking aprons,
improvements and fortification of existing AD sites, construction of warehouses
surrounded by high earthen berms (likely to house SAM ammunition stores), construction
of aircraft shelters, and deployment of up to 50 aircraft.
Since January 2018, KAB has been the target of dozens of attacks from
adversarial groups in Syria using groups of UAVs carrying explosive ordnance [31] [32]
[33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39]. According to Russian government accounts, the UAVs
employed in the attacks are of an improvised nature, assembled from commercially
available parts, and are pre-programmed to fly to their targets using GPS navigation [33].
The Russian government further claims that the Pantsir and TOR-M1 systems have been
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effective in preventing any casualties or damage, effectively intercepting the UAVs
outside the borders of KAB at safe distances [33] [34] [35] [36].
With the S-400 providing long-range aerial coverage to Russia’s airstrikes, the
short-range AD systems serve three main purposes. First, as was the case prior to the S400 deployment and prior to the first reported UAV attack, they provide general AD,
protecting various high value assets such as the aircraft, personnel, equipment, and
maintenance facilities from air attacks. Second, they provide point defense of the various
S-400 components, being high value assets themselves. Third, they are likely subordinate
in the layered AD network to the S-400 C2 structure, engaging lower priority targets such
as the improvised UAVs where expense of using the S-400 SAMs would be cost
prohibitive. There has been no public reporting of the S-400 being fired in defense of
KAB.
The Russian build-up of KAB represents a clear case study in the allocation of
AD resources. With the establishment of the base and initial deployment of at least 36
aircraft to KAB, having a total replacement value of approximately $822.8M, the
investment was protected with AD consisting of four SRS systems, likely networked,
subordinate to common C2, with shared information from LR surveillance assets. After
significant expansion of facilities, deployment of the S-400 and at least 50 aircraft having
total replacement value of approximately $3.52B (see analysis in Appendix C), and
receiving continued and credible UAV attacks, the IADS was expanded to consist of at
least ten SRS systems and the S-400 components. The total estimated cost of the Russian
IADS pre- and post-deployment of the S-400 system is summarized in Table 5.1 (see
analysis in Appendix D). An assumption is made in the quantity of SAM resupply rounds
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furnished to KAB as no public information is available. The assumption is made that for
the SR systems, one-to-three full reloads per battery are supplied and for the LR system,
one-to-two full reloads are supplied.
Table 5.1: Estimated Deployment Cost of KAB IADS
SAM
Resupply
Rounds
Per
Battery

Battery
Unit
Cost

System

SAM
Ready
Rounds
Per
Battery

TOR-M1

8

8-24

23.66

Pantsir-S1

12

12-36

S-400

16

16-32

SAM
Unit
Cost

($M 2017 est.)

Deployment
Cost
($M 2017 est.)

Quantity
Batteries
Initial

Final

Initial

Final

0.196

1

4

26.80-29.93

107.18-119.73

10.63

0.357

3

6

57.59-83.30

115.19-166.60

767.00

6.560

0

1

0.00

976.92-1081.88

4

11

84.39-113.23

1199.22-1368.21

Total

This analysis shows that the Russian investment of 36 aircraft, totaling $822.8M
in replacement cost was protected by deploying between $107.2M and $119.7M in AD
assets at a time when the presumption of a successful air attack was low. Once the
probability of a credible air attack was presumed high and the investment of aircraft had
grown to 50 totaling $3.52B (0.22% Russian GDP in 20173) in replacement cost and
including the deployment of the S-400, between $222.7M and $286.33M in SR AD assets
were deployed to mitigate the losses to the $4.72B to $4.89B investment (up to 0.31% of
2017 GDP).
Total IADS investment cost prior to S-400 deployment is estimated to be between
13.0 and 14.5% of the total replacement cost of the PA. After the S-400 deployment, the

3

According to official GDP figures published by the World Bank
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total SR IADS investment is estimated to be between 4.6 and 6.1% of the cost of the PA,
whereas the LRS investment is between 27.7 and 30.7% of the cost of the PA. The SR
IADS investment is estimated to be between 20.6 and 29.3% of the deployed LR battery
cost.

5.1.2. September 2019 Attack on Saudi Oil Infrastructure
On September 14, 2019, Saudi Arabian state-owned Saudi Aramco oil production
infrastructure was attacked by a group of between 17 and 25 cruise missiles and/or
UAVs. The attack targeted two facilities, located at Abqaiq (7 Mbbl/day capacity) and
Khurais (1.5 Mbbl/day capacity) (Figure 5.3). Both plants suffered extensive damage
and were taken offline, reducing Saudi Arabian oil production by a total of 5.7 million
barrels per day, representing about half of daily total production and 5% of the global oil
supply. Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack, but both the Saudi
Foreign Ministry and the US State Department assigned blame to Iran, with Riyadh
claiming the attacks did not originate from Yemen. [40] [41] [42].
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Figure 5.3: Geographical Overview of September 2019 Attack on Saudi Oil Infrastructure

In the month leading up to the attack, the global price of crude oil averaged about
$62/bbl4 (Figure 5.4). Just prior to the attack, the Khurais facility represented $93M/day
of at-risk oil revenue, and the Abqaiq facility represented $434M/day of at-risk oil
revenue. With the sudden reduction of supply on the global oil market, a price shock was
seen as the Brent Crude level spiked to $71.95/bbl (19% increase). Shortly thereafter, the
Saudi government replaced the lost production capacity with supply from reserves,
stabilizing prices and locking in sustained losses [43].

Figure 5.4: Daily Price per Barrel of Brent Crude Oil, February to December 2019

4

Brent Crude benchmark price

78

The original production capacity had been restored by the end of November,
2019. It is estimated that the total cost of the oil reserves sold to offset the lost production
as a result of the attack is between $8B and $12B. Assuming the losses are proportional
to the nominal production of each facility, the losses due to the Khurais damages are
estimated to be between $1.4B and $2.1B and those due to the Abqaiq damages are
estimated to be between $6.6B and $9.9B. The cost of the required repairs to the facility
likely represent a small fraction of the total costs.
Analysis of publicly available satellite imagery (Google Earth) reveals the Saudi
AD posture just prior to the attack. As shown in Figure 5.5, two Patriot 3+ ADS batteries
located outside the Abqaiq facility were populated as of August 18, 2020 (about one year
after the attack), but as of August 17, 2019 (less than one month prior) only the eastern
site was occupied.

Figure 5.5: Geography of Abqaiq Oil Facility Patriot AD Batteries
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The six I-HAWK batteries situated along the east coast provide aerial defense to
the urban areas and a front of protection to inland sites from ingressing air attacks.
However, due to their limited range, the I-HAWK batteries WEZ does not cover the
Abqaiq facility. Additionally, since operationally the Patriot target engagement radar
(TER) 120 degree FOV is fixed (as it is primarily a missile defense system) [44], the
Patriot battery at Abqaiq was situated to provide aerial defense of the coastal area and
point defense of missile attacks originating in Iran from the north across the Persian Gulf.
(Figure 5.5) The Khurais oil facility appears to have no permanent local AD sites and
with Riyadh about 160 km to the southwest, and Abqaiq about 170 km to the northeast,
was outside the WEZ of any Saudi AD on the date of the attack.
With two Patriot sites available, an estimated battery cost of $281.6M and
estimated SAM round costs of $4.9M (PAC-2 GEM-T) and $8.4M (PAC-3) (see
Appendix D), the Saudi government was at least theoretically prepared to invest up to
$2.18B in AD assets to protect the Abqaiq facility, but appeared to have deployed a
single Patriot battery, an investment of between $399.2M and $483.2M, or between 4.0%
and 7.3% of the realized losses at that facility. The actual value of any defensive system,
however, is largely dependent upon the competency of its operators. According to
reports, the Saudi Arabian soldiers generally “[have] low readiness, low competence, and
are largely inattentive” [45].
The AD posture leading up to the attack is representative of the expectation of
attack by ballistic and tactical missiles originating in Iran, which was likely the highest
perceived credible threat to the facilities. In order to defend the sites against a UAV or
cruise missile attack, which can ingress toward their targets from any angle, the sites
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would need to be protected by at least three Patriot sites each to provide a 360 degree
WEZ, at an expense of at least $1.2B per site. This is perhaps why Russian President
Vladimir Putin offered5 the S-400 AD system for purchase to the Saudi government [42].

5.2. IADS Force Construction Model
With the two real-world AD events quantified in terms of the cost of IADS
deployed and the replacement cost of PA, a realistic IADS force construction model is
implemented. Based on the events analyzed, the empirical data for five scenarios is
presented in Table 5.2. The first three scenarios involve the IADS at KAB. The first is
the IADS deployed at KAB prior to the S-400 LRS deployment. The second is the IADS
at KAB subsequent to the S-400 deployment, excluding the value of the S-400
components (assuming the mission was installing the no-fly zone and not defending the
airbase). The third is the IADS at KAB including the value of the S-400 components
(assuming the mission including defending the airbase). The fourth and fifth scenarios
involve the IADS at Abqaiq, with all data equal except the total value of the PA varying
from the low- to the high-end estimates.
For the SRS at KAB (Tor-M1 and Pantsir-S1), four reloads is assumed per
battery. For the LRS at KAB (S-400) and Abqaiq (Patriot 3+), one reload is assumed per
battery.

It has been reported that this exchange was tongue-in-cheek and perhaps an attempt to “troll” the
American President. The proposed sale of the S-400 to Riyadh, however, had been discussed long before
the September 2019 attack [44].
5
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Table 5.2: Empirical IADS Configuration Data Summary
Parameter

Scenario
1

2

3

4

5

Number PA

2

4

3

1

1

Total PAValue ($M)

822.8

3520.0

3520.0

6600.0

9900.0

Value Battery 1 ($M)

23.66

23.66

23.66

281.6

281.6

Value Missile 1 ($M)

0.196

0.196

0.196

8.4

8.4

Quantity Battery 1

1

4

4

1

1

Quantity Ready Rounds Missile 1

8

8

8

16

16

Reloads Battery 1

4

4

4

2

2

Value Battery 2 ($M)

10.63

10.63

10.63

281.6

281.6

Value Missile 2 ($M)

0.357

0.357

0.357

4.9

4.9

Quantity Battery 2

3

6

6

1

1

Quantity Ready Rounds Missile 2

12

12

12

4

4

Reloads Battery 2

4

4

4

4

4

Value Battery 3 ($M)

767.00

Value Missile 3 ($M)

6.56

Quantity Battery 3

1

Quantity Ready Rounds Missile 3

16

Reloads Battery 3

1

Battery Value Subtotal($M)

55.55

158.42

925.42

563.2

563.2

Ready Rounds Subtotal ($M)

14.42

31.98

136.94

154.00

154.00

Reload Rounds Subtotal ($M)

127.65

318.30

232.86

347.20

347.20

Total IADS Value ($M)

127.65

318.3

1295.22

1064.40

1064.40

Fraction Total Value of PA

0.155

0.090

0.378

0.161

0.108

82

Using the five scenarios, with the estimates of the values of the PA and the AD
components, it is estimated that high value PA are protected by IADS having between
9% and 38% of the total replacement value of the assets under protection.
This analysis focuses on the objective value of PA in terms of replacement cost.
Of course, assets commonly under protection of IADS also have strategic value to the
interests of both sides of a potential conflict, but these values are subjective. If one side of
the conflict has an idea of the strategic value of a particular asset assigned to it by its
owner, then that knowledge can allow the belligerent to modify its own estimate of the
objective value of the asset in question.

5.3. Procedurally generated scenarios
The protection model developed above along with publicly available information
on the parameters of various AD systems (see Appendix A) provides the empirical
foundation for the scenario generation function (SGF). The SGF procedurally generates
configurations of the PA, the IADS components, and the swarm components, all of which
are used to populate the properties and initial states. The inputs to the SGF are a random
seed and a single-valued “complexity level” (CL). The CL, varying between 1 and 11, is
the control that determines how complex the scenario generated will be. The total number
of and value of PA, the number and capability of the AD systems all increase with
increasing CL. In Table 5.3, in the objective function analysis, and in the
SwarmCommand RTSG, all values are related as points rather than monetary units.
Based on the analysis of AD system costs (see Appendix C and Appendix D), a scaling of
$1500 per point was chosen, allowing the least costly AD SAM rounds to be represented
as small whole numbers.
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Table 5.3: Scenario Generation Function IADS Capability vs Complexity Level
AD Battery Capability Level

SRS 2

Total
ADS
Expected
Value

Fraction
Total
Value
of PA

CL

Number
PA

Total
PA
Value

1

1

50000

-

-

-

8

-

6374

0.13

2

1

50000

-

-

-

10

5

12393

0.25

3

1

50000

-

2

-

-

5

14292

0.29

4

2

100000

-

2

1

-

-

17022

0.17

5

2

100000

-

2

2

6

-

23634

0.24

6

2

100000

-

5

4

5

-

28027

0.28

7

3

150000

-

7

5

6

-

31232

0.21

8

3

150000

-

8

8

7

-

35387

0.24

9

3

150000

-

10

10

10

-

40254

0.27

10

3

150000

3

5

2

5

-

49122

0.33

11

3

150000

6

5

3

5

3

60822

0.41

LRS 1

MRS 1

MRS 2

SRS 1

The primary controlling variable for AD capability is its intercept range, the
maximum extent of the WEZ. Both the battery and SAM round unit costs increase as a
second-order polynomial function of the intercept range (Appendix D). The other major
parameters that vary with the AD capability, are the number of track channels, the
electrical FOV, and the SAM inventory of ready rounds (magazine). The higher the
capability of a given SAM, the higher its capacity for engaging targets over a wider and
deeper WEZ. The AD capability level in Table 5.3, varying between 0 and 10, is the
factor that scales each of the possible AD systems in a given scenario. The AD
parameters which are dependent on the capability level, per AD tier are summarized in
Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Upper and Lower Bounds of AD Parameters per AD Tier
Parameter

SRS

MRS

LRS

Maximum Intercept Range (km)
lower bound

5

20

60

upper bound

20

60

150

Number Track Channels
lower bound

1

2

4

upper bound

4

6

10

Field of View (degrees)
lower bound

45

60

60

upper bound

60

90

90

Magazine
lower bound

8

12

12

upper bound

16

20

32

With the PA values in Table 5.3 a function of CL, the AD capability level for
each AD tier was selected in order to result in a total IADS value that conforms to the
force construction model demonstrated in the previous section.
For a given input CL, the SGF generates the number of PA listed in Table 5.3,
with a 50% chance of a single additional PA. The SGF spaces each PA (green squares)
along a line, separated by 10 km, each with an additional normally distributed random
east/north offset having a variance of 40 km2 in both the east and north dimensions. The
list of AD systems to be generated is processed in descending order of tier and level as in
Table 5.3. The intercept range, number of track channels, FOV, and magazine are
determined by linearly interpolating between the upper and lower bounds of each
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parameter, each with an added offset which is uniformly distributed on [-0.5 0.5] km. The
maximum track range is set at 1.5 times the intercept range.
Each AD system is positioned relative to one PA, 10 km ahead of the protected
front, with a random offset in each north/east dimension uniformly distributed on [-1.5
1.5] km. Once all the PA have had an AD system assigned, any remaining AD systems
are positioned in echelon formation between the primary ADS and the selected PA,
creating a layered defense.
The EWS (red triangle) is situated at the geometrical mean position of all AD
systems, offset behind their line by 5 km, with an additional random offset in each
north/east dimension uniformly distributed on [-5 5] km.
Finally, all the IADS elements and PA are rotated about the origin by a random
angle uniformly distributed on [0 360] degrees.
The randomization for each scenario, in AD parameters, relative dispositions, and
of the geography of the protected front are necessary to the AI swarm agent training
process, and is discussed in Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY.
An example scenario (CL = 4) produced by the SGF is shown in Figure 5.6, with
the individual parameters summarized in Table 5.5.
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Figure 5.6: Example Output Scenario of SGF (CL = 4)

Table 5.5: Example Output Scenario of SGF (CL = 4) Parameters
Parameter

MRS 1

MRS 2

Maximum Intercept Range (km)

29

23

Maximum Tracking Range (km)

43

35

Number Track Channels

3

2

Salvo Size

2

2

Field of View (degrees)

65

60

Magazine

14

12

Points (battery)

9220

7800

Points (ready rounds)

3040

2320
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As in Table 5.3, with CL =4, SGF will produce one level 2 MRS and one level 1
MRS. Nominally, the level 2 MRS would have an intercept range of 24 km and the level
1 MRS would have an intercept range of 20 km. With the EWS having a fixed cost of
15,000 points, the IADS cost in this example totals 37,380, which is about 25% of the PA
point total (150,000), which falls in the bounds of the IADS construction model data.
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CHAPTER 6 UAV UNIT MODEL

The UAV is the basic unit of the autonomous swarm. For this research, the
capability of the swarm to achieve ME in the DEAD mission is dependent upon the
swarm unit behavior function to implement cooperative and exploitative actions rather
than to “outperform” the IADS via jamming, radar evasion by radar cross section (RCS)
reduction or terrain-masking, or reducing the interceptor 𝑃𝑘 through enhanced speed or
maneuverability. Since the strength of swarm derives from the cooperation of many units,
the unit cost should be low.

6.1. Low-capability Cruise Missiles
The most capable cruise missiles (CM) in western arsenals such as the TLAM
have ranges in excess of 2000 km and more than 2 hours of total flight time. They also
tend to have advanced capabilities such as terrain contour matching and digital scene
matching for extremely low-altitude guidance and navigation. These advanced weapons
tend to cost $1M or more per unit. However, less-capable CMs with range below 1000
km cost much less, in the range of $250k to $400k range per unit [46] [47].
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6.2. Performance Envelope
It is stipulated that the swarm unit have modest capabilities in terms of airspeed,
climb rate, acceleration, and turn rates, typical of a low-cost CM. Without further detail,
it is stipulated that the performance envelope of the swarm unit be limited to below 30 kft
(9144 m) altitude, and between 0.15 and 0.90 Mach airspeed. Additionally, the swarm
unit maneuverability is limited to a 3 g’s while turning, 0.5 g’s while linearly
accelerating, and 15 mps of climb or descent. Assuming that the swarm unit can maintain
some level flight configuration inside this envelope, the only detail necessary to this
analysis is the reduction in the swarm unit endurance as a function of altitude and
airspeed. The total endurance for a turbojet or turbofan aircraft is proportional to the
inverse of the drag force integrated over the change in weight [48]:
𝑊𝑖

𝑡𝑒 ∝ ∫
𝑊𝑓

1
𝑑𝑊
𝐷

(65)

To maximize endurance for a given quantity of fuel used, the drag force should be
minimized. In general, for a jet-powered aircraft, the rate of fuel mass consumption is
proportional to the airspeed and inversely proportional to the altitude. This relationship is
approximated with the parametric equation (66), where ℎ is the altitude and 𝑀 is the
airspeed Mach number.
̂̇ = 𝑎 − 𝑏ℎ + 𝑐𝑀 − 𝑑ℎ𝑀
𝑚

(66)

̂̇ (ℎ, 𝑀) over time gives the total fuel consumed. If the initial fuel
Integrating the 𝑚
mass is stipulated, then the parameters 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 in (66) can be selected to conform
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to the desired boundary conditions. The envelope boundary conditions selected are
summarized in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Fuel Consumption Approximation Function Boundary Conditions
Airspeed
(M)

Altitude
(m)

Endurance
(min)

0.15

9144

100

0.15

1524

60

0.90

9144

30

0.90

1524

20

With the initial fuel mass of 250, the desired endurance values at the edges of the
flight envelope are met with the parametric values set as follows:
𝑎 =4.556E-2
𝑏 =2.552E-6
𝑐 =1.963E-1
𝑑 =7.291E-6

A contour of the swarm unit endurance approximations function is plotted in
Figure 6.1, with the envelope overlaid in black.
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Figure 6.1: Swarm Unit Endurance Model Contour and Flight Envelope

The purpose of the endurance model is not to propose any specific design
characteristics on the swarm unit, since that is not the focus of this research. Instead, it is
intended to place reasonable bounds on the total time the swarm has available for its
mission as well as impose physics-based consequences for swarm behavior. Since flying
at higher speeds and lower altitudes both decrease the efficiency at which an ADS can
engage the targets, it is important to reflect the real-world costs of those particular swarm
behaviors. The effect is to force the swarm unit behavior function into balancing the
competing interests of economizing on endurance and maximizing speed and minimizing
altitude.
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6.3. Kinematic Model
A block diagram of the swarm unit plan kinematics model is shown in Figure 6.4.
The swarm plan kinematics are driven by the waypoint position and speed setpoints. This
models the swarm unit plan position, velocity, and acceleration vectors in <east, north>
coordinates. The altitude coordinate is controlled separately. Both the waypoint and
speed setpoint inputs create demands on the unit acceleration vector, which is integrated
to produce the velocity vector. The velocity vector is integrated to produce the position
vector, the offset of which is initialized at startup.
The plan kinematic model consists of two main control loops: the turn controller
(top half of Figure 6.4) and the speed controller (bottom half of Figure 6.4). The turn
controller takes the waypoint plan position vector as an input and produces the
acceleration demand proportional to the angular difference between the current heading
and the heading to the waypoint. A simple check is made to ensure that the swarm unit
turns in the direction producing the shortest maneuver. The magnitude of the acceleration
turn component is limited. The turn acceleration vector is produced by computing vector
components perpendicular to the current heading. This results in a constant-speed turn
having radius given by
𝑉2
𝑟𝑇 =
𝑎

(67)

where 𝑎 is the magnitude of the acceleration vector and 𝑉 is the current speed. The speed
controller also contributes to the acceleration demand, but the acceleration vector
components demanded by the speed loop are parallel to the heading and therefore do not
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contribute to turning the unit. The speed controller operates in two modes. The first mode
is a simple first-order loop with rate limited by the linear acceleration limit. This mode
operates as long as the distance to the waypoint, relative to the unit’s current position, is
greater than twice the shortest radius turn capable, given the current speed and turn
acceleration limit. This means that the swarm unit has enough space to turn and point its
heading at the waypoint without having to slow down or turn harder than the turn
acceleration limit.
If the waypoint is too close for the unit to turn toward without violating one of
those conditions, the speed setpoint is modified (slowed) to the fastest value that will
allow the unit to make the turn at the turn acceleration limit:
𝑉𝑆 = 0.5√2𝑟𝐺𝑜 𝑎 𝑇𝑙𝑖𝑚

(68)

The interaction of the two modes produce smoothly-varying turns which always
operate at the maximum turn acceleration limit. Figure 6.2 shows a plot of an example of
the swarm unit dynamic response to a sequence of four waypoint.
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Figure 6.2: Swarm Unit Navigation Example

The example shows the swarm unit position plotted as line colored by the swarm
speed, with the deep red corresponding to 300 mps and the deep blue corresponding to
235 mps. The input waypoint positions, annotated on the figure as WP1 through WP4,
are shown as black crosses, and the swarm unit positions at the time the waypoint input
changed are annotated as UP1 through UP4, shown as black circles.
Initially, the unit was near position <19 E, 65N> traveling at 300 mps toward
WP1. At the time UP2 the unit was near position <21.5 E, 61.5N>, and the waypoint
updated to WP2 having position <15E, 54N>. The swarm unit was able to make the
necessary turn at 300 mps to align its heading to the new waypoint without slowing, as
shown in the figure with the trajectory remaining the deep red color.
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At the time UP3 the unit was near position <16.5 E, 55N>, and the waypoint
updated to WP3 having position <19E, 56N>. With the new waypoint position less than 3
km directly behind the swarm unit, it was unable to make the turn at 300 mps speed
without exceeding the turn acceleration limit of 3 g’s. As the figure shows, the speed
controller adapted the speed down to as low as about 235 mps (the deep blue color) in
order to make the turn in the shortest time available, before accelerating back up to the
300 mps speed setpoint.
The swarm unit altitude kinematic model block diagram is shown in Figure 6.3.
The swarm unit altitude kinematic model is a simple first-order system to close the
difference between the current altitude and the altitude setpoint, with the rate of change
limited to the fixed value of ±15 mps.

Figure 6.3: Swarm Unit Altitude Kinematics Block Diagram
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Figure 6.4: Swarm Unit Plan Kinematics Model Block Diagram
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CHAPTER 7 ADS MODEL

Modern ground-based AD weapon systems are typically built around radar
technology for detection, tracking, identification, and SAM guidance. The long-range
surveillance, acquisition, and tracking functions are typically divided between individual
radar systems with features that are optimized for those roles. Often the tracking, fire
control, and missile guidance functions are combined and executed by a single multifunction radar. Since a multi-function radar must simultaneously handle target tracking
and missile guidance functions, often with multiple simultaneous objectives, they are
most often implemented using phased-array antenna technology, which allows rapid
electronic beam scanning over a wide angular FOV [11]. The two-coordinate scanning
phased arrays is a significant multiplier in the capacity for a FCR and allows wide-area
multitarget tracking and engagement. The FCR phased-array antennas are often mounted
on rotating platforms, which allow the WEZ to be rotated around a wide angular swath
[49].
For maximum flexibility in engagement over the WEZ, separate platforms launch
the SAM rounds vertically, which then maneuver into appropriate engagement
orientation, allowing for launch in any direction [7].
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Central to the IADS is the local C2 node, which exchanges data with external
surveillance networks and provides common air picture to the FCR sites along with target
assignments and missile launch authorization or commands [49].

Figure 7.1: Photograph of the Russian Barnaul-T AD C2 Operation Screen

Figure 7.1 shows the operation screen of a modern C2 node, with symbology
indicating the location of three subordinate FCR systems, their WEZ, and the local air
picture.

7.1. Performance Envelope
As described in Chapter 5, each ADS is characterized with several key
performance parameters, which are listed in Table 7.1. These parameters scale with the
performance level of the IADS.
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Table 7.1: ADS Performance Parameters
Parameter

Note

Maximum Track Range

Targets beyond this range cannot be tracked by the ADS.

Maximum Intercept Range

Intercepts beyond this range have a very near zero probability of killing
their target.

Minimum Intercept Range

Intercepts inside this range have a very near zero probability of killing
their target.

Field of View

Targets and interceptors outside this angular swatch cannot be tracked.
SAMs flying outside the FOV are terminated immediately. Tracked targets
flying outside the FOV are dropped immediately.

Number of Track Channels

The maximum number of simultaneous tracking channels available to the
ADS.

Salvo Size

The maximum number of SAMs than can be simultaneously guided to a
single target per track channel.

Salvo Delay

The minimum period of time after launch of a SAM that the ADS must
wait before firing the next, independent of track channel.

Magazine

The number of ready rounds available for firing for each ADS

SAM Speed

The average speed at which the SAM round flies toward its intercept point.

Each ADS is modeled as composed of a modern TER with a phased-array antenna
mounted on a mechanically rotatable platform.
The kinematics antenna pedestal are modeled as a simple first-order loop, as
shown in Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: ADS Antenna Pedestal Kinematics Model

The input to the controller is the demanded azimuth angle, relative to North. The
rate is proportional to the angular position error. The rate is limited to +/- 25 degrees per
second before integrating to produce the azimuth angle. The angle is offset by a value at
initialization. A correction is made to the sign of the rate demand to ensure that the
pedestal rotates in the direction that is angularly the shortest distance to the demanded
angle. If uncorrected, a situation can arise, especially in cases near the 0/360 degree
modulus point, where the loop will cause the rotation in the “long way around.” For
example, if the current pedestal azimuth position is +15 degrees, and the demanded angle
is +345 degrees. Instead of rotating by +330 degrees, it is more efficient to rotate by -30
degrees. This effect is also important in preventing situations which can cause target
tracks and active missile flyouts to terminate prematurely when the FOV rotates the
“wrong way” and the active tracks are moved out of the FOV.

7.2. SAM Guidance
This research is concerned with the gross performance of SAM systems rather
than any specific implementation – the sensing technology, guidance algorithms, warhead
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or kill vehicle properties, etc. Since the weapon engagement timeline is critical to the
analysis, the SAM flyout kinematics model is generalized to an energy-conserving
proportional navigation system ((69) through (72) [50]) with proportionality constant 𝑁 =
4 [51], which flies the SAM at a constant average speed to the target track plan position.
The SAM turning acceleration (orthogonal to the velocity vector) is limited to 30 g’s.
This is a typical value for SAM design to ensure intercept of aircraft with maximum
maneuverability of 10 g’s. With the swarm unit maneuverability stipulated to be 3 g’s or
less, the SAM will always be able to out-maneuver the target and reach an intercept [50]
[51].
𝑅⃑ = 𝑅⃑𝑡 − 𝑅⃑𝑚
⃑𝑟 = 𝑉
⃑𝑡 − 𝑉
⃑𝑚
𝑉
⃑𝑟
𝑅⃑ × 𝑉
⃑Ω
⃑ =
𝑅⃑ ⋅ 𝑅⃑
⃑
𝑉
⃑𝑟 | 𝑚 × Ω
⃑⃑
𝑎 = −𝑁|𝑉
⃑𝑚 |
|𝑉

(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)

It is not important to realistically model the altitude of the SAM flyout trajectory,
since the average SAM speed is used and since the swarm unit flight envelope is modest
in comparison with the capabilities of modern SAM systems, in terms of speed, altitude,
and maneuverability. Figure 7.3 shows a block diagram of the kinematic model of the
ADS SAM guidance and flyout.

102

Figure 7.3: ADS Missile Guidance and Kinematics Model Block Diagram
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Publicly available data for the maximum and average speed for several SAM
systems compiled in Appendix A. The average speed of a SAM is a function of its
trajectory to the target and its guidance scheme and the range and altitude at intercept are
the primary drivers of the average speed over the trajectory. The average speed data is
plotted in Figure 7.4, versus the maximum intercept range for the particular SAM. The
figure also includes a logarithmic fit to the data.

Figure 7.4: Average Speed vs. Maximum Range for Selected Publicly Available SAM Systems

The logarithmic fit is used to assign the average SAM speed for a particular ADS
system based on its maximum intercept range.
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7.3. Probability of kill
It is assumed that the swarm unit has no advantage over a modern SAM that could
reduce the probability of kill. In fact, as described in Chapter 6, the swarm unit flight
envelope is stipulated to be quite modest compared to any modern SAM. Therefore, it
must be assumed that as long as an intercept occurs inside the ADS prescribed WEZ, it
will result in a very high probability of kill.
The 𝑃𝑘 model for any SAM intercept – a one-time event occurring when the SAM
has closed the distance to its target – is taken simply as a function of the range from the
ADS at which the intercept occurs. Each ADS is characterized by two intercept range
parameters: the maximum intercept range and the minimum intercept range. These form
the boundary, along the FOV, of the WEZ, as illustrated in Figure 7.5.
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Figure 7.5: Illustration of ADS WEZ

For intercepts occurring between 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑡 , the 𝑃𝑘 is fixed at 0.95. Outside
𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑡 and inside 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 , the 𝑃𝑘 falls off exponentially with range, as illustrated in Figure
7.6.
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Figure 7.6: Probability of Kill Beyond Maximum Intercept Range Example

Each intercept has probability 𝑃𝑘 of killing a single swarm unit in the group that is
being engaged in the track channel. When the last unit in a group is killed, the track
channel is automatically reset, and any active SAMs flying out against that channel are
terminated.
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CHAPTER 8 DESIGN OF BASIC SWARM AGENTS

This chapter details the design of basic swarm agent behavior functions that are
used to baseline the ME of an AI swarm agent in an IADS. The level of sophistication of
a UAV swarm (of a given size) and therefore its expected value of ME can be thought of
as being determined primarily a function of two properties: its level of coordination
among constituent elements and its ability to react to events as the conflict unfolds. This
is shown conceptually in Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1: Basic Swarm Agent Levels

The levels of swarm coordination and reaction are defined as follows:
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Zero coordination: If a group of autonomous entities has no coordination, then it
is by definition not a swarm.
Level 0: minimum coordination, no reaction to events
o Each swarm unit (no grouping) selects its own target and route a priori
o Routing optimization attempts to maximize overall ME.
Level 1: minimum coordination, minimum reaction to events
o Level 0 plus: Swarm re-targeting and re-routing occurs when an IADS
target is destroyed.
Level 2:
o Level 1 plus: Swarm re-targeting and re-routing occurs when swarm
attrition occurs.
Level 3:
o IADS elements are prioritized for targeting.
o Level 2 plus: Swarm groups react to IADS events such as tracking and
engagement state changes.

With the preceding definitions, a volley of cruise missiles flying along preplanned routes toward their targets would represent a Level 0 swarm, in that the routeplanning happens a priori with no re-reouting or re-targeting possible, and the target
selection and route planning are based on the static initial conditions of the IADS and PA.
Example Level 1 and Level 2 swarm behaviors are designed algorithmically and serve as
baselines for swarm ME to judge the AI agent behaviors against. Since the Level 3
swarm behaviors must maximize long-term ME and react to changing environmental
states, they are the subject of the AI agent behavior research. The basic swarm agents
behavior function algorithms designed for this research are described below.

8.1. Basic SwarmBot Logic
The basic SwarmBot behavior functions used for this research are documented in
the flow charts in Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3. All three implemented basic swarm agents
use the same behavior function logic, with the difference being their reaction to
environmental events. All basic swarm bots have an update period of 5 seconds
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simulation time. Each update, the observation function is updated, which brings
observable information from the environment. For the basic swarm bots, this information
includes the total swarm size (number of units), the total number of swarm groups, the
positions and continuity states of all IADS elements, and the tracking status of all groups.
The total number of track channels per ADS is unknowable to the swarm, but the
logic requires an estimate. At initialization, the estimated number of track channels per
ADS is set to one. As the simulation evolves, if at any time a multiple swarm groups
report being tracked by the same ADS, and the number of groups is larger than the
estimated number of track channels for that ADS, then the estimate is increased to match
the number of reporting groups. This allows the swarm to adapt to new information as the
conflict unfolds.
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Figure 8.2: Basic SwarmBot Behavior Function Flowchart Page 1 of 2
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Figure 8.3: Basic SwarmBot Behavior Function Flowchart Page 2 of 2
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no

Likewise, the maximum tracking range of each ADS is unknown but must be
estimated. In a similar fashion, the swarm estimates the maximum track range of any
given ADS by remembering the longest range of any swarm group reporting a track state
from each ADS.
In addition to updating environmental states and making estimates of
unobservable properties, the observation function also provides state-change alerts, to
inform the reaction logic of the various swarm bots, described below.
Based on the analytical results from Chapter 2, the swarm partitioning strategy for
the basic swarm agents is divided into two cases. In the situation when there is a single
ADS defending one or more PA, the swarm should be evenly partitioned into a number of
groups equal to the number of PA. Otherwise, the swarm should be partitioned such that
each group contains a single unit.
The assignment of targets for the swarm groups likewise depends on the
composition of the IADS. If there are no PA but the EWS remains, then all groups will
target it. If only ADS remain, then each swarm group will target the ADS nearest to it.
If PA are available to be targeted, the strategy is split into two cases: single ADS
and multiple ADS. When a single ADS is defending the PA, the PA are prioritized for
attack by examining how many engagements the ADS could attempt at each swarm
group as it traverses its current position toward the PA. This calculation is made
analytically, similar to the one-dimensional formulation of (43), but does not have a
closed form in two dimensions. The algorithm pseudocode is listed in Figure E.1. The
vector of engagement opportunities per PA is sorted in descending order and the vector of
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swarm group sizes is sorted in descending order. Going down the sorted list, the largest
swarm groups are assigned to the PA with the most protection.
In the case where multiple ADS are defending the PA, each PA is examined to
determine which ADS is capable of protecting it, based on its intercept range and the
disposition of the PA relative to the ADS. For each ADS that is in range, the estimated
number of track channels for that ADS is totaled for each PA. This gives an estimate of
the amount of overlapping coverage for each PA (see reference illustration in Figure
8.2). Then the swarm groups are assigned to target the PA by taking each in turn and
assigning it to the least-allocated PA in the running total of swarm units allocated, up to
the desired number. If there are extra unallocated swarm groups at the end of this process,
they are allocated as equally as possible to all the PA.

8.2. SwarmBot0.0 (Level 0 Swarm Agent)
As a Level 0 swarm agent SwarmBot0.0 has zero reaction level, the attack plan is
determined a priori and is executed without regard to changing environmental conditions.

8.3. SwarmBot1.0 (Level 1 Swarm Agent)
As shown in Figure 8.2, SwarmBot1.0 reacts to certain changes in the
environment, but only regarding information observed about the IADS. When the number
of ADS or PA changes (usually because one was destroyed) or the number of estimated
track channels for one of the ADS changes, each swarm group re-evaluates the attack
plan and potentially selects a new target.
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8.4. SwarmBot2.0 (Level 2 Swarm Agent)
As shown in Figure 8.2, SwarmBot2.0 reacts to certain changes in the
environment regarding information observed about the IADS as well as information
about the swarm composition as well. In addition to same IADS properties that cause
SwarmBot1.0 groups to re-evaluate their attack plan, SwarmBot2.0 also re-evaluates
when the total number of swarm units changes (through attrition) or when the number of
swarm groups changes (through split or merge actions).
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CHAPTER 9 DESIGN OF BASIC ADS AGENTS

This chapter details the design of basic ADS agent behavior functions that are
used in the training of the AI swarm agents. In addition to the technical capabilities of the
individual ADS units the level of capability of an IADS to counter air threats is defined in
large part by the operations of the ADS units themselves, working together. Modern ADS
operations are typically undertaken by human operators who undergo extensive training
to counter a variety of air threats in different scenarios [7] [52], however, more tasks are
being automated at the C2 and FCR level as time progresses [9] [11].
As discussed in Chapter 2, the capacity for a single ADS can be examined
analytically, but in the case of grouped ADS working together to repel an attack of a
large number of air threats, the strategies for pairing targets to weapon systems becomes
just as important in determining the outcome of the attack.

9.1. The Weapon-Target Allocation Problem
The Weapon-Target Allocation (WTA) problem is known to be NP-Complete and
has been the subject of theoretical and heuristic development focusing primarily on the
missile defense case. Work has been done to extend the problem to a dynamic framework
in which a shoot-look-shoot strategy is developed [53] [54] [55]. Like the missile defense
case, the UAV swarm WTA problem must seek to maximize the expected success of
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interception by paring available weapon inventories to the targets in the scenario, with the
various weapon and target pairing having some predictable probability of kill, usually
based on the target trajectory and some weapon characteristics.
The UAV swarm defense case presents various complications to the WTA
problem that are not present in the missile defense case. Primarily, since the swarm is
able to partition itself into groups of various sizes which are unknown to the IADS, the
single-shot probability of kill against any group is unknown. Also, unlike the missile
defense case, the swarm targets are reactive and cooperative, forcing the IADS
continually re-evaluate its WTA solution. Additionally, the antenna FOV variable is
completely disregarded from the missile defense case, but is a crucial element in the
UAV swarm case, as real-world events have demonstrated.
The level of integration of the IADS elements can be thought of as being
determined primarily a function of two properties: its level of coordination among
constituent elements and its level of information sharing. This is shown conceptually in
Figure 9.1.
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Figure 9.1: Basic ADS Agent Levels

The levels of IADS coordination and information sharing are defined as follows:







Zero information sharing: If a group of AD systems has no information sharing,
either among elements or from common superior elements, then it is by definition
not an IADS.
Level 0 (not an IADS): no coordination, no information sharing
o Each ADS has only its own local air picture.
o Each ADS makes engagement decisions without regard to the others.
Level 1: no coordination, minimum information sharing
o Each ADS receives the common air picture.
o Each ADS makes engagement decisions without regard to the others.
Level 2: low coordination, moderate information sharing
o Each ADS receives the common air picture and the engagement selections
of the other ADS.
o Each ADS makes engagement decisions taking into account states of other
ADS.
Level 3: high coordination, high information sharing
o A centralized engagement planner receives the common air picture, the
current tracking and engagement states and SAM inventories of all ADS.
o The centralized engagement planner makes target engagement
assignments for each ADS.
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With the preceding definitions, the WTA heuristics described in the literature is
representative of Level 3 IADS behaviors, in which the engagement assignments are
made by a single algorithm taking into account all relevant weapon and target states. The
requirement that the WTA solution be re-evaluated at a high rate over the course of the
conflict, as opposed to once at the outset as in the missile defense case, requires that the
heuristic depart from the optimization techniques that require long computation times
such as GA and simulated annealing [55] [56].

9.2. ThreatBot Designs
In this research, the WTA problem is one of four tasks each ADS must execute:
target assignment, track control, antenna FOV control, and launch control. The update
rate (simulation time) at which these tasks are executed are standardized and summarized
in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1: ADS Agent Behavior Tasks and Update Periods
Task

Update Period (s)

Target Assignment

10

Track Control

10

FOV Control

1

Fire Control

1

The Target Assignment task is the WTA problem, assigning the various targets to
ADS for engagement this either occurs at the ADS level, in the case for Level 0 through
Level 2 ADS or at the IADS level for Level 3 ADS. The 10 second update period for
Target Assignment is representative of fused information rate at the IADS level. The
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Track Control algorithm is executed at the individual ADS level and concerns managing
the track channels each ADS: the logic to start and end tracks based on which targets
have been assigned. A single track may be canceled per update period and a single new
track may be started per update period. The 10 second update period for Track Control is
representative of tasks including target deconfliction, acquisition, track settling, and kill
assessment, and is representative of a highly skilled, dedicated target track operator or
algorithmic control.
The FOV Control task is the algorithm that evaluates the current target conditions
and controls where the ADS antenna FOV should be oriented to best execute the
engagement of the targets that have been assigned it. With a 1 second update period, this
is representative of the operation of a dedicated operator or an algorithm.
The Fire Control task is the algorithm that evaluates the current tracking
conditions and performs the decision-making around when to fire on active track
channels. With a 1 second update period, this is representative of the operation of a
dedicated operator or an algorithm.
This research implements the ADS tasks using two distinct designs:
Primary/Secondary and Target Grouping. In the Primary/Secondary construction, each
ADS is assigned one primary target and 𝑁𝑐 − 1 secondary targets. The various tasks are
completed with the goal that the primary target must be engaged, and the secondary
targets may be engaged, if doing so does not interfere with the primary.
The Target Grouping construction assigns targets to ADS in groups based on their
geographical clustering. The target clusters are then assigned to ADS based on their
relative geography. The various tasks are completed based with the ADS attempting to
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maximize intercept success at the group level. Table 9.2 summarizes the ADS agents
developed for this research and which algorithms they implement for the various tasks.
The algorithms are described in the following sections.
Table 9.2: ADS Agent Algorithm Matrix

ADS Agent

Level

WTA Strategy

Target
Assignment

Track
Control

FOV
Control

Fire
Control

threatBot1.0

1

Primary/Secondary

TA_PSA1

TC_PSA1

FOV_PSA1

FC_PSA1

threatBot2.0

2

Primary/Secondary

TA_PSA2

TC_PSA1

FOV_PSA1

FC_PSA2

threatBot3.0

3

Target Grouping

TA_TGA1

TC_L3

FOV_L3

FC_L3

threatBot3.1

3

Target Grouping

TA_TGA2

TC_L3

FOV_L3

FC_L3

9.3. Target Assignment
9.3.1. TA_PSA1
TA_PSA1 (flowchart in Figure 9.2) is a Level 1 primary/secondary target
algorithm. As such, operating at the individual ADS object level, the algorithm selects a
single primary target and potentially multiple secondary targets from the common air
picture, without regard to the selections of the other elements in the IADS. The algorithm
consists of two stages: Prioritization and Selection.
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Figure 9.2: Algorithm TA_PSA1 Flowchart

The algorithm computes a priority value for each target in the air picture using the
estimated time-to-go (TTG) (74) to reach a PA, the EWS, or the ADS itself. The most
threatened element – the one with the shortest TTG – is selected and the priority
calculated as linearly increasing with decreasing TTG. At the time of each evaluation, the
predicted intercept point (PIP) of immediate launch is calculated, and if the intercept
range is outside the coverage of the ADS, the target priority is set to zero.

𝑉𝑐𝑙𝑠 (𝑡, 𝑎) =

𝑟𝑡,𝑎 ⋅ 𝑣𝑡,𝑎
|𝑟𝑡,𝑎 |
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(73)

𝑇𝑔𝑜 (𝑡, 𝑎) =

|𝑟𝑡,𝑎 |
𝑉𝑐𝑙𝑠

(74)

After all targets have been prioritized, the list is sorted in descending order. Any
zero-elements are disregarded. The primary target is selected as the highest priority
target. A number of secondary targets – equal to the number of track channels 𝑁𝑐 less one
– is taken from the remaining list of prioritized targets.

9.3.2. TA_PSA2
TA_PSA2 (flowchart in Figure 9.3) is a Level 2 primary/secondary target
algorithm. As seen in the flowchart, TA_PSA2 implements TA_PSA1 as the first stage,
and follows up with a stage to incorporate target selection data from other sensors in the
IADS. If there is only a single ADS active in the IADS, then TA_PSA2 is exactly
TA_PSA1.
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Figure 9.3: Algorithm TA_PSA2 Flowchart
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The follow-on stage of TA_PSA2 works to de-conflict the primary target
selection of the various ADS. Each ADS examines its own primary target selection and
that of all the other ADS. An ADS defers to another ADS having longer range coverage
when both have selected the same target as primary (provided the longer-range ADS has
SAM rounds remaining). The deferral is implemented by the shorter-range ADS simply
swapping the primary target with the first entry on its secondary target list that is not a
primary of any other ADS, thus promoting a lower priority secondary target to the
primary slot.

9.3.3. TA_TGA1
TA_TGA1 (flowchart in Figure 9.4 through Figure 9.6) is a Level 3 target
grouping algorithm. As such, it executes at the network level, using the common air
picture to allocate targets to threats using a spatial clustering technique. The algorithm
works in three stages: prioritization, clustering, and matching.
In the prioritization stage (flowchart page 1), each target in the air picture is
assigned a priority value based on its TTG to the various IADS elements, weighted by
their types. The priority values are calculated as an exponential function of decreasing
TTG. For each target, the instantaneous priority value is filtered with first-order
smoothing filter. The filter has a coefficient selection stage that depends upon whether
the priority is increasing or decreasing as a function of time: increasing priority uses a
larger coefficient and thus produces a faster response. Decreasing priority uses a smaller
coefficient and thus produces a slower response.
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Figure 9.4: TA_TGA1 Algorithm Flowchart Page 1 of 3
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Figure 9.5: TA_TGA1 Algorithm Flowchart Page 2 of 3
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Figure 9.6: TA_TGA1 Algorithm Flowchart Page 3 of 3

The clustering stage (page 2) attempts to condense the list of targets in the
common air picture to a smaller list of clusters based on their spatial grouping. The
clustering algorithm used is a slightly modified version of DBSCAN [57], the algorithm
of which is listed in Figure E.3. The clustering algorithm is repeated up to three times,
each time reducing the neighboring distance threshold, until the air picture separates into
at least two clusters, or until each cluster consists of a single target.
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When the clustering has finished, the priority values of the target clusters are
calculated from the individual targets comprising each cluster with the statistic in (75),
which allows the algorithm to maintain awareness of two important situations: a large
group of targets having similar priorities and a large group of low-priority targets
containing a single high-priority target. The centroid position and velocity of each target
cluster is also calculated.
𝑇

𝑃𝑐 = √(max 𝑃𝑡 ) ∑ 𝑃𝑡
𝑡

(75)

𝑡

The final stage is pairing the target clusters with the ADS in a manner to
minimize the probability that any IADS element is successfully attacked. First, the list of
ADS priorities is calculated and sorted. This priority is a function of the number of track
channels, the salvo size, and the remaining magazine for each ADS. The target cluster list
is processed in descending order of priority. For each cluster, the prioritized list of ADS
is processed by calculating the intercept solution of the cluster by each ADS. The
resultant list sorted and the ADS requiring the shortest engagement time is assigned all
the targets in the cluster. In this algorithm, any particular ADS may be assigned more
targets than it can simultaneously track.

9.3.4. TA_TGA2
TA_TGA2 (flowchart in Figure 9.7 through Figure 9.9) is a Level 3 target
grouping algorithm. As such, it executes at the network level, using the common air
picture to allocate targets to threats using a greedy version of first-price sealed-bid
auction algorithm [21]. The algorithm works in two stages: prioritization and tendering.
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The prioritization stage is identical to that of TA_TGA1, with the exception that
the instantaneous priority calculated is a linear rather than exponential function of TTG.
Additionally, the priorities are scaled in proportion to the objective value estimates for
the various IADS elements as described in Chapter 5.
The tendering stage is analogous to an organization submitting a tender request
and receiving bids by different offerors to complete the task. All bids are evaluated to
ensure they meet the specified minimum requirements and the bid having the lowest cost
while meeting the requirements is awarded the contract.
In this algorithm each target is processed in order of descending priority. Each
ADS enters a sealed bid for the target and the ADS having the lowest bid is awarded
allocation of the target. The bid value entered by each ADS is calculated as the amount of
time required to engage the target resulting in a specified minimum probability of kill
𝑃𝑘,𝑚𝑖𝑛 . If an ADS cannot engage the target sufficiently to meet the minimum kill
probability specified, either because it has already been allocated enough targets to fill its
track channels, because it is out of range or will become so, the ADS has insufficient
rounds in its magazine, or the salvo size, SAM speed, or target speed are such that the
accumulated engagements available will be insufficient, then the ADS can enter a “no
bid” and will not be considered for assignment of that target.
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Figure 9.7: TA_TGA2 Algorithm Flowchart Page 1 of 3
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Figure 9.8: TA_TGA2 Algorithm Flowchart Page 2 of 3
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Figure 9.9: TA_TGA2 Algorithm Flowchart Page 3 of 3

Each ADS calculates its bid for the target in the following manner. First, if the
number of targets already assigned to it meets or exceeds its number of track channels,
then “no bid” is entered. Otherwise, the ADS calculates the targets inescapable range as
in (76), which is a function of the target and SAM speed as well as the maximum
intercept range of the ADS. The inescapable range is the distance from the ADS from
which the target cannot escape an in-zone intercept by flying straight away.
|v
⃑ t|
)
Vm
= 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 𝑇𝑓,𝑖

R n.e. =R Int (1𝑝𝑡,𝑖
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(76)
(77)

𝑃𝑘,𝑖

0
, |𝑝𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠 | ≥ 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑡
|𝑝𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠 | − 𝑅𝑛.𝑒.
) , 𝑅𝑛.𝑒. < |𝑝𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠 | < 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑡
= 𝑃𝑘,𝑜 (1 −
𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑡
, |𝑝𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠 | ≤ 𝑅𝑛.𝑒.
𝑃𝑘,𝑜

(78)

𝑗

𝑃𝑘,𝑐,𝑗 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝑃𝑘,𝑖 )

𝑀𝑠

, 𝑗 = 0. . 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑁, 𝑅𝑠 )

(79)

𝑖

The ADS then calculates the maximum number of intercepts between the targets
current position and its predicted IADS endpoint (see Figure E.1). For each of the
potential intercepts, having time-of-flight 𝑇𝑓,𝑖 , the single-engagement probability of kill
𝑃𝑘,𝑖 is estimated. Each 𝑃𝑘,𝑖 is estimated as a function of the range of the PIP (78), which
is the nominal value inside the inescapable range, but linearly decreases to zero at the
intercept range (Figure 9.10), taking into account the possibility that the target could
attempt escape rather than continuing its present course.

Figure 9.10: Estimated Kill Probability Function

Finally, the accumulated probability of kill is calculated as the series
multiplication of the individual events as in (79). The 𝑗th intercept in the series
corresponding to the lowest entry of 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,𝑗 that meets or exceeds the minimum
134

requirement is taken as the number of engagements necessary. The accumulated time-offlight for the intercepts from 1 to 𝑗 is the total time of the bid. If the greatest value in
𝑃𝑘,𝑐,𝑗 does not meet or exceed 𝑃𝑘,𝑚𝑖𝑛 , then the ADS enters a “no bid” for the target since
it is unable to meet the requirement. If the target is not currently within the ADS FOV,
the bid time is increased by the amount of time that would be required to move the
antenna pedestal the minimum amount putting the target in the FOV.
It is evident from the formulation above that ADS with a high salvo size, short
salvo time, and fast SAM speed will have high efficiency and therefore be able to place
low bids and be awarded high priority targets.
Finally, the list of targets that were not assigned, in the case where all ADS
presented “no bids” for them, are assigned if their priority values are high enough that not
assigning them for engagement would present too high a risk. In this case, the ADS that
is nearest it in range is assigned the target.

9.4. Track Control
9.4.1. TC_PSA1
The Level 1 Primary/Secondary Track Control algorithm (flowchart in Figure
9.11) works in two phases: canceling active tracks and beginning new tracks. Since it
works on the Primary/Secondary construction, the highest priority for the algorithm is to
ensure that the primary target assigned it is tracked. Since the assignments are expected
to change over time, and what was a primary target can become a secondary or even unassigned target, the algorithm must be able to handle these updates without disruption to
ongoing engagements.
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Figure 9.11: TC_PSA1 Algorithm Flowchart
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First, tracks with ongoing engagements cannot be canceled whatsoever, regardless
of their priority status, ensuring that SAM rounds are not wasted. Likewise, if a track
channel is occupied by the priority target, it cannot be canceled. Otherwise, if all track
channels are occupied and the primary target is not currently tracked, then the first
secondary target track channel is canceled, freeing a track channel.
If there are unused track channels, the logic to begin new tracks simply adds the
priority target to the first available channel if it is not currently tracked. If it is, then each
secondary target is taken in turn, beginning tracks on them if they are not already tracked.

9.4.2. TC_L3
The Level 3 Track Control algorithm (flowchart in Figure 9.12 through Figure
9.14) works to ensure the track channels available are allocated to the highest priority
targets that have been assigned. First, the current status is evaluated to determine the
priority values of the targets that are currently assigned and tracked. If any track channels
are available, then a new track is started on the highest priority target for this ADS,
regardless if it was assigned or not.
Next, if all track channels are currently active, then tracks may be cancelled in
two ways. First, the lowest priority tracked target is considered. If an un-tracked target
has priority at least 10% higher than that of the lowest priority tracked target, the tracked
target may be cancelled depending on its engagement status. If there are currently no
SAMs in flight against it, then it is dropped without further consideration. Otherwise, the
the priority of the un-tracked target must be progressively higher as the number of SAMs
in flight increases in order to drop the tracked target because doing so would cause the
unrecoverable loss of those SAM rounds.
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Figure 9.12: TC_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 1 of 3
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Figure 9.13: TC_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 2 of 3
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Figure 9.14: TC_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 3 of 3

Finally, if all track channels are occupied with tracks and there is at least one
assigned target in the list, then the first unassigned target that is tracked will be cancelled
to clear a track channel for the targets on the assignment list.

9.5. FOV Control
9.5.1. FOV_PSA1
The Level 1 Primary/Secondary FOV control algorithm (Figure 9.15) works in
two different modes depending on whether or not the ADS is currently guiding any
SAMs in active engagements.
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Figure 9.15: FOV_PSA1 Algorithm Flowchart
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When there are no active engagements, the FOV is controlled to ensure the
primary target remains trackable and engageable. If the priority target is assigned, then
the intercept solution for that target is calculated. The antenna azimuth setpoint is set to
the PIP of the primary target. If no priority target is assigned, then the azimuth setpoint
remains unchanged.
When there are active engagements (against primary or secondary targets), the
mean position of all active SAMs is calculated. The antenna azimuth setpoint is set as the
angle to the mean position. This attempts to keep the most active SAMs in the FOV to
prevent premature termination of the engagement.

9.5.2. FOV_L3
The Level 3 FOV algorithm (flowchart in Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17) works by
pointing the antenna at the target PIP as in FOV_PSA1, but rather than focusing on just a
primary target, FOV_L3 computes a weighted composite PIP for all relevant targets.
The first stage consists of computing the weights for all targets in the shared air
picture. This stage operates in one of two modes, dependent upon whether the ADS is
currently engaging any targets. If not, each target in the air picture that is not assigned to
the ADS receives a zero weight, and will therefore be ignored by the algorithm. All
targets that are assigned receive a base weight equal to their proportion of the priority
summation of the entire assigned set. Furthermore, the target having the highest priority
receives an additional 25% increase in weight and all assigned targets that are currently in
the FOV receive an additional 10% increase in weight.
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Figure 9.16: FOV_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 1 of 2
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Figure 9.17: FOV_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 2 of 2

If there are any active engagements ongoing, then only targets with active
engagements (regardless of their assignment status) receive weights proportional to their
priority values, and all other targets are zero-weighted.
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After the target weights have been computed, the PIP for each target in the air
picture is computed and the weighted average of the PIPs is computed and used to
generate the antenna azimuth setpoint.

9.6. Fire Control
9.6.1. FC_PSA1
The Level 1 Primary/Secondary Fire Control algorithm (Figure 9.18) orders fire
against targets based on their probability of intercept (judged based on proximity to the
inescapable range), the remaining ADS magazine, whether the target in question is a
primary or secondary target, and how many SAMs belonging to the ADS are already
flying out against the target.
The ADS will fire against a primary target inside the inescapable range regardless
of remaining magazine. If the primary target is outside the inescapable range, but its PIP
is inside the intercept range, then the ADS will fire the first missile in a salvo when it has
more than half its initial magazine remaining, and the remaining missiles in a salvo when
it has more than three quarters its initial magazine remaining.
The ADS will fire a single missile only against a secondary target inside the
inescapable range regardless of remaining magazine. If the secondary target is outside the
inescapable range, but its PIP is inside the intercept range, then the ADS will fire a single
missile only when it has more than half its initial magazine remaining.
This algorithm works to reserve SAM rounds for primary targets, while
committing a small portion of its magazine to secondary targets that have high
probability of intercept.
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Figure 9.18: FC_PSA1 Algorithm Flowchart
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9.6.2. FC_PSA2
The Level 2 Primary/Secondary Fire Control algorithm (Figure 9.19) is identical
to the Level 1 algorithm FC_PSA1 with the exception that when evaluating the fire
condition, rather than checking for how many SAMs are in flight against a target,
FC_PSA2 checks the total number of active engagements across the entire IADS where
as FC_PSA1 checks only the number of active engagements controlled by the ADS
making the fire decision. The Level 2 algorithm works to ensure that overlapping fire
among multiple ADS is prevented, which can lead to over-commitment of SAM
resources.
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Figure 9.19: FC_PSA2 Algorithm Flowchart
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9.6.3. FC_L3
The Level 3 Fire Control algorithm (flowchart in Figure 9.20 through Figure
9.22) operates in three stages. First, a threshold is calculated for each active track that
when exceeded, the fire can be ordered if authorized. Second, the fire authorization for
each target is determined. Finally, the target is fired upon if the engagement is authorized
and if the target priority meets or exceeds the threshold. Each stages works to economize
on SAM resources by engaging in situations with high probability of intercept and by
preventing overlapping fire between ADS.
The first stage computes the firing threshold for up to three simultaneous
engagements. These can come from any ADS in the network, and each ADS evaluates its
own prioritization when contributing to the engagement of the target. Each additional
SAM added to a concurrent engagement has a progressively higher threshold for firing,
and is also dependent upon the total remaining SAM rounds across the IADS.
The second state authorizes fire on each target based on the predicted intercept
probability. At this stage, only targets assigned to the ADS are authorized to be fired
upon. The target PIP is compared against a range threshold, ranging between the
inescapable range (for cases when a small number of rounds remain in the magazine) to
the maximum intercept range (for cases when many rounds remain in the magazine).
In the final stage, before the firing decision is made, a negative firing
authorization status can be overridden for targets that the ADS deems are threatening
IADS elements with little reaction time remaining.
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Figure 9.20: FC_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 1 of 3
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Figure 9.21: FC_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 2 of 3
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Figure 9.22: FC_L3 Algorithm Flowchart Page 3 of 3
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CHAPTER 10 BASE AGENT MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

This chapter presents results of agent-vs-agent play in a reference scenario. This
is intended to show the overall capability of the ADS agent designs to minimize swarm
ME playing against the basic swarm agents, which make predictable decisions. This
performance serves as a baseline to judge the AI agents ME against. The reference
scenario is shown in Figure 10.1, and summarized in Table 10.1.
The baseline is a CL 4 scenario and as such consists of one Level 2 MR ADS and
one Level 1 MR ADS providing layered, overlapping coverage. The IADS investment to
protect the PA equals 25.8% of the 150k total point value of the PA.
Table 10.1: Baseline ME Performance Reference Scenario (CL = 4) Parameters
Position (km)
IADS
Element

East

North

Point
Value

PA 1

-10

-10

50000

PA 2

5

-5

50000

PA 3

10

-10

50000

EWS

-5

-5

15000

5

11835
(battery)
265
(SAM,
ea.)

ADS 1

0

Intercept
Range
(km)

FOV
Width
(degrees)

Number
Track
Channels

Salvo
Size

Salvo
Time
(s)

Magazine

40

60

2

2

10

16

153

ADS 2
Total

10

0

7087
(battery)
182
(SAM,
ea.)

20

60

189618

2

2

4

8

10

8
24

Figure 10.1: Baseline ME Performance Reference Scenario (CL = 4)

Keeping the IADS scenario fixed, the swarm ME baseline was measured by
varying the number of swarm units and both the agent behavior logic. For each agent-vsagent matchup, the total swarm size was varied from 10 to 22 units. The upper end of the
range was selected because total number of SAM rounds available in the reference
scenario is 24. With a single-shot 𝑃𝑘 of 0.95 stipulated, the expected number of failed
engagements due to chance is 1.2 out of 24. Limiting the swarm size to 22 at the upper
end prevents the swarm from achieving high ME solely by overwhelming numbers. The
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lower bound of the range was selected to ensure that even the most sophisticated swarm
agent had little chance of success with such a small force. Each swarm size configuration
was repeated over n = 100 runs in order to capture the statistical properties of the
engagements.
The ME results for each matchup as a function of swarm size are presented and
summarized in the following sections. The ME values are shown as a percentage of the
total ME achievable for the scenario. The ME runs (n=100) swarm size increment (10 to
22 units) is presented as box-and-whisker plots (the plot symbology key is shown in
Figure 10.2).

Figure 10.2: Box-and-Whisker Plot Symbology

10.1. Basic Swarm Agents vs ThreatBot1.0
The baseline scenario ME against ThreatBot1.0 as a function of swarm size is
shown in Figure 10.3. The top, middle, and bottom plots show the ME for swarmBot0.0,
swarmBot1.0, and swarmBot2.0, respectively. Figure 10.4 shows plots of the mean and
median ME for each swarmBot overlaid, plotted versus swarm size.
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The plots in Figure 10.3 and Figure 10.4 show that the threshold swarm size for
swarmBot0.0 and swarmBot1.0 is 13 units against threatBot1.0. To achieve a similar
effect (mean ME), swarmBot2.0 required a swarm size of at least 15 units. However, at
the other end of the range, swarmBot1.0 and swarmBot2.0 outperformed swarmBot0.0.
In fact, swarmBot1.0 and swarmBot2.0 had marginal improvements in ME for each
swarm size increment above 16, but swarmBot0.0 did not. In fact, it required a swarm
size of 19 before the ME was improved over that of a swarm size of 13, in terms of
median ME. For swarm sizes of 18 units and more, swarmBot2.0 performed nearly as
well as swarmBot1.0, but for sizes of 16 units and fewer, swarmBot2.0 performed quite
poorly.
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Figure 10.3: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot1.0
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Figure 10.4: ME Statistics vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot1.0
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10.2. Basic Swarm Agents vs ThreatBot2.0
The baseline scenario ME against ThreatBot2.0 as a function of swarm size is
shown in Figure 10.5. The top, middle, and bottom plots show the ME for swarmBot0.0,
swarmBot1.0, and swarmBot2.0, respectively. Figure 10.6 shows plots of the mean and
median ME for each swarmBot overlaid, plotted versus swarm size.
The plots in Figure 10.5 and Figure 10.6 show that the baseline swarm bots
performance against threatBot2.0 was very similar to their performance against
threatBot1.0. While the mean and variance of the run distributions are very similar
comparing performance against threatBot1.0 and threatBot2.0, the threatBot2.0
distributions have a wider inter-quartile range in most cases, especially for the largest
swarm sizes. This indicates that the logic improvements in the target assignment and fire
control algorithms, namely sharing track and engagement states between ADS to
minimize overlapping engagements is effective in depressing swarm ME. The
opportunity for overlapping engagements is higher for larger swarm sizes, so this is
where the effect is most noticeable.
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Figure 10.5: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot2.0
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Figure 10.6: ME Statistics vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot2.0
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10.3. Basic Swarm Agents vs ThreatBot3.0
The baseline scenario ME against ThreatBot3.0 as a function of swarm size is
shown in Figure 10.7. The top, middle, and bottom plots show the ME for swarmBot0.0,
swarmBot1.0, and swarmBot2.0, respectively. Figure 10.8 shows plots of the mean and
median ME for each swarmBot overlaid, plotted versus swarm size.
The plots in Figure 10.7 and Figure 10.8 show that the baseline swarm bots
performance against threatBot3.0 was much reduced compared to their performance
against threatBot1.0 and threatBot2.0. The threshold swarm size for swarmBot0.0 and
swarmBot1.0 is 15 and 16 units against threatBot3.0 compared to 14 units against
threatBot1.0 and threatBot2.0. This represents a significant improvement in the ability of
threatBot3.0 to allocate engagements efficiently. The ME for swarmBot2.0 against
threatBot3.0 is significantly depressed compared to is performance against threatBot1.0
and threatBot2.0, having a threshold swarm size of 20 units or more required to achieve
25% ME or better.
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Figure 10.7: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot3.0
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Figure 10.8: ME Statistics vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot3.0
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10.4. Basic Swarm Agents vs ThreatBot3.1
The baseline scenario ME against ThreatBot3.1 as a function of swarm size is
shown in Figure 10.9. The top, middle, and bottom plots show the ME for swarmBot0.0,
swarmBot1.0, and swarmBot2.0, respectively. Figure 10.10 shows plots of the mean and
median ME for each swarmBot overlaid, plotted versus swarm size.
The plots in Figure 10.9 and Figure 10.10 show that the baseline swarm bots
performance against threatBot3.1 was much reduced compared to their performance
against threatBot1.0 and threatBot2.0. Version 0.0 and 1.0 swarmBots performed better
against threatBot3.0 than against 3.1 for equivalently-sized swarms, but swarmBot2.0
performed better against threatBot3.1 than against threatBot3.0.
The threshold swarm size for both swarmBot0.0 and swarmBot1.0 is 20 units
against threatBot3.1 compared to 14 units against threatBot1.0 and threatBot2.0 and 1516 against threatBot3.0. This represents a significant improvement in the ability of
threatBot3.1 to allocate engagements efficiently.
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Figure 10.9: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot3.1
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Figure 10.10: ME Statistics vs Swarm Size: Baseline SwarmBots vs ThreatBot3.1
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10.5. Base Agent Mission Effectiveness Summary
The basic swarm agent ME capabilities are summarized in Table 10.2. The entries
in Table 10.2 are the expected value of the number of swarm units required to achieve
25-, 50-, and 75-percent ME (47.4k, 94.8k, and 142.2k points) benchmarks for each
matchup. These performance benchmarks were chosen because they roughly correspond
to the three PA, each worth 50k points in the baseline scenario. In the case of N/A entries,
the particular swarm agent was unable to achieve the specified benchmark.
Table 10.2: Baseline ME Performance Agent-vs-Agent Matchup Matrix
Number of Units in Swarm Required to Achieve
Mean ME [25 50 75] %
Swarm Agent
Threat Agent

swarmBot0.0

swarmBot1.0

swarmBot2.0

threatBot1.0

[15 21 N/A]

[15 17 19]

[17 18 20]

threatBot2.0

[15 21 N/A]

[15 18 21]

[18 19 21]

threatBot3.0

[18 20 N/A]

[17 20 22]

[20 22 22]

threatBot3.1

[20 22 N/A]

[20 22 22]

[19 21 22]

The table shows that threatBot ADS agent level 1.0 through 3.0 generally
correspond to improving performance defending against each given swarm agent as a
higher average number of swarm units is required to achieve each ME benchmark as the
threat sophistication increases.
An unexpected result is that holding the threat agent constant, the swarmBot1.0
achieved the best benchmark results, outperforming swarmBot2.0. Recall from Chapter 8
that the difference between the two agent behaviors is that the swarmBot2.0 responds to
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more environmental changes than does swarmBot1.0. This design lead to the initial
expectation that it would have improved performance, but for all ADS agents,
swarmBot1.0 outperformed swarmBot2.0. This result could indicate that swarmBot2.0 is
too reactive to certain events in the conflict leading to sub-optimal decision-making.
Alternatively, it could indicate that the targeting logic is inadequately taking advantage of
the changing information available to swarmBot2.0 that is unavailable to swarmBot1.0.
However, the swarmBot2.0 agent was more effective against the threatBot3.1 agent than
either 0.0 and 1.0 swarmBot agents. This result is illustrative of the thesis of this work;
the optimal swarm decision-making strategy is unknown and difficult to predict, but can
be discovered by the ML process.
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CHAPTER 11 DESIGN OF AI SWARM AGENTS

The design of an AI swarm agent comes down to the specification of the
observation function, the behavior function, and the action function, as described in
Chapter 4. As in all ML endeavors, this is an iterative process, where the details of the
various functions are settled upon through experimentation and trial and error.
The observation function is implemented by selecting various observable
environmental parameters, performing transforms on them if necessary, and connecting
those as inputs to the behavior function ANN.
The action function is implemented by analyzing the behavior function ANN
output layer neurons. These may be transformed in some way and using the results to
select a particular action. As detailed in Chapter 4, the basic actions that can be taken by
the swarm agent are to update the flight waypoint, update the altitude setpoint, and update
the ground-speed setpoint.
The behavior function ANN is specified by a few hyperparameters. The width of
the input and output layers are dictated by the particular needs of the observation and
action functions, respectively. The tunable hyperparameters include the number of width
of the hidden layers, and the individual neuron activation functions.
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This chapter focuses on the design of three experimental swarm bots that
demonstrated particularly interesting results.

11.1. Experiment D
11.1.1. Observation Function
The observation function for swarm agent Experiment D uses various
environmental inputs to compute perceptions divided into two categories: spatial and
non-spatial. The non-spatial perceptions are a spatial array relative to the swarm group. It
does this by computing a “stress input”, contributed to by the perceived states of the
various ADS active threats, sorted into angular bins centered on the swarm group’s
current heading, as illustrated in Figure 11.1.
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Figure 11.1: Angular Bins For Experiment D Spatially-Distributed Inputs

The non-spatial perceptions and their descriptions are as follows:
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Self Swarm Proportion This is the fractional portion of the total swarm that this
group constitutes, ranging between 0.0 and 1.0. It is updated in real time as the swarm
splits, merges, and suffers attrition. It is a unique value for each group that constitutes the
whole swarm.
Swarm Attrition This is the total attrition that the swarm has undergone since the
beginning of the game. All attrition is counted in this variable, as it can occur in various
ways, by successful engagement by an enemy ADS, successful or unsuccessful attempt to
destroy an IADS asset, or expiration of fuel reserves. This input ranges from 0.0 when all
swarm units are still active to 1.0 when all swarm units have been destroyed. All active
swarm groups receive this input identically.
Proportional SAMs Fired This is the running count of SAMs fired by any ADS
in the IADS divided by the initial swarm size. It serves as a rough metric for the phase of
the overall conflict, as it increases monotonically. Together with the Swarm Attrition
input, this allows the group to estimate the phase of the conflict: if this value is large and
the Swarm Attrition is small, then the group understands that it is tending to win the
conflict.
The spatial perceptions and their descriptions are as follows:
Nearest PA Reachable At the swarm group’s current position and speed, it
estimates the number of engagements, M, the most threatening threat (MTT) can execute
before the group reaches the nearest PA. If the number of swarm units in the group is
larger than M, assuming a two-SAM salvo, then this input is set to a value of 1.0.
Otherwise, it is set to 0.0. The algorithm to estimate the number of engagements is
included in Figure E.1. Figure 11.2 shows examples of the algorithm results.
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Figure 11.2: Example Plots of Estimating Number of Consecutive Engagements Possible (nShotsXYInRng
Algorithm), 16 km Intercept Range, 8 Second Salvo Delay

The algorithm results are shown for a single swarm starting point in the left plot
of Figure 11.2 and the right plot shows the results contour evaluated over all starting
points inside the ADS range ring. The left plot shows that when the swarm group (blue
circle) starting at position <5, 20> km and moving at a constant 300 m s-1 speed, the ADS
(red diamond) can execute seven consecutive engagements (endpoints at red x’s) before it
reaches the PA (green square). The contour plot on the right extends this algorithm to a
field of starting points, but maintaining the same endpoint at the PA. Assuming the ADS
can guide a 2-SAM salvo each engagement, the swarm group would need more than twotimes the contour labels shown to reach the PA at the various starting points. As shown,
this result is a highly nonlinear function of the ADS properties (some of which are
unknown, and must be estimated) and the swarm group properties. Figure 11.3 shows a
more complicated example where multiple ADS are defending multiple PA.
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Figure 11.3: Example Plots of Estimating Number of Consecutive Engagements Possible (nShotsXYInRng
Algorithm):Left Targeting PA, Right Targeting EWS

The Nearest PA Reachable input incorporates many static and dynamic
observable parameters from the environment into a single highly-semantic input to the
ANN. As Figure 11.3 shows, the single input conveys much input to the swarm group
ANN about how likely it is to achieve ME given its current states.
The Nearest PA Reachable input uses the MTT metric, defined by (80).
𝑀𝑇𝑇 = arg max 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡(𝑠, 𝑡)
𝑡∈𝑇

𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝑡 − 𝑅𝑠,𝑡
, 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 < 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝑡
0
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
2 , 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑠, 𝑡)
𝑐𝑇 (𝑠, 𝑡) = {
1
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

𝑐 (𝑠, 𝑡)
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡(𝑠, 𝑡) = { 𝑇

𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑠, 𝑡)
= ((𝑁𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑇 𝑡 < 𝑁𝑇𝑡 ) ∪ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑠, 𝑡))
∩ (𝑅𝑠,𝑡 < 𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐾 𝑡 ) ∩ 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛(𝑠, 𝑡) ∩ 𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑂𝑉(𝑠, 𝑡)
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(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)

Nearest EWS Reachable Identical to Nearest PA Reachable input, except that it
calculates for the nearest EWS instead of the nearest PA. This input is kept as a separate
input from the equivalent PA input because while the EWS has a lower ME point value
than any single PA, it presents much higher abstract value to the swarm in achieving high
ME.
Self Stress Angular Array This input represents the level of danger the IADS
presents to the swarm group distributed over an array of aspect angles. The angular
regions into which the stress value is binned are shown in Figure 11.1. Each active ADS
in the scenario contributes a level of instantaneous stress to each swarm group, based on
its proximity and its engagement states. The instantaneous stress inputs are binned into
the angular regions. The three coefficients (𝑐𝐴 , 𝑐𝐵 , and 𝑐𝐶 ) which define the stress
calculations are included as extra parameters in overall behavior function optimization.
The instantaneous stress level perceived by each swarm group for each ADS is described
by (84).
−𝑐𝐶

𝑅𝑠,𝑡
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝑡

𝑆𝑠,𝑡 = (𝐴 + 𝐵)𝑒
𝑐 , 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑠, 𝑡)
𝐴={ 𝐴
0 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑐𝐵 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑇 𝑡 , ≥ 1 𝑆𝐴𝑀 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
𝐵={
0 , 𝑛𝑜 𝑆𝐴𝑀𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡

(84)
(85)
(86)

The self-stress angular array is highly dynamic and provides the swarm group
ANN with information regarding the attention that the IADS is focusing on it as well as
the spatial relationship of the group to the elements of the IADS network.
Others Proportional Angular Array This input represents how the rest of the
swarm is oriented relative to the particular swarm group over the same angular regions
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that the stress levels are perceived. The angular location of each other swarm group is
computed and the number of units in that group divided by the total swarm size is added
to the appropriate bin. The sum of all bin values plus the value of the Self Swarm
Proportion input will always be equal to one.
Others Stress Angular Array This input represents the swarm’s level of
engagement with the IADS. It is simply the sum total value of each other swarm group’s
Self-Stress Array binned into the appropriate angular region for this swarm group.

11.1.2. Action Function
The action function for swarm agent Experiment D can produce eleven unique
actions relative to the swarm and relative to the IADS. The swarm-related actions are
further divided into swarm constitution and relative geometry. The IADS-related actions
are all concentrated on moving the swarm group relative to various points of interest in
the IADS. The actions that can be performed by the swarm agent Experiment D are as
follows.
Loiter This causes the swarm group to cease translational motion and remain at
its current location in a tight orbit.
Split This causes the swarm group to divide itself into two independent swarm
groups having an equal number of units. The newly-created swarm group is independent
and makes its own decisions having an identical behavior function as its progenitor, but
acting upon perceptions unique to its own perspective.
Merge With Nearest This causes the swarm group to begin a merge maneuver
with the nearest swarm group. Once completed, the merge maneuver results in both
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swarm groups aligning their velocity vectors and positions. They then become a single
group with the number of units equal to the sum of the merging groups. At this point,
they act as a single group with one behavior function. While performing the merge
maneuver, all further behavior decisions by both groups are ceased until the merge is
completed or aborted. The merge is aborted when one group or both is terminated.
Ingress to Swarm Centroid This causes the swarm group waypoint to update to
the swarm centroid position. The centroid position is the weighted (by number of units)
average of plan position of all active groups in the swarm. In effect, this causes a
particular group to move toward groupings of other swarm constituents.
Egress from Swarm Centroid This causes the swarm group waypoint to update
to the opposite direction of the swarm centroid position. In effect, this causes a particular
group to break away from groupings of other swarm constituents.
Ingress to MTT This causes the swarm group waypoint to update to the position
of its MTT.
Egress from MTT This causes the swarm group waypoint to update to the
opposite direction of the position of its MTT.
Orbit MTT Clockwise (CW) This causes the swarm group waypoint to update in
such a fashion so that the group moves in a CW direction around its MTT position while
maintaining a constant distance.
Orbit MTT Counter Clockwise (CCW) This causes the swarm group waypoint
to update in such a fashion so that the group moves in a CCW direction around its MTT
position while maintaining a constant distance.
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Ingress Near Asset This causes the swarm group waypoint to update to the
position of the PA nearest it.
Ingress Near EWS This causes the swarm group waypoint to update to the
position of the EWS nearest it.

11.1.3. Behavior Function
The behavior function for swarm agent Experiment E consists of three stress
factor coefficients (𝑐𝐴 , 𝑐𝐵 , and 𝑐𝐶 ) and the fully-connected feed-forward ANN. The ANN
has a 41 inputs, an 11-neuron wide output layer, and four hidden layers with widths of
104, 83, 42, and 22 neurons each, moving from input to output. Configured in this way,
the ANN has 262 total neurons, 262 bias inputs, and 17,548 total weights. Taken
together, the total behavior function has 17,813 parameters. The logistic function was
selected as the activation function for all neurons.
Each update, the observation function receives new perceptions from the
environment and performs the transformations described above. The ANN inputs are
updated and the ANN is updated, with all neuron activation functions updating in layerorder from input to output. Then the output layer neurons activations are collected and
masked. The masking deactivates some outputs because they represent unavailable
actions due to specific circumstances. For example, the Split action is only available if
the group contains more than one unit. Likewise, the actions specific to points of interest
in the IADS, such as Ingress to Nearest EWS may be masked because there are no active
EWS. The current action is selected corresponding to the output neuron with the largest
un-masked activation.
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Once the selected action is updated, the necessary transforms are computed and
the swarm update is complete.

11.2. Experiment E
11.2.1. Observation Function
The observation function for swarm agent Experiment E was designed to be much
smaller than that of Experiment D. Instead of producing a spatial array of IADS
measurements, this observation function focuses only on the engagement states of the
MTT identified for each swarm group. Additionally, it clusters the swarm groups and
provides information only relative to the local swarm constituents.
The clustering of the swarm groups is accomplished using a modified version of
the DBSCAN algorithm [57], the pseudocode for which is included in Figure E.3. The
swarm groups are clustered using data in three-dimensions: their East-North positions as
well as a pseudo-metric dictated by their perceived MTT. This allows groups who are
positioned near each other to be clustered into separate clusters if they focusing on
different threats in the IADS. The distance metric used by the clustering algorithm,
clustDist, is one of the extra parameters included in the behavior function under
optimization.
The perceptions and their descriptions are as follows:
Self Cluster Proportion This is the proportion of its cluster that the swarm group
constitutes, having a value between 0.0 and 1.0.
Cluster Swarm Proportion This is the proportion of the entire swarm that the
groups cluster constitutes, having a value between 0.0 and 1.0.
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Proportional SAMs Fired This is the same perception as is used by Experiment
D.
Distance to Cluster This is the distance the swarm group is away from the
centroid of its parent cluster, divided by clustDist the clustering distance metric. This
value decreases the closer a swarm group gets to its cluster. If the group is the only
member of its cluster, this value will be zero.
Merge Candidate Available This is a perception having value of 0.0 or 1.0 and
detects when another group has moved into a posture that allows acceptable merging
maneuvers, based on its distance and the alignment of its velocity vector with the self
group. The signal value is set to 1.0 when two conditions are met: first, another swarm
group is within the mergeMaxDistance metric and second, the dot product of the velocity
vector of the two swarm groups is greater than or equal to the value of mergeMinVelAlign
metric. These two metrics are extra parameters in the Experiment E behavior function
under optimization.
Trackable by MTT This is a perception having value of 0.0 or 1.0 depending on
whether or not the swarm group’s perceived MTT is currently capable of tracking the
group, as in (83).
Tracked by MTT This is a perception having value of 0.0 or 1.0 depending on
whether or not the swarm group perceives that its MTT is currently tracking the group.
Engageable by MTT This is a perception having value of 0.0 or 1.0 depending
on whether or not the swarm group’s perceived MTT is currently capable of engaging the
group, as in (87).
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𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑠, 𝑡) ∩ (𝑅𝑃.𝐼. 𝑠,𝑡 < 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝑡 )

(87)

Engaged by MTT This is a perception having value of 0.0 or 1.0 depending on
whether or not the swarm group perceives that its MTT is currently engaging the group
with one or more SAMs.
Proportion of Cluster Ingressing to MTT This is the proportion of the swarm
group’s cluster (by group count) that is currently selecting the action to ingress toward
this group’s perceived MTT.
Proportion of Cluster Threatened by MTT This is the proportion of the swarm
group’s cluster (by group count) that is currently threatened (tracked) by this group’s
perceived MTT.
Nearest EWS Reachable This is the same perception as is used by Experiment
D.
Nearest PA Reachable This is the same perception as is used by Experiment D.

11.2.2. Action Function
The action function for swarm agent Experiment E can produce eleven unique
actions relative to the swarm and relative to the IADS. These are very similar to the
actions available to Experiment D. The main differences are that rather than performing
actions relative to the entire swarm, Experiment E performs actions relative to a smaller,
geographically clustered portion of the swarm. The actions that can be performed by the
swarm agent Experiment E are as follows:
Loiter This is the same action as can be performed by Experiment D.
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Split This is the same action as can be performed by Experiment D.
Merge With Nearest This is the same action as can be performed by Experiment
D.
Ingress to Cluster Centroid Similar to the analogous action available to
Experiment D, this causes the swarm group waypoint to update to the centroid position of
the swarm group’s cluster. The centroid position is the weighted (by number of units)
average of plan position of all active groups in this swarm group’s cluster.
Egress from Cluster Centroid This causes the swarm group waypoint to update
to the opposite direction of the group’s cluster centroid position.
Ingress to MTT This is the same action as can be performed by Experiment D.
Egress from MTT This is the same action as can be performed by Experiment D.
Orbit MTT Toward Cluster This causes the swarm group waypoint to update in
such a fashion so that the group moves orbits around its MTT position while maintaining
a constant distance. The direction of the orbit, whether CW or CCW is determined by the
relative location of the swarm group’s cluster centroid. In this case, the group orbits the
MTT in a direction that moves it nearer its cluster centroid. If the swarm group is the only
member of its cluster, then it orbits MTT in the direction of the nearest swarm group,
regardless of its cluster membership. If the swarm group is the only group in the swarm,
then the direction of rotation is CW.
Orbit MTT Away from Cluster This is a similar action as Orbit MTT Toward
Cluster, however this causes the group to orbit the MTT in a direction that moves it
further away from its cluster centroid. If the swarm group is the only member of its
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cluster, then it orbits MTT in the opposite direction of the nearest swarm group,
regardless of its cluster membership. If the swarm group is the only group in the swarm,
then the direction of rotation is CCW.
Ingress Near Asset This is the same action as can be performed by Experiment
D.
Ingress Near EWS This is the same action as can be performed by Experiment
D.

11.2.3. Behavior Function
The behavior function for swarm agent Experiment E consists of three extra
parameters that help define its observation function (clustDist, mergeMaxDistance, and
mergeMinVelAlign) and the fully-connected feed-forward ANN. The ANN has a 13
inputs, an 11-neuron wide output layer, and three hidden layers with widths of 33, 20,
and 13 neurons each, moving from input to output. Configured in this way, the ANN has
77 total neurons, 77 bias inputs, and 1,492 total weights. Taken together, the total
behavior function has 1,572 parameters. The hyperbolic tangent function was selected as
the activation function for all neurons.
Like the Experiment D action function, this function performs masking to
deactivate some outputs because. The current action is selected corresponding to the
output neuron with the largest un-masked activation.

11.3. Experiment F
11.3.1. Observation Function
Experiment F has an identical observation function as Experiment E.
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11.3.2. Action Function
Experiment F has an identical observation function as Experiment E, with the
addition of a speed setpoint (SP) controller. The speed SP value is connected to an
additional neuron on the behavior function output layer. Each update, the speed SP
neuron activation 𝑎𝑉𝑆𝑃 is transformed into the speed SP command 𝑉𝑆𝑃 with a simple
linear transformation as in (88).
𝑉𝑆𝑃 = 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 + (𝑎𝑉𝑆𝑃 − 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛 )

𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛

(88)

The speed SP control is suspended, however, if the group is currently performing
a merge maneuver, because doing so requires control of the speed setpoint. Whenever the
merge maneuver is completed or aborted, the neural speed control is re-activated. The
speed control setpoint limits, 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 are 50 m s-1 and 300 m s-1, defined in
Chapter 6. The activation function limits 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥 are -1 and 1, respectively, for
the hyperbolic tangent function.

11.3.3. Behavior Function
The behavior function for swarm agent Experiment F is identical to that of
Experiment E, with the addition of a single output neuron. The ANN has 78 total
neurons, 78 bias inputs, and 1,505 total weights. Taken together, the total behavior
function has 1,586 parameters.

11.4. Summary
The action functions of the three AI swarm agents designs presented in this
chapter are nearly identical. Their observation functions all process the same
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environmental inputs but produce much different perceptions. The behavior functions of
Experiments E and F are nearly identical, and are an order of magnitude less complex
than that of Experiment D.
Table 11.1: Comparison of AI Swarm Agent Design Features

AI Swarm
Agent Name
Experiment D
Experiment E
Experiment F

Number of
Perceptions
41
13
13

Number of Number of
Intentions
Actions
11
11
11
11
12
11

Total Parameters
17,813
1,572
1,586

The complexity of Experiment D’s behavior function was designed in order to
provide ample parameters for optimizing the use of the wide perception input. The
observation function for Experiment E was designed to incorporate the same
environmental inputs of Experiment D, but to do so using a much smaller number of
perceptions, and thus require a behavior function with a smaller number of parameters.
Experiment F was designed to be a carbon-copy of Experiment E with the addition of the
speed SP as an additional degree of freedom to examine the power of this variable in the
swarm DEAD mission area.
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CHAPTER 12 AI SWARM AGENT MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

This chapter analyzes the achieved mission effectiveness for several highly
successful agents from different design experiments described in the previous chapter.
For each highlighted trial, the training parameters are documented and the population
learning curves are shown. An analysis of the adaptive behaviors learned by the
highlighted agents is presented along with data from example gameplay. Finally, the
statistical ME of selected cognitive agents is explored with Monte Carlo analysis and
compared against baseline non-cognitive swarm agents. The effect of adding a traditional
ME enhancement, RCS reduction, to the cognitive agents is explored.

12.1. Predicting Behaviors
The AI swarm agent behavior function training process generates a lot of data that
is difficult to handle and process. Each candidate behavior function consists of the
connectome (the ANN weight and bias values) plus any extra parameters. Training the
agent behavior functions involves repeated SwarmCommand RTSG gameplay with the
most successful agent behaviors reinforced by the GA or PSO techniques over many
iterations. For example, training the Experiment D agent over a single trial for 70
generations using 200 candidate behavior functions produces 249 million data points.
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The only way to evaluate the quality of any behavior function is to collect data
against threat software agents or humans in SwarmCommand gameplay. AI swarm agents
capable of achieving high ME in gameplay can then be analyzed by examining their
tactics in gameplay events. Then behaviors of other AI swarm agents can be predicted by
comparing the behavior functions of AI agents directly. This section describes a
technique developed to compare the AI behavior functions directly to predict similarity in
gameplay behaviors.
Since the observation, action, and behavior functions are all deterministic, for a
given AI swarm agent design, if two individuals have identical behavior function
parameters, then their action function outputs will also be identical then when presented
with any arbitrary environmental inputs; they will behave identically.
For any swarm agent design, with a fixed observation function and action
function, the degree to which any agents gameplay behaviors are efficient at achieving
high ME is completely described by the behavior function parameters, as well as the
degree to which any individual agents are similar or differ compared to one another.
The similarity of a group of individual AI agents can be predicted by clustering on
the parameters that define their respective behavior functions. This is done in three
stages. For illustration purposes, the results of this process are shown in Figure 12.2
using the population of behavior functions taken from Trial 7, Generation 70 of
Experiment E.
First, the parameters of each behavior function are grouped into a number of
“genes”. This grouping involves concatenating the list of input weights and biases for
each individual neuron in the behavior function. Grouping the data in this way preserves
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the uniqueness of each individual, defined by the way the ANN operates. Additionally,
the extra parameters are grouped together as a single additional gene. For any AI swarm
agent behavior function design, the number of genes will equal the number of neurons in
the behavior function ANN plus one.
Next, each gene is clustered individually across the population, identifying the
unique combinations of weights and biases for the particular neuron. The clustering
algorithm used is DBSCAN. Since the inputs clustered are typically of high
dimensionality, the cosine similarity is used as the clustering metric, with a minimum
value of 0.99 required for core and neighbor cluster assignment. Once the population has
been assigned clusters for this gene, the actual gene data (cluster center) is taken as the
modal entry for each cluster.
An example is shown in Figure 12.1. The data shown is for gene 3: the third
neuron of the ANN, which is in the first hidden layer. Each gene consists of 14 values (13
input weights and 1 bias weight) since it is fully connected with the perception input
vector having length 13. The total population is 200 individuals for this training trial.
Significant clustering is readily apparent from visual inspection of the data. Most input
weights are low-valued and near zero, with 7 of 14 locations having more significant
weights: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13, and 14.
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Figure 12.1: Gene Pool Data Example: Experiment E, Trial 7, Generation 70, Gene 3

Table 12.1: Gene Clustering Example: Experiment E, Trial 7, Generation 70, Gene 3

Weight
Input 1
Input 2
Input 3
Input 4
Input 5
Input 6
Input 7
Input 8
Input 9
Input 10
Input 11
Input 12
Input 13
Bias Input

Allele 1
-0.5633
0.0031
0.8266
-0.0055
-0.4638
-0.0155
0.1626
-0.0163
-0.0609
0.0704
-0.0503
-0.0107
-0.3843
0.8726

Allele 2
-1.0978
0.0031
1.2744
-0.0055
-0.4638
-0.0155
0.4990
-0.0163
0.7921
0.0704
-0.0503
-0.0107
-0.3359
0.8726

The DBSCAN algorithm clusters the 200 individuals’ gene 3 data into 2 alleles
with modal centers shown in Table 12.1. The two alleles are very similar to one another,
both heavily biased toward activation, with activation promoted by perceptions 3
(Proportional SAMs Fired) and 7 (Tracked by MTT), and inhibited by perceptions 1 (Self
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Cluster Proportion), 5 (Merge Candidate Available), and 13 (Nearest PA Reachable). The
most notable difference is the way that allele 2 allows perception 9 (Engaged by MTT) to
promote activation, while allele 1 largely ignores it.
Finally, once all genes have been individually clustered, the genotype of each
individual is assigned. Each individual’s genome is constructed as the vector of gene
alleles identified in the prior step. For example, for gene 3, of which there are 2 different
alleles in the population, each individual will be identified as having either allele 1 or 2 in
position 3 of its chromosome. The genome, then, is a vector of length equal to the
number of genes defining the behavior function. For Experiment E, this reduces the
dimensionality of the behavior function characterization from 1,572 to 78. With the
genome represented as a sequence of symbols, it is clustered using DBSCAN with the
Hamming distance6 as the clustering metric, with a maximum symbol substitution
fraction of 2% for the entire genome. For Experiment E, this amounts to up to 2 allele
differences allowable over the entire genome for cluster membership assignment.
Figure 12.2 shows the gene allele clustering (bottom) and genotypical clustering
(top) results for the given example. The alleles for each gene are color-coded along the yaxis in the bottom plot, with the data for each individual varying along the x-axis. The
individuals are ordered according to their genotypical clustering results, which are shown
in the top plot.

6

The Hamming distance is the number of differences in an ordered string of symbols. For example, the
strings ‘fabled’ and ‘failed’ have a Hamming distance of 1.
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Figure 12.2: Population Genotype Clustering Example: Experiment E, Trial 7, Generation 70
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The gene 3 example results from above are seen in Figure 12.2, where nearly the
entire population (194 individuals) have the first allele of gene 3 and only 3 individuals
have the second allele. The remaining 3 individuals have variants of the gene that are
unique enough to not cluster with any other.
The largest subpopulation is the set of individuals having genotype 4 (orange
bubbles in top plot), which are plotted in order numbered 4 through 94 in Figure 12.2.
The number of alleles for each gene is plotted in Figure 12.3. An interesting
result is that there is only a single allele each for 33 of 78 genes, including the genes 56
through 61. These genes represent the neurons in the middle of the final hidden layer,
those that feed the output layer neurons. Another 17 genes each only have 2 alleles in the
population. The most diversity exists in the second hidden layer, where nearly every gene
exhibits 2 or more alleles throughout the population.

Figure 12.3: Genetic Diversity: Experiment E, Trial 7, Generation 70
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Examining the action selection responses for individuals in a clustered genotype
has shown that the genotype membership assignment described here is predictive of the
action selection given an arbitrary perception input vector with 70 to 95% accuracy.
Table 12.2 shows a summary of the action selection prediction accuracy in response to an
ensemble of random perceptions for the identified genotypes in the example. The portion
is computed as the fraction of the subpopulation whose behavior function selects the
modal action response given a random input perception vector. The test data consists of
1000 random perception vectors. As expected, the larger the number of individuals in a
genotype subpopulation, the higher the likelihood that small variations in the genome will
produce different outcomes due to the highly non-linear nature of the behavior function
ANN. However, the accuracy can be improved by tightening the clustering distance,
which produces smaller genotype clusters, and potentially differentiates small differences
in large genotype subpopulations.
Table 12.2: Accuracy of Genotype Clustering in Predicting Common Behaviors

Genotype
Cluster
4
2
5
8
1
3
7
10
11
6
9
12

Genotype
Cluster
Population
59
22
12
11
7
6
5
3
3
2
2
2
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Portion
Selecting
Modal Action
0.635
0.76
0.723
0.651
0.703
0.907
0.68
0.826
0.711
0.856
0.859
0.816

This result shows that when analyzing the results of the training data, a
representative from a high-performing genotype can be used as a proxy for the other
constituent members of that genotype rather than analyzing them all individually.

12.2. Selected AI Swarm Agent Behaviors
Several training trials were conducted using various swarm agent designs and
threat agent designs. This section summarizes some ME-maximizing behaviors that were
discovered through swarm agent behavior function optimization.

12.2.1. Experiment D Trial 2
The details for training Trial 2 for Experiment D are summarized in Table 12.3.
The learning curve for the trial is plotted in Figure 12.4. The learning curve is plotted as
the mean fitness for the agent population divided into five quintiles over the learning
epochs (generations). For the training purposes, the fitness is expressed as the ME
achieved as a fraction of the full point value possible for each scenario. A unique, random
scenario was generated for each generation, with the complexity level specified.
Table 12.3: Experiment D Trial 2 Training Parameters

ADS Agent Adversary
Scenario Complexity Level
Swarm Ratio
Optimization Technique

threatBot1.0 (early variant)
2
0.50
Genetic Algorithm




#AI Behavior Functions

Uniform selection
Parents persist
Top 25% selection

200 per iteration
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Figure 12.4: Learning Curve: Experiment D Trial 2

The learning curve in Figure 12.4 shows that by the 7th generation, the top
quintile of swarm agents were able to achieve perfect ME, and by the 12th generation, the
top two quintiles were capable of doing so. While this seems impressive at first, it is
indicative of a very low bar. The threat agent used to train the swarm agents against was
an early version of threatBot1.0.
The main tactic that was discovered by ExpD.T2 was moving in formation.
Figure 12.5 and Figure 12.6 show representations of two generalized formations realized
by ExpD.T2.G30.C075 and ExpD.T2.G30.C029, individual swarm agents numbered 75
and 29 of generation 30, respectively. The figures also show screen captures of the swarm
forming the formations during gameplay. These formation tactics were named Nest Egg
and Meat Shield owing to their shapes.
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Figure 12.5: ExpD.T2.G30.C075 “Nest Egg” Formation Tactic

Figure 12.6: ExpD.T2.G30.C029 “Meat Shield” Formation Tactic

The “Nest Egg” and “Meat Shield” formation tactics are similar in that the swarm
initially partitions itself into a heterogeneous mixture of group sizes ranging from small-,
medium-, and large-sized units. In the Nest Egg formation, the large group is positioned
centrally, surrounded by a ring or wedge of small groups (hence the name). A mediumsized group is positioned forward of that grouping (in the direction of the ADS threats).
Any additional units left over tend to get clustered into a smaller sub-grouping as shown
in the figure.
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The Meat Shield formation is similar, with the exception that a large group takes
the forward position (hence the name). In both cases, once the formation is achieved, it
attacks the nearest PA.
Both formation tactics are successful against the early threatBot1.0 because that
agent does not attempt to de-conflict overlapping engagements from multiple ADS
threats. It is important to remember that even though the group unit numbers are shown in
the figures, the IADS does not have information on how many individual swam units
comprise each group. When the threatBot1.0 agent naively assigns engagements, it
typically begins with the leading edge groups in the formation. In the Meat Shield case,
this is the group with the largest number of units, so it requires several consecutive shots
to eliminate, allowing the trailing groups to ingress successfully. For the Nest Egg
formation, the medium-sized group is typically engaged first. In both cases, however, the
AI agent formations induce the threatBot1.0 agent to waste both time and SAM rounds
by overlapping engagements on the same groups.
This strategy is successful against the low-level threat agent, but are not
successful against the more sophisticated threatBots 2.0, 3.0, and 3.1. This is because
they include logic to specifically avoid overlapping target assignments (and thus
engagements).

12.2.2. Experiment D Trial 5
The details for training Trial 5 for Experiment D are summarized in Table 12.4.
As shown in the table, the only difference between Trial 2 and Trial 5 was the
substitution of threatBot1.0 with threatBot3.0 as the ADS agent. The learning curve for
the trial is plotted in Figure 12.7.
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Table 12.4: Experiment D Trial 5 Training Parameters

ADS Agent Adversary
Scenario Complexity Level
Swarm Ratio
Optimization Technique

threatBot3.0
4
0.50
Genetic Algorithm




#AI Behavior Functions

Uniform selection
Parents persist
Top 25% selection

200 per iteration

Figure 12.7: Learning Curve: Experiment D Trial 5

With a much more advanced adversarial agent, the ExpD agent took much longer
to train, as shown in its learning curve. After about 75 generations, the top quintile of
agent behavior functions began to consistently show fitness above 50% maximum ME.
By 150 generations, the mean fitness for the top quintile averaged about 80% maximum
ME. However, the random variation in scenario per generation as well as the nondeterministic outcomes in each gameplay session were enough to impose significant
uncertainty in ME outcomes, as the swarm agent was trained in scenarios where the ADS
had twice as many SAM ready rounds available as swarm units.
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In Trial 5, ExpD did not develop any form of formation flying strategy against
threatBot3.0. Instead, every successful genotype developed some variation of a
split/merge exploit. A description of this of this behavioral strategy follows, with plots
from an example game session for illustration. The example game session shown was a
match between AI swarm ExpD.T5.G148.C063 and threatBot3.0, playing in a complexity
level (CL) 4 scenario which was not in the training set.
Initially, the swarm partitions itself into the maximum number of groups, with
each consisting of only a single unit. Then, each begins attacking the nearest PA. Along
the route, individual groups initiate a merge action when they detect they have attacted
the IADS attention as leading groups. This is seen in Figure 12.8, an action snapshot of
the example game session between times 120 and 180 seconds. Swarm groups 5, 6, and
10 are in the lead positions, ingressing at full speed (dark red coloring of trajectory lines)
toward the IADS and start being tracked by the ADS (indicated by the magenta blocks
and dashed lines). This activity by the ADS is registered as stress inputs perceptions for
the swarm groups in the angular bins corresponding to the forward direction of
movement. Since these groups are in the lead positions of the overall swarm, their swarm
proportion perception angular array indicates that the rest of the swarm is largely behind
them. This combination of inputs (shown in Figure 12.9, for swarm group 6) leads the
group to switch its action from Ingress to Nearest PA to Merge with Nearest (shown in
Figure 12.10).
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Figure 12.8: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpD.T5.G148.C063 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 – 180 seconds

Figure 12.9: Example Gameplay – Group 6 Perceptions Plot: ExpD.T5.G148.C063 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 – 180 seconds
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Figure 12.10: Example Gameplay – Group 6 Actions Plot: ExpD.T5.G148.C063 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 – 180 seconds
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When swarm group 6 initiates its merge at approximately 130 seconds, it begins a
turning maneuver to align itself with its merging partner, group 10 behind it. Likewise,
swarm groups 5 and 10 perform similar merging maneuvers and resultant turns. The
merging maneuver and the merging result – two distinct targets merging into one target –
present the IADS target assignment logic with challenging inputs. Once the two distinct
targets tracks merge into a single track, the ADS tries to free resources by dropping the
duplicated track file, resulting in wasted shots fired. Additionally, the merged groups
immediately re-split into distinct groups. Since the threatBot3.0 Target Assignment logic
algorithm TA_TGA1 uses spatial clustering, the repetitive merging and splitting actions
cause significant delays in the tracking performance since targets that are allocated to a
particular ADS by the target assignment algorithm may no longer be available to for
tracking since their data has become stale after their merge maneuver.
The delays induced to tracking and engagement as well as the wasting of SAM
resources are enough to allow a few swarm units to leak past the IADS defenses and
strike the PA. This particular swarm agent never appears to attempt a strike on the EWS
or any ADS directly. The merging maneuvers taken by any particular group are highly
dependent upon the relative geometry and velocity vectors of the two merging groups. In
many cases, much less severe maneuvers are required to bring the groups into merge
alignment. In these cases, the impact to the IADS target assignment algorithm are much
less severe. This is the main reason the ExpD.T5 swarm genotypes cannot achieve
consistently high ME over a variety of scenarios.
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12.2.3. Experiment E Trial 3
The details for training Trial 3 for Experiment E are summarized in Table 12.5.
This trial was intended to compare the learning and performance of the Experiment E AI
swarm argent with that of Experiment D, as the two are very similar, with the exception
that ExpE’s observation function is much more compact, consisting of higher semantic
perceptions than that of ExpD. The learning curve for the trial is plotted in Figure 12.11.

Table 12.5: Experiment E Trial 3 Training Parameters

ADS Agent Adversary
Scenario Complexity Level
Swarm Ratio
Optimization Technique

threatBot3.0 (prior to splitangle logic fix)
[2 4]
0.70
Genetic Algorithm




#AI Behavior Functions

Uniform selection
Parents persist
Top 25% selection

200 per iteration

Figure 12.11: Learning Curve: Experiment E Trial 3

204

With a much more compact set of perceptions produced by the behavior function,
agent ExpE learned to achieve a consistently high ME against threatBot3.0 in about 50
generations, as shown in its learning curve. This is a significant improvement over
ExpD’s learning ability owing mainly to the improvement in the observation function.
A close examination of the behaviors learned by ExpE show that it discovered an
oversight in the design of the antenna FOV algorithm used by threatBot3.0. The agent
learned how to exploit the algorithm deficiency, allowing it to consistently defeat the
IADS.
As seen in the flowcharts in Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17, the antenna FOV
adjustment algorithm for threatBot3.0 (FOV_L3) computes the antenna FOV pointing
azimuth demand from a weighted sum of the position of the predicted intercept points
(PIP) of each target in the IADS air picture. When the swarm is partitioned into two
targets, both with similar posture to a particular ADS (and thus similar priority), the
computed azimuth demand will be equal to the average of the angle to their PIPs. The
ExpE.T4 swarm learned to exploit this algorithm by partitioning into two groups and
seeking the edge of the threat FOV before beginning a coordinated strike on the ADS.
This strategy causes the ADS to center its FOV between the ingressing swarm groups,
but when the angular spread is greater than the width of its FOV, it cannot track and
engage either group. The swarm groups strike the ADS, eliminating them before turning
their attention to striking the PA. The results of an example gameplay session are plotted
in Figure 12.12 through Figure 12.15 to demonstrate the exploitative behaviors learned
by swarm agent ExpE.T3.
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Figure 12.12: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T3.G061.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 0 – 120 seconds
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Figure 12.13: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T3.G061.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 – 240 seconds
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Figure 12.14: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T3.G061.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 240 – 320 seconds
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Figure 12.15: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T3.G061.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 320 – 400 seconds
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Figure 12.16: Example Gameplay – Group 1 Perceptions Plot: ExpE.T3.G060.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0
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Figure 12.17: Example Gameplay – Group 1 Actions Plot: ExpE.T3.G060.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0
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Figure 12.18: Example Gameplay – Group 2 Perceptions Plot: ExpE.T3.G060.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0
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Figure 12.19: Example Gameplay – Group 2 Actions Plot: ExpE.T3.G060.C001 vs ThreatBot3.0
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In the example game session, a single ADS with 13 ready rounds protects two
PAs, attacked by a 7-unit swarm. Initially (Figure 12.12), the swarm partitions itself into
two groups of equal size and both groups begin ingressing toward the single ADS. The
ADS begins tracking the lead target (group 2 – 3 units) and fires its first shot at t = 87.7
seconds, expecting a maximum range intercept. In response, swarm group 2 switches to
its Egress from MTT action and turns outbound. Sensing its partner’s threat reaction as a
combination of the change in its Portion of Group Ingressing to MTT perception
simultaneously with the change in its Portion of Group Threatened by MTT perception,
swarm group 1 switches to a Loiter action.
After the failed out-of-range engagement attempt of group 2, the ADS drops its
track, in response to which group 2 switches back to Ingress to MTT. Likewise, sensing
its partners attack, group 1 switches its own action to Ingress to MTT. This set of
coordinated actions on behalf of the two groups has created an angular separation with
respect to the ADS.
Now group 1 has taken the lead position, and continues to ingress and the ADS
attempts a maximum-range engagement (Figure 12.13). The two swarm groups continue
with the coordinated alternating ingress/egress behaviors, continuing to increase angular
separation with respect to the ADS, but not closing much range.
By t = 240 seconds, the two swarm groups are separated by about 120 degrees.
Group 1, to the south-east of the ADS and having ingressed into the WEZ, is engaged
successfully, suffering attrition as it turns evasive. Simultaneously, group 2 to the north,
sensing that it is un-threated by the ADS, ingresses (Figure 12.14).
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The two groups continue their coordinated attack, slowly closing range to the
ADS until about t = 360 seconds when both groups sense that they are mutually able to
attack but neither are threatened (Figure 12.15). This is due to the ADS FOV algorithm
falling to the average value lock described above. As the figure shows, both groups
ingress toward the ADS, just outside its FOV, while the ADS FOV remains fixed
between the two trajectories, unable to track and engage either. Once the swarm groups
destroy the ADS, they are free to continue attacking the PA with no defense from the
IADS.
Unsurprisingly, the strategy developed by AI swarm agent ExpE.T3 works against
an IADS containing multiple ADS as that the agent learned by playing scenarios
generated at complexity level 4. The strategy is able to scale because the observation
function divides the overall swarm into clusters of groups which are geographically
concentrated and have selected a common MTT. This allows the overall swarm to
partition itself into teams which independently attack their ADS targets. Figure 12.20
shows the histograms of the extra parameters for the population of Experiment E
behavior functions at generation 60. The distribution of Clustering Distance (clustDist)
values shows that the population is largely divided into three values: 10.1, 10.4 and 11.1
km. The agent ExpE.T3.G060.C001, which produced the gameplay shown in the
example, had extra parameters with values: clustDist = 10.116 km, mergeMaxDistance =
1.911 km, and mergeMinVelAlign = 0.766.
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Figure 12.20: Extra Parameters Histogram: ExpE.T3.G060

The strategy developed by AI swarm agent ExpE.T3 is a valid and highly
effective exploit of the nature of the DEAD engagement. However, a human operator
either performing target assignment tasks at a C2 node to a subordinate ADS or working
locally at an ADS prosecuting targets in its list would recognize the situation and not be
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susceptible to the same attack. In fact, no game session has been collected to date in
which a human player controlling an ADS fell victim to this kind of attack when playing
against an AI or human controlled swarm agent.
Because this tactic is particularly conspicuous to a human observer, a small
modification was added to the FOV_L3 logic to prevent the ADS from falling prey to this
attack. The logic simply counts the number of targets assigned to it and the number of
targets current in its FOV. If at any time the number assigned is greater than zero at the
same time that the number in its FOV equals zero, then instead of setting the FOV
azimuth demand to the weighted average PIP, the FOV azimuth demand is set to the
heading to the highest priority target that is assigned. This has the simple effect of
breaking the stalemate condition, cause the FOV to move toward the highest priority
target. Then the normal logic takes over once one or more targets come into the FOV.

12.2.4. Experiment E Trial 8
The details for training Trial 8 for Experiment E are summarized in Table 12.6.
This trial was a direct repeat of Trial 3 with the exception being the inclusion of the
FOV_L3 improvement to detect and mitigate the split-angle attack strategy developed by
swarm agent ExpE.T3. The learning curve for the trial is plotted in Figure 12.21
(population fitness divided into quintiles) and Figure 12.22 (population fitness divided
into ventiles).
Table 12.6: Experiment E Trial 8 Training Parameters

ADS Agent Adversary
Scenario Complexity Level
Swarm Ratio
Optimization Technique

threatBot3.0 (after splitangle logic fix)
[2 4]
0.70
Genetic Algorithm
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#AI Behavior Functions

Uniform selection
Parents persist
Top 25% selection

200 per iteration

Figure 12.21: Learning Curve Experiment E Trial 8 (Quintiles)

Figure 12.22: Learning Curve Experiment E Trial 8 (Ventiles)
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The learning curve shows that the training population of Experiment E largely
was unable to find successful strategies to achieve high ME against ADS agent
threatBot3.0 when it included the logic to specifically counter the split-angle attack.
However, the top ventile (highest-performing 5%) was able to achieve an average ME of
60% in the latest generations of learning, albeit with high variance generation to
generation.
An individual that was found to consistently achieve high ME was
ExpE.T8.G050.C003. The results of an example gameplay session are plotted in Figure
12.23 through Figure 12.26 to demonstrate the behaviors learned by swarm agent
ExpE.T8. An important note is that the clustDist parameter in the ExpE behavior function
had attained a value of 0.0 km for agent ExpE.T8.G050.C003. This means that no matter
what the swarm partitioning or distribution during gameplay, each swarm group would
always be the sole member of its own cluster.
Initially, the swarm partitions itself into two groups, which begin to ingress
toward the MTT. The eastern-most ADS begins tracking both groups and fires a single
SAM at each. In response, both groups switch their action to Orbit MTT Away from
Cluster. Since each group is the sole member of its cluster due to the value of clustDist
evolving to 0.0, this action manifests as both groups orbiting the MTT in a direction
opposite of the other, as seen in Figure 12.23.
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Figure 12.23: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T8.G050.C003 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 0 – 180 seconds
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Figure 12.24: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T8.G050.C003 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 180 – 240 seconds
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Figure 12.25: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T8.G050.C003 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 240 – 300 seconds
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Figure 12.26: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpE.T8.G050.C003 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 300 – 360 seconds
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Figure 12.27: Example Gameplay – Group 3 Perceptions Plot: ExpE.T8.G050.C003 vs ThreatBot3.0
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Figure 12.28: Example Gameplay – Group 3 Actions Plot: ExpE.T8.G050.C003 vs ThreatBot3.0
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Subsequently, each group momentarily selects the Split action until it is
comprised of only a single unit. The new groups break away and immediately begin
ingressing toward the MTT. Now the swarm is partitioned into eight independent groups,
with largest groups (groups 3 and 6) comprising five and four units each, respectively,
along the leading edge, with the successively smaller groups trailing.
As the initial SAM engagements fail, the ADS switches its priority to the leading
groups (3 and 6), begins tracking them, and fires one SAM at each. Having gained the
attention of the ADS, the leading edge groups repeat the process, seen in Figure 12.24,
by switching their action from Ingress to MTT to Orbit MTT Away from Cluster. The
action extends the timeline of the engagement allowing the other groups to close more
distance to the MTT. The groups repeat the cycle of ingress/rotate maneuvers, allowing
the swarm to close distance to the eastern ADS and destroy it by occupying its two
engagement channels and extending each successive engagement timeline.
At about t = 280 seconds, (Figure 12.25), swarm group 3 has come within range
of the north-east PA, and its perception Nearest PA Reachable stimulates a subtle change
in its behavior relative to the rest of the swarm, as seen in Figure 12.27 and Figure
12.28. Instead of attacking the PA as it perceives it is able to do without harm, now group
3, perceiving simultaneously that its MTT is tracking it, switches its attack to Orbit MTT
Away from Cluster. The rest of the swarm continues to ingress toward the MTT, but that
ADS cannot break off its continued engagement of group 3 (with 3 remaining units)
because it is the highest priority since it is in the vicinity of the PA.
This diversion tactic is successful, as group 3 continues to orbit and suffers
attrition from engagements, but the remaining groups close distance and destroy the
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remaining ADS. With no remaining defenses, the remaining swarm units are able to
destroy the PA.
The tactics developed by ExpE.T8 are highly successful because they exploit two
features of the nature of the DEAD mission simultaneously. First, the engagement
efficiency of the ADS are significantly reduced by the maneuver cycle extending the
timeline of the simultaneous engagements. Second, because the IADS places a high
priority on engaging targets that are near any PA, the agent learned to use a diversion
tactic to allow the swarm to ingress without being engaged at the expense of sacrificing
units. A key development that allowed these tactics to develop is the evolution of the
clustDist parameter to a value of 0.0, fundamentally altering the of the swarm’s action
function.

12.2.5. Experiment F Trial 4
The details for training Trial 4 for Experiment F are summarized in Table 12.7.
This trial used threatBot3.0 with FOV_L3 logic improvement as the ADS agent as in
ExpE Trial 8. That trial showed that the threatBot3.0 with FOV_L3 was very effective in
preventing the swarms from developing tactics that were overwhelmingly effective. The
Experiment F swarm agent was created in an attempt to overcome the dominance of
threatBot3.0. ExpF is identical to ExpE, except that it has a single added neuron on its
output layer, and thus an additional action in its action function. The addition output
neuron activation level is used to control the swarm unit’s speed setpoint. ExpF Trial 4
examines whether the additional degree of freedom provided by the speed setpoint
control is sufficient to allow the swarm agent to develop high-performing tactics against
the most advanced threat agent.
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The learning curve for the trial is plotted in Figure 12.29 (population fitness
divided into quintiles) and Figure 12.30 (population fitness divided into ventiles).
Table 12.7: Experiment F Trial 4 Training Parameters

ADS Agent Adversary
Scenario Complexity Level
Swarm Ratio
Optimization Technique

threatBot3.0 (after splitangle logic fix)
4
0.70
PSO Algorithm




#AI Behavior Functions

10 local optima
10 iterations optima
memory
Velocity decay 0.40

200 per iteration

Figure 12.29: Learning Curve Experiment F Trial 4 (Quintiles)
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Figure 12.30: Learning Curve Experiment F Trial 4 (Ventiles)

The learning curve shows that the top quintile of the training population of
Experiment F was able to find successful strategies to achieve high ME against ADS
agent threatBot3.0 when it included the logic to specifically counter the split-angle attack.
Additionally, the top ventile (highest-performing 5%) was able to achieve a perfect ME
in the latest generations of learning, albeit with high variance generation to generation.
The near-perfect tactics developed by the most successful ventile of ExpF.T4 are
illustrated in Figure 12.31, which shows the results of a gameplay session of individual
ExpF.T4.G058.C197 against threatBot3.0.
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Figure 12.31: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpF.T4.G058.C197 vs ThreatBot3.0

Initially, the swarm divides itself into two equally-sized groups. Hereafter, the
westernmost group will be referred to as Group 1, and the easternmost as Group 2.
Likewise, the westernmost ADS will be referred to as ADS 1, and the easternmost as
ADS 2. Each of the two groups ingresses toward the WEZ of the nearest ADS along a
gradually-bending course. Each group also modulates its approach angle producing a
sinusoidal overlay on its course. The shape of the course taken is produced by modulation
of both the waypoint and speed setpoint outputs of the behavior function. The average
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speed achieved by each swarm group is about 150 m/s, which is half their designed
maximum speed of 300 m/s. Using Algorithm 1 (Figure E.1), this reduction in speed is
expected to allow each ADS to nearly double the number of engagements available on
each swarm group (18 vs 10 shots for each track channel). At first glance, this tactic
would appear to lead to a reduction in ME.
The groups switch tactics once they reach the axis between the two ADS. At this
point, each group continues its sinusoidally-modulated behavior, but adjusts its overall
course to directly approach the ADS. This continues until each group is able to strike its
ADS target.
In cases when the strategy works perfectly, the ADS systems never attempt a
single engagement against either swarm group. This is because the modulated speed and
heading coordination the swarm groups causes each ADS to reactively switch its
attention between the two groups, which end up being about 180 degrees separated, with
respect to each ADS. This is illustrated in the plots in Figure 12.32.
Figure 12.32 contains four plots, with each showing data recorded between 250
and 540 seconds of the gameplay example shown in Figure 12.31. The first plot shows
the heading angle (direction of travel) of each of the two swarm groups (Group 1 in red,
Group 2 in cyan) vs time. The second plot shows the bearing angle between ADS 1 and
each swarm Group, as well as the azimuth angle of ADS 1’s antenna in black. The third
plot shows the computed time-to-go (Tgo) for each swarm group relative to ADS 1.
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Figure 12.32: Example Gameplay – ADS 1 Target Assignment Data: ExpF.T4.G058.C197 vs ThreatBot3.0

The fourth plot is the result of the target assignment algorithm TA_TGA1,
showing which targets have been assigned to ADS 1. The target assignment behavior
shown is the root cause for the “indecision” suffered by the ADS, resulting in it never

232

engaging either swarm group. ADS 2 suffers a similar fate. The sinusoidally-modulated
approach of each swarm group produces the sawtooth heading pattern and the Tgo pattern
plots in Figure 12.32. When the two groups synchronize their movements, their Tgo
patterns relative to ADS 1 become out of phase. This causes the target assignment
algorithm to oscillate between assigning group 1 and group 2 to ADS 1, as seen starting
at about 375 seconds. The target assignment logic is updated with a 10 second period.
The swarm group heading behavior and resulting Tgo patterns shown in Figure
12.32 are made possible by the fact that the swarm behavior function causes them to fly
at the lower speed of 150 m/s rather than top available speed of 300 m/s. This is because
of the turn acceleration limit of the swarm unit design. Assuming a constant turn
acceleration 𝑎 𝑇 and moving with speed 𝑣, the target trajectory produces a circle with
radius 𝑟𝑇 as in (89). The constant heading rate of change 𝜔 in rad/s is given by (90).
𝑣2
𝑟𝑇 =
𝑎𝑇
𝑣
ω=
𝑟𝑇

(89)
(90)

With the swarm unit design maximum turn acceleration of 3 g’s, the swarm unit
can achieve a maximum heading rate of change of 5.6 deg/s when flying at maximum
speed of 300 m/s. The 90 degree peak-to-peak sawtooth waveform of the heading pattern
would require 16 seconds to complete. This time is longer than the 10 second update
period of the TA_TGA1 algorithm, so it would be ineffective. However, the
ExpF.T4.G058.C197 swarm behavior function causes the swarm units to fly between 150
and 156 m/s. The lower speed allows the swarm groups to make the 90 degree heading
change maneuver in 8.0 to 8.3 seconds. This faster maneuverability allows the swarm to
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change its heading between a threatening and non-threatening states faster than the target
assignment algorithm updates. The assignment logic then ends up oscillating between the
two end states, Group 1 and Group 2 being assigned. Since the two groups move into
opposing positions, the ADS must move its antenna to place the assigned target into its
FOV in order to engage it. The resulting oscillation pattern in the ADS antenna azimuth
is seen in Figure 12.32 as well.
The target assignment logic is unable to break out of the oscillatory state while the
two swarm groups approach from opposite directions, eventually destroying each ADS.
This strategy is effective against two ADS simultaneously when the two swarm groups
can force their Tgo patterns into the out-of-phase condition. The strategy is also effective
against a single ADS system with the same condition.
The tactics described here are very effective against the threatBot3.0 ADS agent,
but not against other agents. This is a result of overfitting the behavior function to a
single peculiarity of the threatBot3.0 agent behavior that is not exploitable in the other
ADS agents.

12.2.6. Experiment F Trial 6
The details for training Trial 6 for Experiment F are summarized in Table 12.8.
The results of Trial 4 showed that the addition of the speed SP control to the action
function led to over-fitting of the behavior function to the particular threat behavior
function. Trial 6 was an attempt to prevent overfitting while leveraging the extra degree
of freedom provided by the speed SP action. To prevent overfitting, Trial 6 used both
threatBot2.0 and threatBot3.0 (with FOV_L3 logic improvement) as the ADS agent. Each
evaluation of the behavior function fitness involved the swarm-vs-IADS gameplay of for
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the particular scenario with the IADS under control of each of the two ADS agents
independently, with the fitness assigned as the average of the two game scores.
The learning curve for the trial is plotted in Figure 12.33 (population fitness
divided into quintiles) and Figure 12.34 (population fitness divided into ventiles).
Table 12.8: Experiment F Trial 6 Training Parameters

ADS Agent Adversary

Scenario Complexity Level
Swarm Ratio
Optimization Technique

threatBot2.0 and
threatBot3.0 (after splitangle logic fix)
4
0.70
PSO Algorithm




#AI Behavior Functions

10 local optima
10 iterations optima
memory
Velocity decay 0.40

200 per iteration

Figure 12.33: Learning Curve Experiment F Trial 6 (Quintiles)
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Figure 12.34: Learning Curve Experiment F Trial 6 (Ventiles)

The learning curve shows that the top ventile of the training population of
Experiment F was able to find successful strategies to achieve greater than 50% ME
against both threatBot2.0 and threatBot3.0 ADS agents consistently generation to
generation. Some generations the achieved ME was over 65%. The intergeneration
variance is due to the random nature of the scenarios used to evaluate fitness. This result
indicates that the top-performing swarm behavior functions were able to develop
successful tactics that were robust to variable scenario parameters and the different
behaviors exhibited by the advanced ADS agents.
To demonstrate some of the tactics used by the high performing ExpF.T6
behavior functions, Figure 12.35 through Figure 12.38 show the results of an example
gameplay session. The speed of each swarm group is plotted in Figure 12.39. Figure
12.40 and Figure 12.41 show the results of the threatBot3.0 target assignment logic for
ADS 1 (easternmost) and ADS 2 (westernmost), respectively.
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Figure 12.35: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpF.T6.G058.C025 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 – 180 seconds
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Figure 12.36: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpF.T6.G058.C025 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 180 – 240 seconds
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Figure 12.37: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpF.T6.G058.C025 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 240 – 300 seconds
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Figure 12.38: Example Gameplay – Action Plot: ExpF.T6.G058.C025 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 300 – 360 seconds
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Figure 12.39: Example Gameplay – Swarm Speed Plot: ExpF.T6.G058.C025 vs ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 –
425 seconds
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Figure 12.40: Example Gameplay – ADS 1 Target Assignment Logic Plot: ExpF.T6.G058.C025 vs
ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 – 425 seconds
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Figure 12.41: Example Gameplay – ADS 2 Target Assignment Logic Plot: ExpF.T6.G058.C025 vs
ThreatBot3.0 – T: 120 – 425 seconds

The main behaviors exhibited by ExpF.T6.G058.C025 are similar to those learned
by ExpD.T5.G148.C063 (Section 12.2.2), wherein the groups respond to max-range
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engagements by the ADS by turning outbound and causing misses. These tactics are
enhanced by ExpF.T6.G058.C025 through modulation of the swarm group speed.
Initially, the swarm divides itself into four groups, two groups of two. As shown in
Figure 12.35 and Figure 12.39, the swarm groups initially fly at 200 m/s, below their
maximum speed of 300 m/s. This is probably done to allow quicker turns to maximize
survivability of max-range shots, allowing a 180 degree turn in 21 seconds rather than the
32 seconds it would require at a speed of 300 m/s. The trailing groups (1 and 3) ingress at
the initial speed of 200 m/s. When the lead groups (2 and 4) sense they are being engaged
at max-range, they respond with an outbound turn combined with an acceleration up to
230 m/s. Each of the two lead groups also combine this maneuver with a single split
action. The two engaged groups continue their evasive maneuver, while the two newlysplit groups (5 and 6) continue to ingress as they are not tracked. These new swarm
groups continue encroaching untracked and accelerate to 225 m/s.
Once the initial engagements from ADS 2 finish (miss), it switches its attention to
the newly-split and fast approaching two swarm groups in the lead (5 and 6). These two
swarm groups repeat the same basic tactic as groups 2 and 4.
By about 330 seconds, ADS 2 has engaged the leading groups effectively and
ADS 1 has also contributed to the attrition, albeit after some forced overcommitting of
SAM rounds. By this time, ADS 1 has exhausted its magazine and the 2 lead groups (2
and 4), having ingressed behind the forward force have not suffered any attrition. Those
two groups continue as ADS 1 engages them, and strike the eastern PA at about 415
seconds. ADS 1, having exhausted its remaining magazine, is unable to prevent the
remaining swarm groups, totaling 3 units, from striking the western PA. At this point,
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with no remaining PA and with both ADS still active, but not engaging, the swarm units
decide to loiter rather than attacking the ADS. This is likely because there is little benefit
in terms of additional ME to be gained from a direct attack on the ADS, since they would
most likely be eliminated. This decision is made without the knowledge of the ADS
magazine count remaining. Had the swarm group known that zero engagements were
available, they likely would have attacked the defenseless ADS in order to attain the
additional ME.
The tactics demonstrated by ExpF.T6.G58.C025 is indicative of the very complex
coordinated behaviors learned by ExpF. The addition of the speed SP action allows much
of the two-wave and coordinated bluff/split actions to be successful.

12.3. AI Swarm Agent Mission Effectiveness
This section shows the results of Monte Carlo simulation runs of the selected AI
swarm agents against the various levels of ADS agent, as in Chapter 10. In each section,
the number of units in the swarm is varied from 11 to 22, for gameplay against the
selected ADS agent playing in the reference scenario described in Chapter 10. As in the
base swarm agent analysis, each scenario is run multiple times (N = 100) to collect a
statistical sample of the results. The ME values are shown as a percentage of the total ME
achievable for the scenario (189,618 points).
Figure 12.42 shows the ME distribution achieved by ExpF.T6.G058.C025 as a
function of swarm size, playing against threatBot1p0, threatBot2p0, threatBot3p0, and
threatBot3p1 (top to bottom). Figure 12.43 shows the mean (top) and median (bottom) of
the ME achieved as a function of swarm size.
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The agent ExpF.T6 behavior function was trained against a CL 4 ADS with a
swarm-size-to-SAM-rounds ratio of 0.70. The adversarial ADS agent was both
threatBot2p0 and threatBot3p0, with the fitness value for each evaluation taken as the
average ME achieved for the individual matches against the ADS agents. For the average
CL 4 match having 24 ready rounds available to the IADS, the stipulated swarm ratio of
0.70 provided an average swarm size of 17 units during training.
The median (top) and mean (bottom) ME achieved by ExpF.T6. G058.C025
against the four baseline threat bots plotted in Figure 12.43 show interesting and
unexpected results. The achieved ME against threatBot2p0 (blue) and threatBot3p0
(green), against which the behavior function was trained, both show low median ME
below swarm sizes of 16 units. The AI swarm agent’s performance against the two ADS
agents then diverges for large swarm sizes, having a differential median ME of between
30 and 60 percentage points. The AI swarm agent is capable of near-perfect ME against
threatBot3p0 for swarm sizes 18 and larger, but 18 is the smallest swarm size that allows
the AI swarm agent to achieve the threshold 25% median ME against threatBot2p0.
This result shows that the tactics learned by the AI swarm agent were heavily
skewed toward performance against threatBot3p0 and were only adequately fit against
threatBot3p0 to keep the agent in the pool of top-performers to ensure propagation to
each subsequent generation during the training.
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Figure 12.42: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: ExpF.T6.G058.C025. vs Baseline ThreatBots
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Figure 12.43: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: ExpF.T6.G058.C025. vs Baseline ThreatBots
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The AI swarm performance curve against threatBot1p0 (black) falls between
those against threatBot3p0 and threatBot2p0. While threatBot1p0 has the most basic
logic with no specific anti-swarming features, it not surprising that the ADS did not
perform better against it because its behavior function was not in the training data.
What is most surprising is that the AI swarm agent performed best against
threatBot3p1, which was the most sophisticated ADS agent with specific anti-swarming
features and was not included in the training set. The threshold swarm size of 15 units
allowed the AI swarm agent to achieve 65% median ME (52% mean ME), which was
better performance than any of the basic swarmBot behavior against any threat ADS
behavior. The AI swarm agent is able to achieve equivalent ME against threatBot3p1
with 5 fewer units than against threatBot2p0.

12.4. RCS Reduction as Mission Effectiveness Enhancement
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the capacity of an ADS to engage air targets is
largely determined by the maximum distance the target can be tracked. Reducing the
swarm unit RCS reduces the effective tracking and engagement range. If reduced
sufficiently, it could reduce the number of engagements available at a given speed. This
section examines the effect on improved ME of implementing a swarm unit RCS
reduction of 3 dB. Reducing the RCS of an air vehicle by half is likely a complicated and
expensive endeavor, as evidenced by comparing the AGM-86 conventional air-launched
CM with the AGM-129 stealth air-launched CM (Figure 12.44). [58]
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Figure 12.44: Advanced Cruise Missile (AGM-129A) Signature Reduction Characteristics, Reprinted
Courtesy of USAF

Given a predicted target trajectory, the maximum number of successive
engagements an ADS can attempt can be computed, bounded by the target endpoint by
evaluating the TOF recursively along the target trajectory and accumulating the TOF for
each engagement.
Using Algorithm 1 (Figure E.1), the maximum number of successive
engagements (per engagement channel) available that each ADS could attempt for the
reference scenario are compiled in Table 12.9, when each of the three PA are the
endpoint for each swarm unit. Since both AD radars have two track channels, the total
engagement capacity for each is double that in the table entries. With the baseline RCS,
the ADS have maximum tracking range values of 60 and 30 km for ADS 1 and 2,
respectively. The 3 dB RCS reduction reduces the maximum tracking range of the ADS
to 50.5 and 25.2 km. The reduced tracking range for the ADS results in slightly
diminished engagement capacity, as seen in Table 12.9.
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Table 12.9: Predicted Maximum Single-Channel Engagement Capacity for Reference Scenario
Baseline RCS

Reduced RCS

ADS 1

ADS 2

ADS 1

ADS 2

PA 1

11

2

10

2

PA 2

11

7

11

7

PA 3

11

9

10

8

Flying at its maximum speed of 300 m/s, a swarm unit can be engaged at a
maximum range of 37 and 18 km, a reduction of 7.5 and 10 percent, respectively, of the
maximum effective ranges two ADS batteries. The total timeline capacity of between 26
and 40 CM targets is tempered by the limited FOV for each ADS.
The ME enhancing effects of a 3 dB RCS reduction are examined in the following
plots. Each figure shows the ME achieved (median top, mean bottom) for the indicated
swarm agent playing against the IADS in the reference scenario controlled by the
indicated ADS agent as a function of swarm size ranging from 10 to 22 units. The
simulation was executed in a Monte Carlo fashion (n = 100) to collect the ME statistics.
Figure 12.45 shows the ME of ExpE.T8.G050.C003 against threatBot2p0 with
the baseline RCS (green) and with the 3 dB RCS reduction (red). For comparison, the
basic swarm bot swarmBot0p0 ME is also included (baseline RCS in black, reduced RCS
in blue).
Figure 12.46 shows the ME of ExpF.T6.G058.C025 against threatBot2p0 with
the baseline RCS (green) and with the 3 dB RCS reduction (red). For comparison, the
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basic swarm bot swarmBot0p0 ME is also included (baseline RCS in black, reduced RCS
in blue).
Figure 12.47 shows the ME of ExpF.T6.G058.C025 against threatBot3p0 with
the baseline RCS (green) and with the 3 dB RCS reduction (red). For comparison, the
basic swarm bot swarmBot0p0 ME is also included (baseline RCS in black, reduced RCS
in blue).
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Figure 12.45: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: ExpE.T8.G050.C003. vs Baseline threatBot2p0 Showing
RCS Reduction Effect
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Figure 12.46: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: ExpF.T6.G058.C025. vs Baseline threatBot2p0 Showing
RCS Reduction Effect
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Figure 12.47: ME Distribution vs Swarm Size: ExpF.T6.G058.C025. vs Baseline threatBot3p0 Showing
RCS Reduction Effect
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The ME data for swarmBot0p0 in Figure 12.45 through Figure 12.47 show an
interesting result. Since swarmBot0p0 implements a very basic, nonreactive, straight-line
and constant speed attack, it is very easy for the AD systems to predict engagement
intercepts and efficiently allocate the targets among the various AD systems. Against
threatBot2p0 (Figure 12.45 and Figure 12.46) the 3 dB RCS reduction had no effect on
the ME of the swarm as the mean and median ME achieved is virtually identical for all
tested swarm sizes. Against threatBot3p0 (Figure 12.47), the 3 dB RCS reduction did
improve the ME of swarmBot0p0 for swarm sizes of 16 units and greater.
As ExpE.T8 was trained against threatBot2p0, it is not surprising that it shows
high performance (Figure 12.45). Applying the 3 dB RCS reduction to the swarm units
allowed ExpE.T8 to further improve its ME against threatBot2p0 for swarm sizes below
16 units. In fact, with a 10 unit swarm the AI swarm agent was able to improve its ME by
293% over that achieved with baseline RCS. Since the RCS reduction itself is insufficient
to reduce the IADS engagement capacity (as evidenced by the performance against
swarmBot0p0), the behaviors learned by ExpE.T8, described earlier, are clearly enhanced
by the RCS reduction.
ExpF.T6 was trained against both threatBot2p0 and threatBot3p0. The tactics
learned by ExpF.T6.G058.C025 showed slightly better ME against threatBot3p0 than
against threatBot2p0 for similar swarm sizes. The AI swarm agent ME against
threatBot3p0 was not enhanced by the 3 dB RCS reduction against where that of the
baseline swarmBot0p0 was. This is likely due to the fact that ME-enhancing tactics
learned by the AI swarm agent occur well inside the ADS trackable range, as described
earlier. The 3 dB RCS reduction did improve the AI swarm agent’s ME against
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threatBot2p0 for swarm sizes 18 units and larger, however. At these larger swarm sizes,
there is no room for improvement for the AI swarm agent against swarmBot3p0, as it was
able to achieve near-perfect ME for swarm sizes 18 and larger.
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CHAPTER 13 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This chapter summarizes the major findings resulting from this research, as well
as interesting discoveries made along the way that are tangentially related to the major
topic. Areas where future work might explore are also presented.

13.1. Major Findings
This research has demonstrated that a group of autonomous agents can learn
cooperative behaviors to achieve high ME in the DEAD domain, which is a highly
variable and dynamic problem area. Not only can the cognitive swarm improve ME over
that of a similar or smaller-sized non-cognitive swarm, but it can leverage traditional
optimizations such as RCS reduction, where a non-cognitive swarm is unable to do so.
In general, the swarm tactics work by forcing the ADS to make sub-optimal
decisions. Even when more advanced ADS agents are programmed to avoid certain types
of decisions, the swarm agents are capable of learning adaptive behaviors which result in
high ME through accumulation of small errors on behalf of the ADS. Most common
among these tactics are converting maximum-range engagements into out-of-range
engagements, and reducing the ADS capacity through prolongation of engagements.
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In all behavior functions that were analyzed to understand specific tactics and
strategies, individual swarm unit attrition was never avoided. Rather attrition was
typically used as a tactic in itself. Intentional attrition of individual swarm units comes in
the forms of deceptive and decoy behaviors which have the effect of occupying
engagement channels for prolonged periods or for moving the ADS FOV into more
favorable position for the swarm.
The training methodology only evaluates the fitness of the behavior function as
the result of a complete gameplay session, rather than some other unsupervised
techniques which attempt to reward small individual changes in states. This forces the
tactics to be scalable across swarm sizes, since attrition is inevitable. As the swarm
declines in size over the course of a single gameplay session, the swarm must arrive at
behaviors that are sufficient to achieve ME in the later stages of the conflict.
The process of designing a ML approach as a solution to any problem area is
necessarily iterative, and this research was no different. A few minor findings related to
attaining successful behavior function training follow.
For meaningful learning to occur, the number of swarm units must be small
compared to the number of ready rounds available. This is because if the swarm is
oversized, it can win by overpowering and the only tactic learned is “just fly right at
‘em”. The small swarm size is inherently unsurvivable, so it must find small ways to
incrementally improve ME via the GA learning process. Initially, every swarm learns to
directly attack an ADS or a PA and then go from there.
This result is interesting because it gets at the economic balancing question of the
cost to deploy a swarm of cognitive weapons versus the cost to deploy non-cognitive
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weapons. Having the value of the swarm unit generally smaller than that of a single SAM
round stimulates the GA by creating a small positive effect on ME just by the swarm
units being shot down by the IADS.
The swarm learning process is susceptible to over-fitting problems when the ADS
behavior function has very specific features that can be exploited leading to high gains in
ME. Several examples were discovered in this research.
An example of a software bug being exploited by the swarm agent was the “drop
track bug”. This was a simple programming bug in the basic logic of threatBot1p0. In the
track control function TC_PSA1 used by the agent, the logic for a single AD radar to
drop an active track is made when that tracked target is not the primary target and when
all track channels are filled with secondary targets. The idea being that the primary target
is not tracked and there needs to be a track channel freed up to do so. Figure 13.1 shows
a screen capture of a portion of the (un-patched) C++ code which contained the bug.
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Figure 13.1: TC_PSA1 Function Code Snippet

The if statement on line 1038 attempts to evaluate the Boolean variable
trackingPriority, which is set earlier in the function if any of the tracked targets are the
primary. However, as written, trackingPriority = false actually assigns7 the false value to

7

In C++, the = symbol assigns the right-value to the variable on the left. The == symbol is used to test the
equality condition of the left- and right-values, and returns a true or false value.
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the variable, therefore causing the condition to always take the else branch. This
prevented the ADS from ever dropping active tracks.
An early AI swarm agent was very adept at developing an attack strategy to
exploit this bug. The swarm would divide into a large number of groups and ingress
toward the nearest ADS. Once the ADS began tracking any swarm group, that swarm
group would switch to loitering in its current position while the untracked groups
continued to ingress. As those other groups became the priority, they would be tracked as
well and would then react in the same way. Eventually each ADS would fill its available
track channels but would be unable to drop track of those loitering targets. Other untracked groups would continue to ingress and eventually strike and destroy the ADS.
Once all ADS were destroyed, the remaining groups were able to attack the PA. This
strategy was perfectly effective and would often result in perfect ME achieved without a
single SAM being fired by the entire IADS.
The AI swarm agent was very ineffective against human-controlled ADS agents,
however, since no human behaved with the same flawed decision-making. The human
gameplay spot-checking was required to identify, find, and correct the software bug. The
AI swarm was satisfied to maximize its objective utility function regardless of how
relevant its solutions are to real-world situations.
This example illustrates a potential application for the ML agent reinforcement
learning methodology used in this research. Adversarial ML agents could be programmed
to operate with the observation and action functions (computer network and Internet
hacker tools) and their behavior functions could be trained in a virtual environment to
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find exploits in software packages provided there existed a sufficient and objective way
to measure ME.
Another example of software feature exploitation was the FOV logic bug, which
was described in Chapter 11. This was less a software programming error and more the
result of a short-sighted design. This phenomenon is reminiscent of accounts of software
development in the early days of the Internet. Developers wrote software assuming that
users would act in good faith and within the spirit of the intended use of the software, and
as a consequence rarely, if ever, considered the security implications of accidental or
intentional misuse. Once attackers discovered vulnerabilities in software, they could be
exploited clandestinely. The attack could only be thwarted once the attack was detected
and the vulnerability was identified and patched.
The coordinate FOV timing attack learned by ExpF.T4 described in Chapter 11
was an overfitting of the behavior function to particular features of the adversary ADS
behavior that was enabled by the addition of an additional degree of freedom in the
swarm action function. It was considered an over-fitting condition because the behavior
function was very good at achieving high ME against the ADS agent against which it was
trained, but those behaviors were not very effective against human or other ADS agents.
The overfitting was avoided by using multiple different ADS agents in the objective
function evaluation.
As the research progressed, several observation and action function experiments
were evaluated. This experimentation showed that it is useful to include additional swarm
parameters (ANN hyperparameters, behavior function parameters, action function
parameters, etc.) into the vector optimizer rather than try to design them to specific
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values. The best performance comes as a result of the optimal values being discovered
along with the complementary behavior functions through the optimization process.
With the observation and action functions designed, cooperative swarming tactics
developed by the AI swarm agents can further enhance ME by addition of traditional
techniques such as RCS reduction, where the traditional technique alone is insufficient.

13.2. Interesting Discoveries
The AI agents learn according to the “letter of the law” rather than the “spirit of the
law” because they are working to strictly maximize their objective utility function. It
would be very difficult to include in that utility function some evaluation of the realworld applicability of the solution beyond ensuring that the rules that dictate the
evaluation (the simulation environment in this case) adhere as closely as possible to those
of the real world. However, additional features can be added to the utility function at will,
which will necessarily produce different outcomes in the resulting behavior functions.
This can be done to encourage certain features becoming prevalent in successful behavior
functions or discouraging the emergence of undesirable features.
The training process used in this research generates large quantities of data.
Terabytes of training and Monte Carlo data was generated requiring hundreds of CPU
days. At the end of a training period, many candidate behavior functions have been
produced, each with a unique set of ANN and extra parameters. As discussed above, the
utility of any behavior function must be checked by human gameplay in order to ensure it
is a real-world relevant solution. The genotyping/phenotyping process described in
Chapter 12 was developed in order to try to reduce the amount of human spot-checking
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that was required. The technique is very useful for post-processing the large pool of
potentially successful agent behavior functions and predicting which behavior functions
will have similar behaviors when presented with identical perceptions.

13.3. Future Work
In the course of this research, several ideas were inspired that could be directions
for continued work in this area. Some of them are discussed as follows.
There is a lot of power in transforming measured states and properties from the
environment into highly-semantic perceptions for the behavior function to operate on.
Several observation function designs were experimented with using different
methodologies, but this is an area where much continued experimentation could lead to
more capability against more advanced ADS agents.
Relatively simple behavior function topologies were used in this research because
the intention was to treat the ANN implementation as a black box, which most effectively
mapped the swarm unit perceptions into intentions. However, experimentation in more
exotic behavior function topologies is likely to lead to new and more complex behaviors.
An example is a topology where multiple ANNs operate in parallel with their intentions
merged and selected by a supervisory system, which itself might be an ANN.
This research used a homogeneous swarm architecture where each group acts as
the individual agent. Each agent has an identical observation, behavior, and action
function, but each agent operates on its own subjective perceptions made by its
observation function. Experiments on the utility of a heterogeneous swarm could take
many forms. For example, the swarm could be divided into different types. This could
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involve mixing cognitive with non-cognitive units or behavior function multiplicity.
Experimentation with incorporating multiple behavior functions into a single swarm
might involve simultaneous training or individual training, action through consensus, etc.
An area where the real-time gameplay and simulation architecture developed in
this research would be particularly applicable is human-machine agent cooperation. The
SwarmCommand RTSG already is capable of allowing one or more humans to control
swarm groups while the selected AI agent controls the others. Research into how best to
train cognitive agents specifically for human-machine teaming could have real-world
applications. Human-machine teaming could take various forms including human
commanders giving orders or directives to machine agents or humans directly controlling
agents interoperating with machine agents.
This methods and techniques developed in this research could have direct
application in related mission areas in adjacent defense domains including naval surface
warfare, army maneuver forces, air-to-air combat, and cyber domains.
It was the early intention to test the ME of the cognitive swarm agents against
third-party AD behavior algorithms. However, a complete dearth of such information in
the published literature ensured that such testing was impossible. In fact, that is what
necessitated the development of the ADS behavior functions documented here. If at some
point in the future, some independent research into that area is published, it could
potentially serve as a very important verification or refutation of the swarming tactics
developed here.
Finally, an obvious extension of this research would be to develop cognitive
agents to control the ADS assets in the other side of the DEAD conflict. These could be
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trained to operate in any air-defense or missile-defense domain, concentrating on
developing tactics to best defend against swarming munitions, strike aircraft, hypersonic
weapons, or ballistic missile attacks.
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Appendix A COMPILATION OF SELECTED AD SYSTEM
PARAMETERS

The specific capabilities and parameters of various real-world AD systems serve
as a foundation for much of the technical body of this research. Information taken from
publicly available sources regarding various AD systems referenced in this work are
compiled here. While several of the systems listed have capability against various classes
of ballistic missiles, all data shown here pertain to performance against aerodynamic
targets only.
Table A.1: Selected Parameters: ADS TOR-M1, 9M330 SAM (SA-15 GAUNTLET)
Parameter

Value

Unit

Reference

Minimum range of WEZ

1

km

[7] [59]

Maximum range of WEZ

12

km

[7] [59]

Minimum altitude of WEZ

0.01

km

[7] [59]

Maximum altitude of WEZ

6

km

[7] [59]

Velocity range of engaged targets

10-700

mps

[7] [59]

Number of simultaneously engaged targets

2

[7] [59]

Number of simultaneously guided missiles

2

[7] [59]

Minimum firing period

5

s

[7]

Reaction time

5-8

s

[7]
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Time of missile launch preparation

10

s

[7]

Time of system deployment

5

min.

[7]

Number of ready rounds

8

Maximum Target Maneuverability

10

g’s

[59]

Average SAM speed (9M330)

635

mps

[59]

[7] [59]

Table A.2: Selected Parameters: ADS Pantsir-S1, 57E6 SAM (SA-22 GREYHOUND)
Parameter

Value

Unit

Reference

Minimum range of WEZ

1.2

km

[60]

Maximum range of WEZ

12-20

km

[60]

Minimum altitude of WEZ

0.005

km

[60]

Maximum altitude of WEZ

10

km

[60]

Velocity range of engaged targets

0-1000

mps

[60]

Number of simultaneously engaged targets

3

[60]

Number of simultaneously guided missiles

3

[60]

Minimum firing period

5

s

[60]

Reaction time

4-6

s

[60]

Time of missile launch preparation

5

s

[60]

Time of system deployment

5

min.

[60]

Number of ready rounds

12

Maximum Missile Maneuverability

32

g’s

[60]

Average SAM speed (57E6)

780

mps

[60]

[60]

Table A.3: Selected Paramters: ADS Buk-M2, 9M317 SAM (SA-17 GRIZZLY)
Parameter

Value
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Unit

Reference

Minimum range of WEZ

3

km

[61]

Maximum range of WEZ

45

km

[61]

Minimum altitude of WEZ

km

[61]

Maximum altitude of WEZ

km

[61]

Velocity range of engaged targets

mps

[61]

Number of simultaneously engaged targets

6

[61]

Number of simultaneously guided missiles

6

[61]

Minimum firing period

5

s

[61]

Reaction time

8-10

s

[61]

Time of missile launch preparation

15

s

[61]

Time of system deployment

5

min.

[61]

Number of ready rounds

4-12

Maximum Missile Maneuverability

30

g’s

[61]

Average SAM speed (9M317)

800

mps

[61]

[61]

Table A.4: ADS S-300 PMU-2, 48N6 SAM (SA-20 GARGOYLE)
Parameter

Value

Unit

Reference

Minimum range of WEZ (48N6E)

3

km

[62]

Maximum range of WEZ (48N6E)

150

km

[62]

Minimum altitude of WEZ (48N6E)

0.01

km

[62]

Maximum altitude of WEZ (48N6E)

unlimited

km

[62]

Minimum range of WEZ (48N6E2)

3

km

[62]

Maximum range of WEZ (48N6E2)

unlimited

km

[62]

Minimum altitude of WEZ (48N6E2)

0.01

km

[62]

Maximum altitude of WEZ (48N6E2)

25

km

[62]

Velocity range of engaged targets

0-2800

mps

[62]
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Number of simultaneously engaged targets

6

[62]

Number of simultaneously guided missiles

12

[62]

Minimum firing period

3

s

[62]

Reaction time

9-11

s

[62]

Time of missile launch preparation

15

s

[62]

Time of system deployment

5

min.

[62]

Number of ready rounds

4-48

Maximum Missile Maneuverability

30

g’s

[62]

Average SAM speed (48N6)

10001250

mps

[62]

[62]

Table A.5: ADS S-400, 9M96/48N6/40N6 SAM (SA-21 GROWLER)
Parameter

Value

Unit

Reference

Minimum range of WEZ (9M96E)

1

km

[63]

Maximum range of WEZ (9M96E)

40

km

[63]

Minimum altitude of WEZ (9M96E)

0.005

km

[64]

Maximum altitude of WEZ (9M96E)

20

km

[64]

Minimum range of WEZ (9M96E2)

1

km

[63]

Maximum range of WEZ (9M96E2)

120

km

[63]

Minimum altitude of WEZ (9M96E2)

0.005

km

[64]

Maximum altitude of WEZ (9M96E2)

30

km

[64]

Minimum range of WEZ (40N6)

3

km

[63]

Maximum range of WEZ (40N6)

380

km

[63]

Minimum altitude of WEZ (40N6)

0.01

km

[63]

Maximum altitude of WEZ (40N6)

30

km

[63]

Velocity range of engaged targets

0-4800

mps

[63]

277

Number of simultaneously engaged targets

10

[63]

Number of simultaneously guided missiles

20

[63]

Minimum firing period

s

Reaction time

s

Time of missile launch preparation

s

Time of system deployment

5

min.

[63]

Number of ready rounds

4-48

Maximum Missile Maneuverability (9M96E)

20-60

g’s

[64]

Maximum Missile Maneuverability (9M96E2)

20-60

g’s

[64]

[63]

g’s

Maximum Missile Maneuverability (40N6)
Average SAM speed (9M96E)

750

mps

[64]

Average SAM speed (9M96E2)

1000

mps

[64]

Average SAM speed (40N6)

1190

mps

[63]
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Appendix B ANALYSIS OF AD FACILITIES AT KAB

The AD facilities of KAB is characterized using publicly available satellite
imagery (Google Earth) along with three propaganda videos produced and televised by
the Russian government and subsequently uploaded to YouTube between June 11, 2017
and February 16, 2018 [65] [66] [67].

Imagery and Video Analysis
Several AD facilities and systems are highlighted by the videos, the locations of
which were identified in the satellite imagery by means of identifying common
landmarks. The AD facilities and systems as of November 7, 2018 are shown in Figure
B.1.
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Figure B.1: Satellite Image: Overview of Identified AD Facilities at KAB, as of Summer 2017 to Winter
2018

Screenshots from the propaganda videos follow, with highlights added identifying
specific AD assets and their locations, as annotated in Figure 5.1.

Figure B.2: KAB SRS Site 1 and LR Surv. Site 1
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Figure B.3: KAB SRS Site 2

Figure B.4: KAB SRS Site 3
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Figure B.5: KAB SRS Site 4

Figure B.6: KAB LRS Site
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Figure B.7: KAB Surveillance Radar Assets and Sites

Figure B.8: Additional Photography of KAB LR Surv. Site 1 (Courtesy Paul Gypteau/AFP/Getty Images)

As of November 7, 2018, the IADS at KAB appeared to consist of one LRS site
and five sites hosting ten SRS: six Pantsir-S2 SRS and four TOR-M1 SRS.
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Comparing these sites with earlier imagery dated November 18, 2015 (Figure
B.9), before the deployment of the S-400 LRS and large-scale build-up of the base, the
IADS at KAB appeared to consist of SRS Sites 1 through 4, and the LR Surveillance sites
1 and 2. The SRS Sites appeared to each host a single SRS, for a total of three Pantsir-S2
and 1 TOR-M1. The surveillance air picture was provided by a pair of 1RL123 radars at
LR Surv. Site 1 and a pair each of SPOON REST and THIN SKIN radars at LR Surv.
Site 2.

Figure B.9: Satellite Image: Overview of Identified AD Facilities at KAB, as of Winter 2015
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Appendix C ESTIMATING COSTS OF SELECTED MILITARY
AIRCRAFT

The bulk of the high-value assets under AD protection at KAB are various fixedand rotary-wing aircraft used for ground attack and air patrol operations and the
associated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, C2, refueling, and transport
support aircraft. Analysis of publicly available satellite imagery of KAB allows
identification and quantification of the total air power stationed at the base.

Prior to Large-Scale Buildup
Figure C.1 shows a satellite image of the northern portion of KAB, dated 18
NOV 2015, just after establishment of the base, prior to deployment of major AD and
major infrastructure improvement projects.
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Figure C.1: Satellite Imagery, KAB Northern Portion, dated 18 NOV 2015

The image is overlaid with markers identifying the type and quantity of various
aircraft parked on the various aprons. The imagery from this date is used because it
clearly shows the aircraft parked on the aprons unobscured by clouds and it was taken
prior to deployment of the S-400 LRS. The types and quantities of aircraft identified are
listed in Table C.1.
Table C.1: Identified Aircraft at KAB on 18 NOV 2015
Su24

Su25

Su30

Su35

Mi24

Mi28

Total

11

11

4

4

3

3

36

After Large Scale Buildup
Figure C.2 and Figure C.3 show satellite images of the northeast and northwest
portions of KAB, dated 7 NOV 2018. Both images are overlaid with markers identifying
the type and quantity of various aircraft parked on the various aprons. The imagery from
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this date is used because it clearly shows the aircraft parked on the aprons unobscured by
clouds, it was taken prior to construction of aircraft shelters, and the number of aircraft
simultaneously visible is the highest compared to other dates, giving an idea of the upper
bound. The types and quantities of aircraft identified are listed in
Table C.2. The presence of various types is corroborated by open source reporting
[68].
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Figure C.2: Satellite Imagery, KAB Northeast Portion, dated 7 NOV 2018

Figure C.3: Satellite Imagery, KAB Northwest Portion, dated 7 NOV 2018

288

Table C.2: Identified Aircraft at KAB on 7 NOV 2018
Su24

Su25

Su30

Su34

Su35

Mi24

Mi28

A-50

An12

An30

An72

IL78

Total

8

2

6

5

8

5

5

2

3

2

2

2

50

Data for foreign sales contracts executed by Russia for some of the aircraft
models identified at KAB are available in open reporting and are listed in Table C.3. The
table shows the aircraft model, the purchasing country, the contract amount (denominated
in US dollars), the quantity of aircraft sold, and the contract date. The table also shows
the calculated per unit cost at the date of the contract execution and the per unit cost
denominated in 2017 US dollars, calculated using the US GDP deflator [69].
Table C.3: Russian Foreign Military Sales Contract Data for Selected Aircraft

Contract
Quantity

Contract
Date

Unit
Cost
($M)

Equiv.
2017
Unit
Cost
($M)

Aircraft

Purchaser

Contract
Amount
($M)

Su-24

Algeria

120

22

2000

5.45

7.49

Su-30

Algeria

1800

28

2006

64.29

76.55

Su-30MKA

[70]

Su-30

Algeria

1000

16

2010

62.50

69.74

Su-30MKA

[70]

Su-30

China

2000

38

1999

52.63

73.90

Su-30MKK

[70]

Su-30

China

2000

38

2001

52.63

70.74

Su-30MKK

[70]

Su-30

China

1000

24

2003

41.67

54.13

Su-30MKK2

[70]

Su-35

China

2000

24

2015

83.33

85.34

[70]

Su-35

Egypt

2000

24

2019

83.33

79.54

[70]

Su-35

Indonesia

1000

11

2018

90.91

88.29

[70]
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Model

Reference
[70]

Mi-24

S. Sudan

42.8

6

2014

7.13

7.38

[70]

For the identified aircraft for which no cost information is available, a proxy value
is produced using information available for functionally equivalent US or NATO aircraft
models. The equivalent aircraft unit cost in 2017 dollars is included in the table,
calculated using the GDP deflator.
Table C.4: US/NATO Equivalent Aircraft Cost Figures

Aircraft

US/NATO
Equivalent

Cost
($M)

Cost
Date

Equiv.
2017
Unit
Cost
($M)

Su-25

A-10c

9.8

1998

13.9

[71]

Su-34

F-15E

31.1

1998

44.3

[71]

Mi-28

AH-64E

34.6

2021

32.4

[72]

A-50

E-3

270.0

1998

384.7

[71]

An-12

AC-130U

210.0

1998

299.1

[71]

An-30

EP-3

36.0

1998

51.3

[71]

An-72

C-130E

11.9

2017

11.9

[71]

Il-78

KC-135

39.6

1998

56.4

[71]

Reference

Total Value at Risk
Using the estimated cost figures, the total equivalent replacement cost of the 36
aircraft visible at KAB on November 18, 2015 is approximately $822.8M (2017 dollars).
Using the estimated cost figures, the total equivalent replacement cost of the 50
aircraft visible at KAB on November 7, 2018 is approximately $3.52B (2017 dollars).
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Appendix D ESTIMATING COSTS OF SELECTED AD ASSETS

Cost data for AD assets can be difficult to ascertain or estimate largely due to the
fact that the military procurement process is governed by forces other than those at work
in markets for other goods and services and there is often a single seller (weapon
developer) and single buyer (government). This is often compounded by the fact that
procurement costs and quantities can often be held by the governing body as confidential
information not for public consumption.
For foreign weapon sales, however, something more like a market exists where
various developers offering similar products must compete for customers in areas such as
effectiveness, interoperability, and cost. Increasingly more countries are developing their
own indigenous weapons industries to attract investment through the export process [73].
These market pressures have had a side effect of making information on weapon sales
contracts more publicly available than in years past.

US AD Exports Data
Data for foreign sales contracts executed by the US of the Patriot 3+ AD system
are available in open reporting and are listed in Table D.1. The table shows the
purchasing country, the contract amount (denominated in US dollars), the contract date,
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the quantity of batteries sold, and the quantity and type of missiles sold. The table also
shows the calculated contract amount denominated in 2017 US dollars, calculated using
the US GDP deflator [69].
Table D.1: US Foreign Military Sales Contract Data for Patriot 3+ AD System

Purchaser

Contract
Amount
($M)

Contract
Date

Equiv.
2017
Contract
Amount
($M)

Kuwait

900.00

2010

1004.22

0

209

0

[74]

UAE

3300.00

2011

3606.73

0

216

288

[75]

Qatar

9900.00

2012

10616.76

11

246

768

[76]

Saudi Arabia

1750.00

2014

1810.79

0

0

202

[77]

Romania

3900.00

2017

3900.00

7

56

168

[78]

Sweden

3200.00

2018

3107.84

4

100

200

[79]

Number
Batteries

Number
Missiles
(GEM-T)

Number
Missiles
(PAC-3)

Reference

In all available sales records, the total number of batteries and the quantity of both
SAM rounds were available. Using this data, the unit cost of a single Patriot PAC-3
battery (c𝐵 ), a single GEM-T missile round (c𝐺 ), and a single PAC-3 missile round (c𝑃 )
were computed, by solving the resulting over-determined set of linear equations
(minimizing least-squared error on total cost (𝑇) by calculating the pseudo-inverse of the
quantity matrix, 𝑄 † ). The estimated unit costs are summarized in Table D.2.
𝑇𝑖 = 𝑐𝐵 𝑄𝐵 𝑖 + 𝑐𝐺 𝑄𝐺 𝑖 + 𝑐𝑃 𝑄𝑃 𝑖
𝑇 = Qc
cB
[cG ] =Q† T
cP
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Table D.2: Estimated Patriot 3+ Component Unit Costs

Component

Unit Cost
($M, 2017 est.)

Patriot 3+ Battery

281.56

GEM-T Missile

4.90

PAC-3 Missile

8.35

Each Patriot 3+ battery consists of three components: up to six launchers, each
with four ready-rounds for the PAC-1/2 SAM and 16 ready rounds for the PAC-3 SAM;
the AN/MPQ-53 phased-array TER, and the AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control Station
(ECS) in which the operators prosecute engagements and launch authority. [44]

Russian AD Export Data
Data for foreign sales contracts executed by Russia for various AD systems are
sparse, but those that are available in open reporting and discovered during literature
search are listed in Table D.3. The table shows the AD system model, the purchasing
country, the contract amount (denominated in US dollars), the quantity of batteries sold,
and the contract date. The table also shows the contract cost denominated in 2017 US
dollars, calculated using the US GDP deflator [69]. Rarely, the available information
includes the number of SAM rounds included in the sale. When available, this
information is also included in the table.
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Table D.3: Russian Foreign Military Sales Contract Data for Selected AD Systems

Contract
Date

Equiv.
2017
Contract
Amount
($M)

System

Purchaser

Contract
Amount
($M)

TOR-M1

Greece

300.00

2000

412.04

10

TOR-M1

Iran

700.00

2006

833.43

29

750

[70]

S-300 PS

China

220.00

1991

358.44

4

320

[81]

Pantsir-S1

UAE

734.00

2000

1008.00

50

[82]

Pantsir-S1

Algeria

500.00

2006

595.31

38

[82]

S-300 PMU 1

China

400.00

2001

537.61

4

S-300 PMU 1

Vietnam

300.00

2005

368.00

2

S-300 PMU 2

China

980.00

2003

1272.96

4

S-300 PMU 2

China

2250.00

2009

2539.89

15

[83]

S-300 PMU 2

Azerbaijan

300.00

2011

327.88

2

[70]

S-300 PMU 2

Iran

800.00

2016

810.90

4

S-400

India

5430.00

2016

5503.90

5

[70]

S-400

Turkey

2500.00

2017

2500.00

2

[85]

Number
Batteries

Number
Missiles

Reference
[70] [80]

198

[81]
[70]

256

150

[81]

[70] [84]

For each system in Table D.3, the system of linear equations describing the
contract cost in terms of battery and SAM quantities and unit costs is:
𝑇𝑖 = 𝑐𝐵 𝑄𝐵 𝑖 + 𝑐𝑀 𝑄𝑀 𝑖

As often as not, the number of SAM rounds is not included in the publicly
available contract information, leaving the cost equation system underdetermined in all
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cases, so a simple MSE solution via computation of the quantity matrix (pseudo)inverse
is not available, as in the prior section.
For this data, the unit costs are estimated using an optimizer to solve the MSE
solution of the total contract cost vector for each system. Additional constraints which
improve the solution convergence are that when unspecified, the SAM round quantities
are constrained to be integer multiples of the per-launcher ready-round configuration for
the particular system in question. These values are listed in Table D.4, along with the unit
cost estimates for each system solved by the optimization routine. The unit cost data are
plotted in Figure D.1 and Figure D.2 versus maximum intercept range, along with a 2nd
order polynomial fit for each (red dashed line).
Table D.4: Estimated Component Unit Costs for Selected Russian AD Systems

System

Maximum
Intercept
Range (km)

Quantity
Ready
Rounds
per
Launcher

Battery

SAM Round

TOR-M1

12

8

23.66

0.196

Pantsir-S1

20

12

10.63

0.357

S-300 PS

90

4

35.56

0.844

S-300 PMU 1

150

4

80.50

1.100

S-300 PMU 2

200

4

153.12

2.530

S-400

400

4

767.00

6.560
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Unit Cost
($M, 2017 est.)

Figure D.1: Russian AD Battery Unit Cost vs. Maximum Intercept Range

Figure D.2: Russian AD SAM Unit Cost vs. Maximum Intercept Range

The TOR-M1, Pantsir-S1, and S-300 PMU 1 system contracts are likely to
represent sales of only a single SAM model each, namely the 9M330 for the TOR-M1,
the 57E6 for the Pantsir-S1, and the 48N6 for the S-300. Multiple missile models are
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compatible with each of the S-300 PS, the S-300 PMU 2, and the S-400 systems, and the
sales contracts likely represent some blend of the compatible SAMs for each. For this
reason, the estimated SAM round cost represents a weighted average cost for the SAM
models and their sales quantities.
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Appendix E ALGORITHM LISTINGS

The pseudocode for the algorithm to compute the maximum number of
consecutive engagements of a target along traveling between two points in two
dimensions, bounded by maximum intercept range, is given below.
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Figure E.1: Algorithm 1 Pseudocode
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The pseudocode for the algorithm to predict the intercept point of a target with
relative position and velocity, given an interceptor speed is listed below. This generalized
iterative vector form typically executes faster than the closed-form solution – which has
several special heading cases that must be accounted for – especially when great accuracy
is unnecessary (e.g., for calculating initial launch angles).

Figure E.2: Algorithm 2 Pseudocode

The pseudocode for the modified DBSCAN clustering algorithm is listed below.
The measure for clustering is the Euclidian distance.
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Figure E.3: Algorithm 3 Pseudocode
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